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I
Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the impact of the various institutional changes which have 
occurred in the Chinese labour market in recent years, against the background of 
the rapid transition to a market economy.   
One aspect of interest is the accessibility of the job market to graduates.  This 
aspect is investigated using survey data on job search. Institutional factors, 
particularly hukou policy, are found to exert a strong influence on graduates’ job 
search behaviour and outcomes.  Specifically, graduates from rural areas, 
classified as non-urban hukou, choose to invest in higher levels of job-search 
effort and appear to have higher probabilities of being employed.  This evidence is 
reassuring in the sense that effort invested in job search appears to be beneficial in 
the graduate labour market in China.   
The second aspect of interest is compensation arrangements within private 
organizational settings.  This aspect is investigated using personnel records (from 
1994 through 2007) from one typical domestic privately-owned firm.  Analysis of 
this data reveals the following: a tertiary education background increases a 
worker’s earnings by more than 30% compared with one having only primary 
education; Guanxi (personal connections) typically increases earnings by around 
16%; tenure is a decisive determinant of whether an individual receives a deferred 
compensation package; finally, local hukou status exerts absolute advantage in 
terms of both salary and the propensity to receive a deferred compensation 
package.   
The third and final aspect is determination of job tenure in the private sector.  
Using data from the same firm as investigated in the previous chapter of the thesis.  
Single-spell and multiple-spell duration analyses are applied to model the 
employment durations of these workers.  We find that migrant workers exhibit a 
higher rate of turnover.  This is despite the implementation of significant hukou 
reform in our study region which allows migrant workers to apply for local hukou 
status.  We argue that this is partly due to employers continuing to discriminate 
against migrant workers in terms of compensation.   
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction 
 
A striking income disparity has been reported across a range of transition economies 
including Central Europe, Southern Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and Asian 
countries (Cornia and Popov, 2001).  The remarkable rise in income inequality in Asia has 
been particularly notable, with the Gini coefficient in China being reported to rise from a 
low level of 0.33 in 1980 to 0.46 in 2000 (Chang, 2002), and then reaching 0.496 in 20061.  
Since, in contemporary society, the earnings of most adults are derived from working in 
organizations, a job provides an individual with the best opportunity they will ever have of 
altering their socioeconomic position.  This research focuses on graduate job acquisition 
and on compensation within a private organizational setting.  Results from this research 
have particular economic policy implications which might help to tackle income disparity 
during this time of institutional restructuring in China. 
Education is one important way for people to escape from poverty or alter their 
socioeconomic circumstances.  However, in China only 6.5% of the population had 
received tertiary education by the end of 20072, and there are millions of graduates who 
have experienced unemployment3.  This large number of unemployed graduates has been 
highlighted since 2003, when the first-wave of graduates, (generated by the policy of higher 
education expansion), started their job search4.  Most recently, in December 2008, Wen Jia-
Bao, the incumbent Chinese prime minister, announced at Beijing University that high 
priority in 2009 would be given to tackling unemployment among university graduates5.  
                                                      
1
  Wang, Ren-Gui, Chapter 10, Taking a Rational View of the Gini Coefficient, Liaowang (China’s 
major political and economic News Weekly current affairs, hosted by Xinhua News Agency), 2009, 
Vol. 20, p22. 
2
  China Statistical Yearbook 2008, National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistics Press, 
2009, Beijing. 
3  
 The Ministry of Human Resource and Social Security announced that employment rate is 68% 
out of 6.17 million graduates in 2009; the employment rate is similar to that of the previous year. 
 
4
  The higher education expansion policy started in 1999, see Section 1.1.  
5
  Jamil Anderlini, “Beijing focuses on employment for graduates to head off unrest”, Financial 
Times, 22 Dec 2008.  
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The problem of graduate unemployment is striking not only because disgruntled students 
have played the historic role of inciting rebellion, but also it represents the (ex-post) 
wasteful investment of scarce resources.  Large sums of money have consequently been 
diverted to re-educating unemployed or underemployed graduates; these resources could 
otherwise have been invested in job-creation programs, which might be particularly 
valuable in a developing country (Bruwer, 1998).  In addition, the poor employment 
prospects for graduates might discourage disadvantaged groups from investing in higher 
education, which would limit or restrict their social mobility and thus their potential to raise 
their social status. 
The early part of this thesis is motivated to provide empirical evidence that can be used by 
policy-makers to combat graduate unemployment in the modern Chinese labour market.  A 
survey of 1,500 graduands at three national universities was conducted in Wuhan city, 
Hubei province in 2005.  The majority of graduates in the sample ended up working for 
private enterprise (Wang and Moffatt, 2008); this reflects the fact that it is private enterprise 
that have created the most jobs in contemporary China (Gu, 2008).  However, a large 
volume of empirical work using aggregate data shows a lower private return to schooling in 
China when compared with other countries, a result summed up by Heckman (2005) that 
Chinese labour markets do not pay skill what it is worth.  We proceed to conduct our own 
investigation of the return to human capital within a private organisational setting6.  
Before discussing the research in detail, it is essential to provide some context on the 
following aspects of the developing labour market in China: the recent restructuring of the 
graduate employment system; the reform of hukou policy; the development of the private 
sector; and the practice of Guanxi (personal connections). 
1.1 The modern graduate employment system  
It normally takes four years for a student to obtain a degree in China7.  After graduation, 
under the centrally planned regime in force before 1978, those who were offered free 
                                                      
6
  With the permission to access to 12 years personnel records of a typical domestic privately-owned 
textile company, determinates of compensation and job tenure have been examined at firm level. 
 
7
  Some degree courses might take longer (such as, it generally takes five years to become a doctor). 
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education by the State were assigned an employment position by the State Planning 
Commission.  Higher education institutions were responsible for implementing job 
assignments to employers.  The Reform and Open policy, introduced in 1978, initiated the 
economic transition towards a market economy.  Some students had been allowed to search 
for jobs since 19898 contingent on their paying “token” tuition fees9.  The proportion of 
graduate job seekers has gradually increased since then, although the tuition fees have 
increased.  In 1997, more than 90% of graduates engaged in job search.  However, the 
number of enrolments in higher education institutions remained subject to careful planning 
by the State. 
On 16 June 1999, the former State Planning and Development Committee and the China 
Education Ministry announced that higher education institutions would increase their 
annual enrolment by 337,000 students, following an increase of 230,000 at the beginning of 
that year.  These two expansions directly resulted in 1.59 million new students being 
enrolled that September, a 48% increase on the numbers of the previous year10 .  The 
enrolment figures have continued to rise since then.  The following justifications were 
offered for the expansion of higher education.  Firstly, there has been a high demand for 
skilled workers due to the economic boom, and a consequent shortage of higher education.  
Secondly, up until 1998, students only accounted for 9.8% of people aged between 18 and 
25 and parents demanded higher education for their children.  Finally, keeping more young 
people at universities would alleviate employment pressure that, despite the booming 
economy, had already generated millions of redundant workers from State-owned 
enterprises during the large scale reform in 1990s11. 
In 1997, the Chinese Education Ministry drew up a scheme to construct the modern 
                                                      
8
  This was experimented in Guangdong province in 1988; a national implementation took place at 
the State universities in 1989. 
9
  The payment made by students was very low since higher education had been largely subsidized 
by the State before 1999.  
 
10
  “Education Ministry admitted that the higher education expansion in 1999 was too rash”, 9 
October 2008, China News. 2008. [Online; cited: June 2009,] Available from: 
http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=135752. 
11
  “Higher education expansion in 1999 is historic”, 2008, [Online; cited: July 2009,] Available 
from http://www.china.com.cn/economic/zhuanti/ggkf30/2008-12/16/content_16956359.htm. 
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graduate employment system.  Under the new system, higher education institutions would 
have no responsibility for job assignment; graduates would compete for positions and 
employers would recruit graduates on the basis of individual performance.  It was expected 
that the State employment agency, local government employment agency and higher 
education institutions would gradually establish a supportive system to facilitate graduate 
job search.  Since 2000, in order to accommodate higher education expansion, a series of 
policy documents have been written to implement this plan. 
In 2006, the higher education gross enrolment rate (i.e. the proportion of 18-25 year olds 
who are in higher education) was reported to be 21%, prompting claims of “mass higher 
education” by the incumbent Minister of Education12.  However, the existence of millions 
of graduate job seekers has generated the unwelcome association of graduation with 
unemployment.  On 9 October 2008, the Chinese Education Ministry admitted that the 
higher education expansion in 1999 had been a rash action.  One measure intended to tackle 
graduate unemployment is to limit the enrolment rate within higher education institutions: 
the increase of new students will be capped at 4% in 2009 and at 3% in 201013. 
One factor which exacerbates the situation is that some graduates are not free to seek jobs.  
Their hukou categories can still impede their access to certain labour markets, such as large 
and prosperous cities, for example Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen.  It has 
been reported that a Beijing hukou was worth ¥300,000 (£30,000) on the black market in 
200814.  This reflects the high demand for a position in such cities.  We now discuss the 
impact of hukou policy on the labour market by reviewing the reform of hukou policy over 
the last three decades. 
1.2 Reform of population registration policy (hukou)  
Hukou (户口) is the population registration system that has been in force since 1958 in 
                                                      
12
  “Higher Education Reaches the Mass Education Stage”, Xinhua News, 19 March 2006. 
13
  “Education Ministry Admitted that the Higher Education Expansion in 1999 was Too Rash”, 9 
October 2008, China News. [Online; cited: June 2009,] Available from: 
http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=135752.  
14
  Beijing Hukou is Priced at ¥300,000, 2008, [Online; cited: June 2009,] Available from 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-05-08/093915499730.shtml 
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mainland China.  There are two classifications of hukou registration.  The first classification 
is hukou leibei (hukou-type), classifying individuals as either chengzhen (urban) or nongye 
(agricultural).  The type of hukou then divides the Chinese population into those “who eat 
the State’s grain as an urban dweller” and those “who supplied grain to both the State and 
their own communities” as a rural resident (Whyte and Parish, 1984).  The second 
classification is the hukou suozaidi (hukou registration place).  This is simply the location 
of a person’s regular residence.  Each citizen is required to register at one and only one 
place of regular residence, which is normally determined at birth.  The registration 
residence defines the boundary of where an individual may be economically active. 
The relevance of hukou to this thesis is the associated rights of access to welfare and other 
work-related opportunities.  Hukou status determines not only provision of food, healthcare, 
housing, and education, but also access to employment, pension and other public resources.  
“Urban dwellers” are town centre residents who are employed by State-owned or 
collectively-owned enterprises.  Until 1996, this group of the population had been looked 
after “from the cradle to the grave” via their work units (danwei).  The welfare of those 
having urban hukou but who are residents in the outskirts depends on their employment 
situation: if employed by the State, they would receive the same welfare as “urban 
dwellers”; if not, they would only have partial urban welfare, i.e. they might only enjoy 
some of the benefits listed above.  The welfare provision for rural residents is nothing more 
than a piece of allotted land from the local government.  According to the China Statistical 
Bureau, urban residents, who averaged 33% of the country's population between 1952 and 
2004, received 77% of China's total social welfare expenditure; rural residents (on average 
67% of the population) received the remaining 23% of this15.  Before 1978, only urban 
residents16 were eligible for access to desirable urban labour markets, while rural residents 
were bound to the rural labour market.  Figure 1.1 attempts to show the structure of labour 
market segmentation in China. 
                                                      
15
  Data based on China Statistical Yearbook 2006, National Statistics Bureau of China, China 
Statistics Press, 2007, Beijing. 
16
  These are people who lived in town centre and worked for the State-owned or collectively-owned 
enterprises. 
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Figure 1.1: Hukou and Labour Market Segmentation in China 
Source: Lai (1996) 
Welfare entitlement arising from hukou status is not portable, even on an intra-urban or 
intra-rural basis.  For example, if a peasant tried to settle in a village beyond his registered 
hukou residence, there would be no allocation of land for him, and he would also be likely 
to face deportation at any time.  Because of the welfare and employment opportunities 
associated with hukou status, the hukou system effectively blocked the flow of labour in the 
pre-reform era.  Of course, this was consistent with one of the objectives of the State: to use 
rural areas as a stable and cheap source of food products and raw materials within its 
strategy of rapid industrialization.  This strategy had been formed at the time of the 
establishment of the People’s republic of China in 1949, partly as a result of concern about 
subversion from the West: the State gave priority to develop its heavy-industry in order to 
be able to defend itself (Chan and Zhang, 1999).  
The conversion of hukou registration is remarkably difficult for an individual; to do so 
involve undergoing a complicated process of seeking approval from the government and 
the outcome is contingent on simultaneous "policy" (zhengce) and "quota" (zhibiao) 
controls.  The policy control stipulates the qualifications of conversion, whereas the quota 
    Labour Market 
Rural labour market 
Urban labour market 
Within State welfare system 
(Urban hukou and desirable jobs) 
Out of the State welfare System  
Rural labour market Labour market in urban areas (no urban hukou quota) 
Private company,   
joint venture and foreign companies 
Temporary, low paid labour demand 
from State-owned companies. 
Before 
1978  
After 
1978 
Introduction                                                                                                                                  Chapter 1 
  
 
 
7
limits the number of qualified people (see Chan and Zhang, 1999).  The most regular 
channels by which to convert hukou status are by studying at a State higher education 
institution (zhaosheng) or being recruited by a State-owned enterprise (zhaogong) or by the 
army17.  In fact, recruitment to a State-owned enterprise or to the army is a channel that is 
commonly available only to those rural residents with political or economic power; this is 
for reasons such as bribery or nepotism.  This leaves the vast majority of rural residents 
with investment in higher education as the only possible way to change their hukou status.  
Studying at a State higher education institution is still the dominant route for hukou 
conversion to large cities; although reforms have taken place in some areas since late 1990s 
(details are discussed later).  People can lose non-agricultural hukou if they commit a 
serious crime (Chan and Zhang, 1999). 
Since 1978, there has been increasing economic migration within the country (mainly rural 
residents being released from agriculture and gravitating to urban locations) driven partly 
by the rapid development of the private sector permitted since the late 1980s.  This 
migration imposed a lot of pressure on the pre-existing hukou system, leading to a number 
of important changes.  In the mid-1980s, a system was set up for the administration of 
temporary residents - the “floating population”.  People of age 16 and over who intend to 
stay in an urban area for more than three months are required to apply for the Certificate of 
Temporary Residence (CTR, zanzhuzheng).  A CTR is granted provided that one of three 
conditions is satisfied: employment; visiting; or medical treatment.  It is usually valid for 
one year and can be renewed.  Almost all provincial and urban governments have drawn up 
their own stipulations to oversee the temporary population residing within their 
jurisdictions; however, most of these areas are small cities or towns (Chan and Zhang, 
1999).  A CTR cannot normally be used to obtain employment in a large city.  
In 1994, the Ministry of Public Security started to establish a certificate-based population 
management system (see Figure 1.2), in which a person is categorised as agricultural or 
non-agricultural hukou based on their residence and occupation, and the individual’s 
                                                      
17
  There are special channels through which to obtain a hukou quota, such as by making a 
significant contribution to the country, for example, scientists creating successful genetic 
modifications to food products; or unofficial channels, such as bribery. 
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residence was also classified as one of three forms: regular, temporary or host.  The second 
and third of these residence types make up the legal floating population 18 .  
 
Figure 1.2: Hukou and Welfare Entitlement since 1994 
 
However, since temporary hukou status (floating population) is not managed by the central 
government, they are excluded from the urban welfare system, and so are forbidden from 
accessing public resources.  In addition, these temporary hukou holders have to pay 
numerous fees, such as administration fees, city construction fees, and city extending fees, 
for permission to remain in urban areas. 
In 2009, hukou status still segments the labour market in most areas of China.  As we saw 
in Figure 1.1 (above), after 1978, more and more migrants were able to move from rural to 
urban areas, but their hukou status constrains them to inferior or temporary positions.  Only 
those with urban hukou have access to the more desirable and superior positions.  The 
differential of occupational attainment and wage caused by hukou status have been strongly 
supported by empirical research (Meng and Zhang, 2001; Knight and Yueh, 2004; Knight 
and Li, 2005; Lu and Song, 2006). 
With the deepening reforms, the centrally planned “cradle to grave” welfare provision 
                                                      
18
  Illegal floating population are those who have no temporary hukou certificates; occasionally, 
some illegal migrants will be sent back to their origins in order to protect urban jobs. 
Hukou 
Leibie (type) Suozaidi (location of residence) 
Liudong (floating) 
no welfare 
Nongye 
 (agricultural) 
FeiNongYe 
(non-agricultural) 
Changzhu (regular) 
with welfare 
Zhanzhu 
(temporary) 
Jizhu 
(host) 
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system has been gradually replaced by the State social insurance system since 1996 (see 
Section 4.3).  However, non-agricultural regular residents are still privileged in terms of 
receiving subsidized education, healthcare, pension, employment opportunities and support 
(Liu et al., 2008).  Cao et al. (2009) present a comprehensive comparison of the social 
welfare disparity between urban and rural residents in contemporary China.  
In 2005, the transient population was more than 150 million which accounts for more than 
10% of the Chinese population and was predicted to increase at 6-8 million per year from 
that time on19.  Moreover, the awareness of equality in China has led to reforms of hukou 
policy in 13 provinces and cities by 2008, they are Yunnan, Hebei, Hubei, Hunan, 
Liaogning, Shandong, Guangxi, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian provinces, and Chongqing, 
Chengdu, Xi’an municipal cities, most are less developed regions.  However, the real 
change is that there is no distinction of hukou leibei (type), but one’s previous hukou 
suozaidi (registered residential place) is still used to distinguish differing welfare 
entitlement and right to access to public services, such as public job agencies20. 
There are still regional advantages associated with hukou status.  Take the access to high 
education in 2009 for example, to study the same subject at the same university, students 
have differing minimum entrance standard.  For an Arts major, 532 points for students from 
Beijing city and 596 for students from Shandong province21.  This is a further reason that 
working in Beijing is more desirable.  The regional benefits associated with hukou have 
been escalated by an uneven economic development over the last three decades.  Regional 
income disparity has been surging.  Residents in the eastern and coastal areas have 
benefited from being the pioneering centres of economic reform where village, township 
and private enterprise were firstly allowed to set up. 
Take for instance the area, Hutang town where the company studied in Chapters 4 and 5 is 
                                                      
19
  Data are estimated on the National 1% Population Survey Sample, China Statistical Yearbook 
2005, National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistics Press, 2006, Beijing. 
20
  “Ministry of Public Security: 13 Provinces and Cities Abolished Rural-urban Hukou Barriers”, 
2008, Xinhua News, 9 Dec 2008. 
21
  Higher education entrance requirement of each province in 2009,  China Education Online, 
[Online; cited July 2009,] Available from 
http://www.eol.cn/include/cer.net/gaokao/zhuanti/2006fsx.shtml 
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located, it is situated in the outskirts of Wujin County, Changzhou city in the Jiangsu 
province where the private economy was pioneered in late 1980s22.  Changzhou is now the 
hub of the national famous “Su (Suzhou) Xi (Wuxi) Chang (Changzhou)” economic golden 
triangle, one of the popular migrant destinations. 
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Figure 1.3: Living Standards Comparison between Changzhou and the National 
Average  
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2004-2007) and Changzhou Statistical Yearbook (2004-
2007) 
In 2006, seven counties from this area were among the top 10 national economic 
development counties, one of these seven counties is Wujin23.  Comparing the per capita 
disposable income per household in Changzhou area with the national average from 2003 
to 2006 (Figure 1.3), we see that residents in Changzhou have enjoyed a much higher living 
standard than those elsewhere.  As can be seen, on average, urban residents are much well-
off than rural residents nationally, urban residents in Changzhou area are much affluent 
than those elsewhere, even a rural household in the Changzhou area had an annual net 
income ¥8,001 in 2006, which was more than twice the national average (¥3,587).  This 
                                                      
22
  The educational privilege is equally enjoyed by people from the same urban area. 
23 
  “Introduction of  Sunan Area”,  Baidu web, 2007,  [Online; cited 27 March 2007,] Available 
from: http:// baike.baidu.com/view/20047.htm 
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gap would be 4-5 times greater if we compared Changzhou to an impoverished area of 
China24. 
Public welfare is strongly related to the local economic situation in China, and the residents 
in Changzhou enjoy better welfare provision.  However, these benefits are exclusively 
bestowed to those with a regular hukou, in this case, a regular Hutang (urban or rural) 
hukou, though urban residents are still more advantaged than rural residents.  In particular, 
the children of non-regular hukou are handicapped by lack of access to compulsory 
education.  The tuition fees paid by those who manage to get a place at local schools are 
double, even triple, those paid by their local peers (Wong, 2004).  There are even reports 
that migrant children have attended temporary schools organized in pig sheds25and these 
temporary schools could be closed at any time.  In terms of tertiary education, children of 
the floating population have to return to their hukou registered places.  Only there are they 
allowed take the national higher education entrance examination, and consequently follow 
the higher educational route outlined in that region.  
In Hutang town in 2008, there were 130,000 regular residents and a floating population of 
170,00026.  There were, at least, five types of hukou among residents in Hutang town before 
hukou reform in 2003:  
• Hukou of Hutang (urban and rural) - with local welfare. 
• Changzhou town-centre hukou - with urban social welfare. 
• Urban or rural hukou of Changzhou jurisdiction apart from Hutang town-with local 
welfare. 
• Urban town-centre hukou of other cities-with urban social welfare. 
• Urban or rural hukou of other cities- with local welfare. 
                                                      
24
  Data are based on Changzhou Statistical Yearbook 2005 and China Statistical Yearbook 2005. 
25
  “May Migrants Children Stay Away from Pig Shed”, Xinhua News, 1 September, 2006. 
26
  “Suggestion for Development of Hutang Community”, Hutang Town Council, 2008, [Online; 
cited: Sept. 2008,]  Available from http://www.hutang.gov.cn/zfgk/zwzt/020080924/1090504.shtml 
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Among these five groups, only Hutang hukou denotes a regular residence and therefore is 
granted entire local welfare.  The remaining types of hukou status including urban and rural 
hukou are in a single group: the floating population, which is excluded from the local 
welfare system27.  
The heavy demand for migrant workers within Jiangsu province (particularly from Su-Xi-
Chang economic golden triangles) has led to hukou experiments in this region since 199728.  
The notable reform occurred on 1 May 2003, it was announced that individuals are to be 
registered as residents of their actual economic activity centre contingent on a legal 
residence (owns or rents a property) and a regular job or stable income.  After this reform, 
the floating population in Hutang town could register themselves as Hutang hukou provided 
that they meet the above requirements.  However, welfare entitlements remain conditional 
upon one’s previous hukou category; that is to say, there has been no change at all. 
1.3 The development of the private sector 
Knight and Song (1995) argue that in the early 1990s that a labour market had still not yet 
developed in China.  This situation has changed with the rapid development of the private 
economy and the increasing transient population since late 1990s (see Section 1.2).  By 
analysing a quarter of a million industrial companies in operation during 1998 to 2003 in 
China, Dougherty et al., (2007) present evidence that the private sector makes up more than 
half of the industrial output and operates much more efficiently than the public sector, and 
effectively form a market-based economy in China. 
The Domestic Privately-Owned Enterprises (DPOEs), including private funded enterprises, 
private partnership enterprises, private limited liability corporation, and private share-
holding corporations29, has proved to be important through its contribution to China’s GDP 
and national employment since the new millennium.  By the end of 2005, DPOEs had 
                                                      
27
  The difference of welfare exclusion is much lower for people from Changzhou area.  Their 
children might not need to pay a higher fee for compulsory education; and do not need to return to 
its origin to take entrance examination for tertiary education.   
28
  Migrants had been allowed to apply for a regular residence (with high requirements, such as 
buying a property) in selected small cities or urban towns based on reforms in 1997 and 2002. 
29
  Definition is based on National Bureau of Statistics of China.   
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accounted for more than 61 percent of the total national number of registered companies, 
which contribute as much as 60 percent of GDP growth30.  They created more than 80 
percent of total new jobs, (non-agricultural positions), and employed more than 0.12 billion, 
(excluding peasants), workers in 200631, which is nearly one tenth of Chinese population.  
With an amazing annual economic growth rate of 25%, which is far greater than the 
national average of 9% since 197832, it has become an important driving force for the 
development of the national economy33. 
The statistics above are based on designated size enterprises - a Chinese statistical term, 
which refers to a firm being an eligible statistical unit if the annual revenue of its principal 
business is more than ¥5 million.  For example, there were only 177,080 designated size 
private industrial enterprises by the end of 2007 (China Statistical Yearbook, 2008), 
meanwhile, there were more than 5.4 million registered domestic privately-owned 
enterprises by the end of the third quarter in 2007 (Liu, 2007).  The majority of private 
enterprise are actually small businesses, more than 80 percent DPOEs employ less than 50 
staff34 and therefore are too small to be included in the national statistics.  This fact, if taken 
into account, shows that the economic role of private enterprise in China has actually been 
under represented in official data.  
The majority of private enterprises are engaged in the secondary and the tertiary sectors, 
which are important sectors in terms of national employment.  As can be seen in Figure 1.4, 
manufacturing was dominant the DPOEs in 1989 (with engagement of 66.4% of total 
                                                      
30
  Huang, Meng-Fu (president of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce), Private 
Economy is an Important Force for Changes in China, The Third Summit of Chinese Entrepreneurs, 
Shenzhen, 25-27 August, 2006.  
31
  Sun, Yu-Bo, “More Than 0.12 Billion People Work for Private Enterprise”, Xinhua Daily, 6 May 
2007. 
32
  Gu, Shen-Zu, “Equality is Essential for Ownership”, Renmin Zhengxie Bao (Newspaper), 26 Oct 
2007, Available from http://cpc.people.com.cn. 
33
  According to Huang Meng-Fu (President of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce), 
the private economy is increased by 15% in 2006; and the number of domestic privately-owned 
enterprises amounted to 4.94 million, [Online; cited March 2009,] Available from 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-01/31/content_5680220.htm. 
34
  Census Data Analysis 24: Current Status and Problems of Chinese Private Enterprise and Policy 
Suggestions, 2004, National Bureau of Statistics of China Bureau.  
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private enterprise), but its share has gradually declined and was overtaken by retailing and 
the hospitality sector (37% of total private enterprise) in 200435.  Private enterprise tends to 
be widespread in the traditional pillars of the Chinese national economy such as textile and 
garment production.  In 2007, the number of private textile and garment enterprises made 
up 63% of this industry in China36.  
66.4
59.4
41
36.8 38.3
29.3
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1989 1992 1997 1999 2001 2004
Year
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
Figure 1.4: Manufacturing Share Change among Private Enterprise 
Source:  Census data analysis 24: Chinese private enterprise current status, problems and 
policy suggestions, 2004, National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
 
However the private sector in China has experienced harsh treatment from the country’s 
administration for over half a century and still faces institutional discrimination.  Policy 
towards the private sector has three distinctive stages. 
• 1949-1977. since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the 
private economy was considered unlawful, and therefore eliminated.  The apparent 
reason was that private economy being against communist ideology.  Vendors would 
                                                      
35
  Data are  based on a national survey of private enterprises in 2002 and in 2005, [Online: cited, 
May 2008,] Available from http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/282306.htm and   
http://www.100paper.com/100paper/yingyongwen/diaochabaogao/20070623/25521.html 
36
  China Statistical Yearbook 2008, National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistics Press, 
2009, Beijing. 
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be reprimanded publicly as part of a campaign to “cut the capitalism’s tail”37.  The 
private economy, where present, remained underground until 1977. 
• 1978-1988. in 1978, the central government redefined the social progress of the 
country, and altered its constitutional status from communism to socialism.  The 
idea presented by Deng XiaoPing (former leader of the communist party, recognised 
as the Chinese Economic Reform Designer) was to allow some people to become 
rich by their own honest work.  These rich citizens would help the poor, and, 
eventually, an affluent communist society would be created.  Consequently the 
private sole trader was legalized from that time on.  Until 1988, the private economy 
was legitimate and defined as “necessary complement to the socialism market 
economy”.  It was then born, though with close monitoring and careful control38. 
• 1989-2005. In the 1990s, the private economy started to grow in coastal and eastern 
areas, particular in Jiangsu, Guangdong, and Zhejiang provinces after experiments 
in these areas.  Meanwhile, China itself had experienced a large scale reform of 
State-owned enterprises which resulted in a huge number of redundant workers, 
private enterprise helped to stabilize the national economy by employing most of 
these workers.  Since then, the role of the private economy in aspects of 
employment, export earnings and tax revenue has flourished.  In 1998, it was 
granted equal legal rights as the public economy and was considered to be an 
“important component of the socialist market economy” 39.  Later with its rapid 
development, the private economy became the most important sector offering jobs 
to millions of peasants released from their allotted land.  But it had not been 
officially approved the equal national treatment as State-owned enterprises until 
                                                      
37
  Jiang, X. and Lin, X., “The Middle Class of  Peasants and Socialism”, People’s Daily, 28 Nov 
1957, [Online: cited March 2009,] Available from 
http://blog.voc.com.cn/sp1/kuangxinnian/135141382375.shtml 
38
  Amendment of Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, at the Seventh People’s Congress, 
Beijing, 25 March to 13 April, 1988. 
39
  Amendment of Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, at the Ninth People’s Congress, 
Beijing, 5-15 March, 1999. 
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200540. 
It remains the case that the institutional segregation between the private and public sectors 
of the economy impacts on the performance of the former.  Institutional barriers have 
prevented private enterprise from entering certain fields, such as the postal system, 
telecommunications, electricity supplying, financial services and media41 .  Restrictions 
imposed on private enterprise include higher technological standards, more demanding staff 
qualifications and larger amount capital requirement.  Financing remains very difficult for 
private firms.  Banking has been dominated by State-owned enterprises, which set 
impossible borrowing criteria for loans to private enterprise42.  In 2007, a national survey 
showed that more than 87% owners of private enterprise reported that it was very hard to 
secure a loan from a bank due to the procedures and that the requirements were very 
difficult to comply with.  The survey also reported that 70% capitals of private enterprise 
had been raised through owners’ savings or frequently from private high-interest loans 43.  
Other unfairness, in comparison to State-owned enterprises, includes private firms having 
to pay additional types of taxes and the lack of access to production factors.  For example, 
there has been shortage of cotton in the country since 2002, but there is almost no import 
quota for private firms.  This partly attributed to bankruptcy of nearly one third private 
textile enterprises in the Changzhou area by the end of 200344.  These difficulties have been 
well documented (Zhang, 2001; Guo, 2002; Mao and Zhang, 2003; Luo and Yin, 2006). 
1.4 Guanxi in the labour market 
Personal contacts or interpersonal connections have structured Confucian society, such as 
                                                      
40
  “Guides on Encouraging and Support of the Non-Government Economy Development”, the State 
Council of the Centre Government of the People’s Republic of China, Document 3, 2005, Beijing. 
41
  Guo, L.-H., “Obstacles Faced by Private Enterprise to Invest in Infrastructure in China”, 
Development Research Centre of the State Council, 2002, [Online; cited Jan 2007,] Available from: 
http://www.drcnet.com.cn/html. 
42
  “A Small Fish in a Big Pond”, the Economist, p78, 12 September 2009. 
43
  Wang Ya-Guang, , Private Enterprise Faces Financing Difficulty,2007, Chinese Information 
Networks for Small and Medium Enterprises,  [Online; cited May 2008,] Available from: 
http://www.nsfgjj.gov.cn/nsxq3/Article/gzdt/gcdt/200702/301.html 
44
  “Reduced Cotton Output and Tax Rebate Cut, Two Difficulties Faced by the Textile Industry in 
the Beginning of the Year”, 2004, Guangdong Provincial Office Sat, [Online; Cited: 20 August 2008] 
Available from http://sz.gd-n-tax.gov.cn/portal. 
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mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan and Korea, for thousands of years, these 
connections are termed as guanxi (关系), Kankei (in Japanese), and Kwankye (in Korean).  
Guanxi can be gained via birth, but more generally are referred to be extensively developed 
from differing social contacts, such as: sharing something in common, sharing the same 
place of birth, or area where people grew up, or lived; sharing a teacher or a school; sharing 
an interest or hobby; sharing the same employer or profession; even sharing of ideology or 
ideals; it also could be established by meeting at dinners, parties or professional gathering 
(Lin, 2001).  Granovetter (1973) distinguished two types of personal connections: strong 
ties (kin and close friends) and weak ties which are characterized by infrequent interaction 
or low intimacy (acquaintances, co-workers, and associates).  He argued that weak ties are 
more productive when compared to strong ties since weak ties have a wider range and 
therefore are more likely to bridge social boundaries or hierarchical levels.  Most obviously, 
individuals in China cultivate, invest (via time, energy, money, etc.) and utilize Guanxi45 in 
order to satisfy personal interests.  
Although the principle and practice of guanxi share a lot in common with social capital in 
other parts of the world as described by Bourdieu (1985), as a process that requires building 
up, nourishment, and reinforcement.  Guanxi is generated from a series of imbalanced 
exchanges, that is to say a favour given is not met with a favour in return right away.  It is 
maintained on a sentimental or emotional basis, renqing (personal indebtedness or loyalty).  
Therefore, it is paramount to have reciprocal gestures and to express commitment to guanxi.  
Because the nature of a sentimentally based relation, material gains only constitute a small 
part of the exchange in guanxi.  The proper payback is to spread the favour given which 
then increases the favour givers’ social standing or reputation (Mianzi) in the community.  
Termination of guanxi is humiliating to the party being declined, especially if the other 
party has a high social status.  Such a declination is perceived to disclose inability or 
immorality of the favour seekers, it hurts one’s reputation and thus one’s social standing.  
Given the severe social consequence of a broken Guanxi, exchanges are conducted 
privately in order to reduce the cost of failing a Guanxi (Lin, 2001).  As dominant exchange 
forms, Guanxi is taken not only by individuals but also by organizations in Confucian 
                                                      
45
  Strong and weak ties, the latter are defined as pseudo-family by Lin (2001). 
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society.  
A popular misconception of Guanxi is that it denotes unethical and illegal back-door 
exchanges.  Guanxi had been interpreted to appear uniquely after the cultural revolution 
(Yang, 1994) or under a particular political economy, e.g. contemporary socialist China 
(Chiao, 1982).  Since most resources had been centrally controlled and the legal system was 
underdeveloped, Guanxi used for personal gain penetrated every sphere of life by the mid-
1990s in China (Chiao, 1982; Xin and Pearce, 1996).  With no exception, empirical work 
shows that Guanxi exerts significant influence on obtaining a urban job (Bian, 1994; 1997).  
A considerable number of studies define Guanxi as a comparative advantage in doing 
business in China, in which Guanxi is used to secure rare resources, bypass or short-cut the 
bureaucratic maze, obtain information and privilege, selling otherwise unsellable goods, for 
a summary see Fan (2002).  However, the existence of Guanxi had been well-documented 
before the cultural revolution (King, 1985) and the practices of Guanxi have thrived in 
developed economies, such as Singapore, Japan, and Korea (Yeung and Tung, 1996; Bian 
and Ang, 1997)  
With an emerging rational legal system which has been constructed to conform to a market 
economy, there has been a revival of Guanxi as social capital to bridge social networks, 
reduce uncertainty and to increase cooperation.  Using in-depth interviews with 155 
Chinese officials and industrial managers in 1995, Guthrie (1998) argues, that the influence 
of Guanxi, as a back-door practise, has decreased dramatically in the urban industrial 
economy.  Instead, it is used to shape a good business relationship.  Frank (1998) predicts 
that China might develop a Guanxi capitalism of subcontracting networks.  Standifird and 
Marshall (2000) provide a theoretical explanation that Guanxi-based business practices 
provide informal ways to reduce environmental uncertainty and opportunistic behaviour.  
Peng and Luo (2000) present empirical evidence that managers’ personal ties with business 
partners and government officials increase a firms’ performance.  Other researchers have 
made similar arguments (Gregory et al., 2000; Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2001; Wellman et al., 
2002; Wang et al., 2003).  
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1.5 Research contribution of this thesis  
The investigation into job obtainment in China will commence with a literature review on 
job search behaviour and search outcomes.  This will enable us to identify any institutional 
influence on employment.  A discussion of theories on compensation arrangements will 
advance our understanding on determinants of compensation, in which the way that 
compensation being suggested to induce incentives is investigated.  However, the limited 
empirical research on compensation arrangements indicates that more empirical work needs 
to be undertaken, in order to improve our understanding on the impact of organizational 
settings on compensation. 
In Chapter 3, we will provide an overview of the high unemployment rate of graduates in 
China.  We will then examine the institutional impact, such as hukou and guanxi on the 
availability of vacancy information and job search channels.  These two institutions would 
potentially have an effect on job search behaviour of different groups.  In addition, we 
inspect possible influence of institutions on job evaluation since this is likely to impact on 
the formation of reservation wage.  Zang (2003) and Zeng and Cui (2008) present evidence 
that well-educated job seekers rely much less on social contacts than those of less well-
educated groups in China.  Therefore, what search methods play an important role in terms 
of graduates’ job obtainment? What are the differences of job search behaviour, more 
importantly do search outcomes differ between graduates with different hukou status?  
These questions will be answered by analysing 512 valid respondents from a survey using 
binary probit, interval regression and Poisson regression models. 
Since the new millennium, private enterprise has employed more graduates than any other 
type of employer; further evidence of this is shown in our survey as well.  This trend is 
strengthening, for example, a national graduate employment survey, in 2007, showed that 
the private sector employed 34% of graduates, which was 11 percentage points higher than 
the second most important class of employer - State-owned enterprises46.  The central wage 
policy in the State-owned enterprises (as a monopsony) historically guaranteed a low rate 
                                                      
46
  The survey is conducted by researchers from Beijing University; it covers 28 higher education 
institutions in 15 provinces. Full contents can be accessed at 
http://www.gse.pku.edu.cn/jianbao/200706.htm. 
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of return to skilled labour.  A large number of empirical studies revealed a low private 
return rate to education, for a review see Fleisher and Wang (2004).  Since private 
enterprise has proved to be more efficient in terms of utilising capital and labour when 
compared with the public sector (Dougherty et al., 2007), we are interested in the private 
return to tertiary education in private enterprise. 
Moreover, the workforce of private enterprise of the labour-intensive industry, such as 
textile and construction industries is dominated by migrant workers, and most of them gain 
their employment via social networks (Jiang et al., 2008).  We ask the question, which from 
human capital, Guanxi, tenure, is the most important factor in terms of determining 
remuneration? In Chapter 4, an OLS model and a Heckman selection model are used to 
explore 1,097 personnel records with salary information.  In 1999, private enterprise were 
required to offer insurance, such as old-age, medical and unemployment, to some, gradually 
to its entire workforce.  We will investigate the determinants of allocating deferred rewards 
among workers.  Two binary probit models are utilised to estimate the probability of being 
offered a deferred compensation package. 
In Chapter 5, we turn our attention to the possible impact of Guanxi and offering deferred 
rewards on job tenure, and the difference in the job separation patterns between local and 
migrant workers.  Knight and Yueh (2004) present evidence that the mobility rate of 
migrant workers exceeds that of urban residents due to the influence of hukou policy.  
However, there has been noticeable hukou reform in Jiangsu province since 2003.  Does 
hukou reform exert an influence on migrant workers’ propensity to leave?  We use duration 
models to analyse data of single and multiple employment spells of 4,034 individuals, 
amounting to 4,356 observations in the same company studied in Chapter 4 over the same 
period. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
An individual’s socioeconomic background and the nature of labour market which they 
confront are likely to shape one’s sources of vacancy, search methods used and the degree 
of search intensity.  These factors then have an influence on search outcomes, namely, 
obtaining employment and starting salary in the short-run.  The longer term search 
outcomes are measured by compensation and tenure.  Both the specific human capital and 
job match theories specifically consider the higher productivity generated by firm-specific 
human capital or a good match.  Workers in these situations usually receive a higher 
payment and stay longer.  However, with the ongoing evidence of pay rise being faster than 
the increases of productivity, a wide range of theories consider that compensation is 
structured to induce effort and longer tenure.  This stream of theories has been summarised, 
and relative empirical studies are reviewed. 
2.2 Job search framework 
The job search and hiring processes are often believed to be the most important but least 
understood part of the employment relationship (Young and Chen, 1999; Petersen et al., 
2000).  Two frameworks have been developed to analyse it, the one-sided job search theory 
which examines the job seekers’ search process (Schwab et al., 1987); and the two-sided 
search theory which takes account of the search value to both job seekers and employers in 
order to explain unemployment in macroeconomics (Mortensen and C.A, 1999).  Since our 
research focus is on an individual job seeker’s search behaviour and search outcome, the 
one-sided job search theory will be addressed here. 
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Figure 2.1: A General Framework of One-sided Job Search 
Source: adapted from Schwab, et al., 1987, p.132 and 141. 
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Schwab, et al. (1987) proposed a systematic analysis from job seekers’ side.  As can be 
seen in Figure 2.1, it contains factors affecting search behaviour which then determines job 
search outcomes in the short and long run.  Job search strategies of a typical individual 
would be formed from two broad aspects: individual socio-economic circumstances and the 
nature of the labour market faced.  The former includes: (1) labour force status (e.g., 
employed, unemployed, and new entrants such as graduates); (2) occupational preferences 
and training received; (3) cognitive abilities, such as decision anxiety or memory capacity.  
The nature of job markets differs in terms of the relative balance of supply and demand for 
types of labour, as reflected in vacancy, unemployment rate and institutional influences, 
such as minimum wage, employment legislation, and job market segmentation.  In the 
context of China, the labour market has been segmented by the comprehensive hukou 
system as discussed in Section 1.2, this institutional segmentation largely attributes to a 
surplus of graduates in the developed areas, and a shortage of those in the developing areas.  
This is summarised well by Lai (2001) that graduates prefer a bed in large cities rather than 
a building in less-developed areas. 
2.2.1 Job search 
 As in Figure 2.1, job searching consists of sources used and intensity of search.  The 
former denotes sources of vacancy information and job search, these sources differ from 
individual to individual.  For example, one determinant is one’s social contacts. The job 
vacancy information performing as a capital has been well established by Stigler (1961; 
1962).  He argued that the vacancy information a job seeker possessed will be rewarded by 
a higher wage rate than on average would be received in its absence.  Using stochastic 
frontier regression techniques, Hofler and Murphy (1992) estimated that workers’ wages 
fall approximately 10% below their potential wages due to the shortfall of vacancy 
information. 
There are, generally, three job search methods: informal means, formal means, and direct 
application (Granovetter, 1995; Beggs and Hurlbert, 1997).  Informal methods rely on 
interpersonal networks and the influence of the intermediary to gain a job.  Formal job 
search methods represent job applications via non-personal labour market intermediaries, 
such as job postings, job fairs, newspaper advertisements, and employment agencies 
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(Bridges and Villemez, 1986).  Methods of direct application include walking into the 
office to inquire about vacancies or sending CVs directly to potential employers.  Although 
more than one third male workers were observed to find jobs through informal channels in 
Holland, the USA and other countries (Burt, 1992; Moerbeek et al., 1995), the effectiveness 
of informal job search methods in terms of obtaining a higher occupational status or starting 
salary is mixed.  A considerable volume of research present empirical evidence to support 
this advantage (Granovetter, 1974; Lin et al., 1981; Holzer, 1987; Simon and Warner, 1992; 
Fernandez and Weinberg, 1997; Ruiter and De Graaf, 2009), whilst others empirically show 
that the job search outcome of using social contacts is contingent upon the original social 
status of job seekers (Marsden and Hurlbert, 1988; Wegener, 1991). 
Job search intensity refers to the frequency with which when pursuing employment, an 
individual engages in specific search activities during a set period of time.  These include 
preparing a resume or contacting an employment agency (Kanfer et al., 2001).  The 
intensity in pursuing information and applying for positions are found to be positively 
related to higher self-esteem (Ellis and Taylor, 1983), and the job seekers’ financial need, 
see a literature review by Rogerson, et al. (2005). 
2.2.2 Job offer evaluation  
As in Figure 2.1, whether or not to accept an offer depends upon the evaluation made by a 
job applicant.  This evaluation is hypothesized as subject to: the perception of the job’s 
attributes, which depends on the job seeker’s attribute preference function; and the type of 
decision processes used to evaluate those attributes. 
However, financial constraint on a job seeker could be one decisive factor in the process of 
evaluating an offer.  Its mechanism is via one’s reservation wage, wr, which can be 
presented as (McCall, 1970; Mortensen, 1970; Kiefer and Neumann, 1979):  
 ( )( ) ( )1,,,, 0 nmwFbfw tr θ=  
Where b is unemployment benefits, (this could be unemployment insurance income, 
inheritance, subsidy from family or any revenue generated during unemployment).  F (w) is 
the distributional function of wage offers, w0 is the wage of the received offer, θt is the 
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discount rate in the finite horizon case; m is the direct cost of the search, n is the job 
seeker’s initial wealth.  Thus it can be inferred that the job applicant’s reservation wage is 
determined by one’s unemployment revenue, job market situation, the preference of present 
value, job search cost and initial wealth.  
When looking into the formation of reservation wage in a developing country, such as 
China, if unemployment benefits exist at all, they are more likely to be available in urban 
areas.  The initial wealth of a job seeker has to be interpreted accordingly.  In terms of 
graduates, it could be gauged by family resources, such as household income; for economic 
migrant workers from rural to urban areas, the expected farming income could be used as a 
proxy (Cook, 1999). 
It is widely accepted that reservation wages are different across job seekers due to 
difference in unemployment income, initial wealth, and preference for current value. 
Noticeably, each individual might have a very different wage distribution function, F(w), 
which depends upon sources of job search, search skills and search intensity (this might be 
influenced by unemployment income and initial wealth).  It is expected that an individual 
with higher unemployment benefits and greater initial wealth will have a higher reservation 
wage, ceteris paribus.  The job seeker would accept an offer under the condition that a wage 
offer is greater than one’s reservation wage.  
2.2.3 Job search outcomes  
Also using Figure 2.1, the outcomes of job search can be conceptualized in two principal 
ways.  The most obvious and easily measured outcomes are the employment obtained and 
the starting salary.  Researchers have consistently found that as unemployment benefit 
levels increase, the time before a new job is obtained increases (Mortensen, 1970; Classen, 
1977), for a review see (Welch, 1977).  The positive relationship between search intensity 
and job attainment has also been verified (Hooft et al., 2004; Bloemen, 2005), as well as the 
negative association between wealth level and job acceptance (Bloemen and Stancanelli, 
2001; Bloemen, 2002; Lentz and Tranaes, 2005).  However, the quality of obtained 
employment, such as employment satisfaction, the length of service (tenure), and career 
progress (or compensation) is the outcome in a longer term, and constitutes the quality of 
job match discussed in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.  
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2.2.4 Empirical job search studies in China 
Lifetime employment was the cornerstone of the centrally planned economy in China.  
Since the implementation of the milestone policy, Reform and Open policy, in 1978, job 
changes emerged.  In the early economic transitional period, the available empirical work 
shows that Guanxi was used to gain urban jobs.  For example, using data from a sample 
survey of 1,008 households in Tianjin metropolitan city in 1988, Bian (1994) reported that 
more than 45% respondents indicate that their first job was obtained via guanxi.  At that 
time, this practice would potentially have faced severe punishment by violating the State 
job assignment rule, for this reason, strong ties were broadly observed.  Bian (1997) used 
the same data and distinguished strong and weak ties, and presented evidence that jobs 
obtained using weak ties were usually better than those acquired by using strong ties, 
though strong ties are more frequently used to obtain jobs. 
With two national household surveys in 1995 and 1999 in China, Knight and Li (2005) 
suggest the labour market is forming, but still at a rudimentary stage.  Institutions, such as 
hukou policy, still constrain labour mobility; therefore, job mobility among urban workers 
remains low.  However, since 2005, the world’s largest number of migrants has been 
observed in China.  More than one tenth of the Chinese population lives in a place other 
than their hukou registration place 47 .  In some prosperous areas, such as Guangdong 
province, Sunan areas in Jiangsu province, the floating population far exceeds local 
residents (see Section 1.2).  Economic migrants dominate the floating population, which 
consists of rural-urban migrants, workers laid off by the State-owned enterprises, and 
graduate job seekers. As a consequence, job search has become a much common 
phenomenon.  
Due to the lack of national data on job changes, researchers collected their own data to 
uncover the characteristics of job search behaviour and outcomes in China.  Guanxi has 
been verified to be beneficial in terms of access to nonfarm vacancy and obtaining 
employment (Zang, 2003; Zhang and Li, 2003; Huang, 2008), Cheung and Gui (2006) 
present evidence to support a positive relationship between strong ties and earnings.  
                                                      
47
  Green Book of Population and Labour No.7, 2006. Editor, F, CAI, B-C, GU, Social Science 
Academic press. 
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However, the use of social contacts has been over-stated among less well-educated job 
seekers, well-educated job seekers, such as those with university education, are observed to 
rely more on formal search methods and the internet (Zang, 2003; Zeng and Cui, 2008).  
Hukou status defines one’s right of entry to public resources (see Section 1.2); therefore, 
local residents present the difference of having more job search channels, such as public 
employment services, than migrant job seekers (Fan, 2002; Zeng and Cui, 2008). 
2.3 Compensation study 
Topel (1986) provided evidence that ten years tenure raises, on average, the wages of a 
typical worker by 20%.  Hersch and Reagan (1990) even reported a 5% annual contribution 
to log wage in their study.  The stylized fact of an age-earning profile has been widely 
attributed to rising productivity generated either from the acquisition of firm specific 
human capital or a good quality of job match.  However, there is also evidence that senior 
workers receiving higher payments are due to their seniority rather than performance or 
productivity (Medoff and Abraham, 1980; Milton and Holmstrom, 1982; Lazear and Moore, 
1984).  Therefore, another school of thought argues that the age-earning profile reflects the 
use of compensation arrangements to induce incentives.  In this section, we will review a 
wide range of theories attempting to explain the determination of compensation and related 
empirical work. 
2.3.1 Productivity and payment  
Based on Becker (1962) and Oi (1962), the human capital model argues that on the job 
training generates specific skills, which have no value elsewhere but are important to the 
firm and increase productivity.  In particular, the practice of sharing costs of obtaining 
specific human capital would result in longer tenure.  The above reasons are used to explain 
the higher payments received by senior staff.  Abraham and Farber (1987) presented 
empirical evidence that workers with more seniority in their current job earn more than 
other workers with the same total labour market experience.  An extensive literature has 
strengthened the positive relationship between specific human capital and age-earning 
profile (Blakemore and Hoffman, 1989; Brown, 1989; Topel, 1991; Chuang and Lee, 2004; 
Dustmann and Meghir, 2005). 
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The job match theory emphasizes that a sufficiently good match of employment would 
generate idiosyncratic productivity and last longer; consequently it is rewarded by a higher 
wage.  Empirical studies seem to support this explanation see (Topel, 1986; Topel, 1986; 
Hersch and Reagan, 1990; Topel, 1991; Williams, 1991; Sloane and Theodossiou, 1998).  
However, more recently Dustmann and Pereira (2008) distinguished between return to 
experience and to firm specific tenure, and presented empirical evidence that returns to the 
former seem to have been substantial whilst returns to the latter were close to zero in the 
United Kingdom and Germany. 
However, there are ongoing concerns of causal relationship between workers’ productivity 
and remuneration.  Initially, Medoff and Abraham (1980) using personnel data from two 
major companies in the United States, investigated the experience, performance and 
earnings among managerial and professional employees undertaking similar work.  They 
found that experience positively correlates with earnings, but this can not be explained by 
performance (productivity).  Therefore, they raised the question that the human capital or 
on-the-job training model cannot explain a substantial part of the observed return to labour 
market experience.  Ioannides and Pissarides (1983) inspected that wages of junior and 
senior workers with firm specific tenure, they showed that junior workers are underpaid in 
terms of the value of their marginal product and senior workers are overpaid.  Lazear and 
Moore (1984) presented evidence that the slope of age-earning profiles of salaried workers 
is steeper than that of self-employed, and therefore suggest the age-earnings profiles reflect 
the desire to motivate workers. 
2.3.2 Compensation arrangement as an incentive device 
Compensation packages (practices) include piece rates, promotions, efficiency wages, 
deferred rewards (such as offering a pension plan), profit sharing, stock option, and so on 
see Prendergast (Prendergast, 1999) for a review.  The following strand of study argues that 
compensation is constantly structured to maximize workers’ productivity by instigating 
effort and inducing longer tenure. 
Holmstrom (1979) and Shavell (1979) consider moral hazard in the principal-agent setting.  
In a complex contractual arrangement, it is impossible and prohibitively costly to perfectly 
monitor the effort of an agent.  Incentive payoffs were then proposed to resolve the 
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principal-agent problem.   
 Lazear and Rosen (1981) propose the tournament model and use this model to interpret the 
use of comparative incentives, such as promotions, to motivate workers.  The main 
characteristic of a promotion is that it not only carries a pay rise, but also increases the 
prospect of further promotions and bigger pay rise.  In the model, contestants are ranked 
according to their performance, workers with highest performances (winners) are promoted, 
and enter into the next round; the losers remain or leave.  The tournament model mirrors 
the salary hierarchy of a particular job structure (see Figure 2.2), such as different job titles 
of one type of work.  Empirical work provides evidence to support the incentive effect of 
promotions on individuals and a team (Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990; Becker and Huselid, 
1992). 
 
Figure 2.2: Promotions and Wage 
Source: Lazear (1981), p. 607 
 
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) proposed the efficiency wage model to explain a wage designed 
to avoid shirking behaviour.  Due to imperfect information, it is costly for employers to 
monitor on-the-job shirking of its employees.  Therefore, employers pay more than the 
market clearing wage (which is higher than unemployment benefits), the efficiency wage.  
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If all firms pay efficiency wages, involuntary unemployment results, hence the threat of 
firing a worker becomes a valid incentive since a worker would receive an economic 
penalty by remaining unemployed for at least some time after fired.  
Lazear (1995) coins the term, Personnel Economics, which he defined as the use of 
economic theory and econometrics to understand issues relating to the human resources 
arena.  Lazear (1981) interprets the age-earning profile as a lifetime incentive device and 
argues that the reason that senior workers receive higher wages is not because they are 
worth what they are paid; instead it is the compensation for their hard work in the early 
stage of their career within the organization; the age-earning profile therefore serves as a 
motivator. 
Figure 2.3 shows the incentive wage structure and effort level a worker chooses.  It is 
assumed that the output of an agent choosing a high effort level is V, V’ is the result of 
choosing a low effort level.  The agent’s opportunity cost, W’, is assumed to be time spent 
on leisure, the voluntary or efficient retirement age is assumed to be T.  Consider two 
payment schemes, W and V, where W is the present value of the W over the period 0 to T, 
the same as the V.  With all else being equal and perfect capital markets, an agent will be 
indifferent between these two pay schemes.  But all else is not equal, consider agents who 
are paid according to marginal product, payment scheme V, at the point D, the likelihood of 
shirking will be overwhelming since the punishment, dismissal, is whatever they will 
receive.  Instead, the W scheme would motivate agents to maintain a high effort level even 
at the very moment of D; it would also exert influence on other younger workers in the 
same organization. 
Due to the shortage of personnel data, much of the work of life-time wage structure (Lazear, 
1981) had been theoretical for decades after it was proposed.  Most available studies are 
from the USA.  Beker, at el. (1994) found that workers who are promoted early on continue 
to be promoted quickly.  Lazear (1999) used personnel records of Safelite (the largest 
national auto glass installer) to investigate the relationship of productivity and pay to tenure.  
The result from an OLS regression on log (payment per day) shows that tenure has a greater 
effect on pay than on output.  However, there has been shortage of the empirical work into 
personnel economics (for a recent literature review see Lin (2005)).  Herpen, et al., (2006) 
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sum up that personnel economics is still at a very early stage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Wage Structure and Effort Level within a Job 
Source: Lazear (1999) Fig 1, page 203. 
 
2.3.3 The job-assignment model  
The earning inequality among individuals not only relates to individual characteristics but 
also to the job itself which correlates with industrial sectors and organizational settings, 
such as hierarchy.  Individuals’ income or utility maximization guides them to choose 
particular jobs over others.  Therefore, wage differentials also depend on self-selection of 
occupational choice. 
Sattinger (1975) proposed a model by using job allocation, which is determined by 
workers’ comparative advantage, to explain the earning distribution.  Rosen (1982) 
addresses the correlation among firm size, span of control, and managerial rewards.  
Sattinger (1993) structured the job-assignment model where workers with high ability 
(comparative advantage) would be assigned to jobs where decision would have an influence 
on a larger operation scale; wages in this framework are largely determined by position.  
Teulings (1995) used data from the Netherlands and presented evidence that wage 
differentials are due mainly to skill differentials.  Empirical evidence by analysing firm 
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personnel records from other countries, such as Germany and Australia supports that wages 
are largely determined by job levels or positions (Pfeifer, 2008; Seltzer and Sammartino, 
2009).   
2.3.4 Empirical compensation studies in China 
Due to its nature, as a developing labour market, on the one hand empirical studies of 
compensation in China are limited.  On the other hand, available studies unsurprisingly 
focus mainly on the State-owned enterprises for its historically important role in the 
centrally planned economy and data availability.  A number of empirical studies provide 
substantial evidence that compensation in the State-owned enterprises has changed the 
centrally fixed wage structure and now shows signs of the market economy, for example, 
wages are more closely related to firm profits and payment are partly from bonus.  For 
details see (Meng and Kidd, 1997; Knight and Li, 2005; Kato and Long, 2006; Buck et al., 
2008). 
There is a paucity of studies investigating determination of compensation in the emerging 
rural industry, the Township, Village and Private Enterprises, (TVPs).  As it can be seen 
from the definition of this category, this empirical work has bundled collective enterprises 
(Township or Village enterprises) and private enterprise into one single group (Meng and 
Miller, 1995; Smith, 1995; Dong, 2005).  Take Meng and Miller (1995) for example, using 
survey data within the TVPs between 1986 and 1987 to examine gender wage 
discrimination in China's rural industrial sector.  They conclude that the difference in 
gender occupational distributions is partly due to discrimination in occupational assignment 
by the community authorities, which is one feature of township but not private enterprise.  
With a survey of the manufacturing sector in Nanjing municipality, Jiangsu province in 
2002, over the period of 1994 to 2001, Dong (2005) examines structure and inequality of 
wage between urban and rural industries.  Results from this research show that 
compensation in the urban enterprises has become increasingly linked to enterprises’ 
performances and that the situation in rural TVPs has become more market oriented.  
However, the township and private ownership enterprises are fundamentally different, even 
official statistics have distinguished between these two types of ownership.  The former is 
owned by the local citizens and is administrated by the local government, whereas the latter 
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was established to be market oriented.  The hiring of labour within township enterprises is 
influenced by the local government, particularly in the light of objective, such as local 
employment maximization instead of profit maximization.  Private enterprise operates on 
the basis of market and their compensation schemes are set in response to the market 
mechanisms48.  Therefore, empirical outcomes from this bundled category are unlikely to 
shed light on the compensation settings of the privately owned enterprises.  
2.4 Job separation 
Labour market experience and firm-specific seniority have been firmly established to be 
negatively related to the possibility of job separation.  These are explained by two classic 
models of labour-market search model (Burdett, 1978) and the employee-employer 
matching model (Jovanovic, 1999).  
2.4.1 Job search model 
Ample evidence shows that observably similar workers receive different payment from 
different employers (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1991; Doms et al., 1997; Abowd et al., 1999; 
Oi and Idson, 1999), therefore there is an incentive for a typical worker to seek out higher-
paid jobs.  As Matilla (1974) noted between 50-60% of job transitions do not involve a 
spell of unemployment; Bowlus et al. (2001) reported that 44% of job transitions of 
younger males in the United States are direct job-to-job moves.  This has prompted the 
interest in development of an on-the-job search model. 
Burdett (1978) proposed a job search model in which workers are allowed to search while 
in employment.  In this model, workers are assumed not to accumulate firm specific human 
capital and know all about the applied job before starting.  Therefore jobs are regarded as 
inspection goods where the termination of employment occurs on the arrival of a 
potentially superior offer.  Workers intend to maximize their own expected discounted 
lifetime income minus search costs.  With more experience, more external employment 
offers arrive and the greater the chance of attracting a higher wage rate, and if current 
wages are high (rises with experience), the probability to induce a switch falls.  
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  “Private Firms are Encouraged to Hire Layoffs”, Xinhua News, 8 April, 2006. 
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Topel and Ward (1992) found that in the first ten years in the USA labour market, a typical 
worker changes jobs seven times, these job changes contribute to more than one third of 
early-career wage growth.  Most importantly, they presented evidence that wages are the 
key determinant of job change decisions among young workers.  Christensen, et al. (2005) 
estimated a structure on-the-job search model of job separation by using data from Demark, 
they present evidence that job search effort decreases with pay rise. 
2.4.2 Job match model 
The other job termination theory is the job match framework; the best noted is the work of 
Jovanovic (1979).  In the model, job matching is treated as a pure experience good.  Due to 
imperfect information on both job seekers’ and employers’ sides, prospective workers are 
heterogeneous in preferences and abilities.  Jobs are heterogeneous in both the skills 
required and their non-pecuniary characteristics.  The match quality can not be observed ex 
ante, it is revealed over time as tenure accumulates.  Since productivities of specific 
worker-job combinations are different, a good match generates a high productivity, 
therefore a higher wage is paid and a low propensity to separate is presented, and vice verse.  
Under this view, a good match is more likely to survive even in the absence of the specific 
human capital effect.  In addition, Jovanovic (1979) shows that the separation probability 
increases in the first instance (screening bad matches) and then decreases with specific firm 
seniority (a small probability of sufficiently decreasing of productivity causes some senior 
workers to resign). 
A large number of empirical studies using aggregate data verify that the possibility of 
leaving is inversely related to job tenure, for a summary see (Farber, 1999).  Ideally, one 
would use specific employer-employee data to investigate the employment match quality.  
Decades after the proposed match theory, only a limited number of datasets are available in 
developed countries.  Diekmann and Preisendoerfer (1988) used personnel records in a 
large West German engineering company, and presented empirical evidence that the time 
pattern of job separation rate fits the prediction of job match theory.  Lane and Parkin (1998) 
used observations of accountant partners from Ernst and Young, and confirmed that as 
tenure increases both terminations and quits follow the pattern predicted by Jovanovic 
(1979). 
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Social networks exert a notable impact on the probability of job separation.  In related work, 
Loury (1983) presented evidence that knowing someone in the firm studied reduces the 
employee’s turnover rate.  Simon and Warner (1992) provided evidence that workers hired 
through “old-boy network” (i.e., recruiters or acquaintances inside the firm) lasted 
significantly longer than those hired through formal recruiting channels.  Loury (2006) 
argues that the longer tenure among workers recruited by informal channels could be 
because the informal channel used is a worker’s last resort, hence they stay with their 
current jobs because there is no alternative.  Empirical results in her study also support this 
explanation. 
2.4.3 Institutional influence on job tenure 
Institutions are well-recognized to exert an impact on employment spell.  In developed 
countries, trade unions have long been seen to increase workers’ tenure by giving members 
a collective voice, sometimes even if it is a poor matched employment relationship 
(Freeman, 1980; Williamson, 1985).  Employment protection legislation might relate to 
significant cost of dissolving employment; stringent legislation then reduces the probability 
of terminating an employment relationship.  Battu, et al. (2002) considered the impact of 
contractual arrangements on employment tenure in the United Kingdom, their empirical 
results indicate that key characteristics of contracts, such as job security, develop with long 
term tenure (as a lock-in effect). 
Moreover, internal institutions directly influence the length of job tenure.  Salop (1976) 
argues that one way to attract those workers who are less likely to leave is to offer (quasi-) 
rents only to those who remain at the firm for long periods of time.  Jacoby (1990) 
discussed the practice of using deferred rewards to penalize premature separation in the 
internal labour markets.  The USA based literature support the assumption that offering 
pensions may generate a stable workforce.  Ippolito (1991) found that offering a pension 
plan increases workers’ tenure on average by more than 20%.  Gustman et al. (1994) 
presents evidence that the turnover of workers with pension coverage is half that of workers 
without.  Using survey data from Norway, Hernas et al. (2006) found that offering an 
occupational pension is generally associated with longer tenure. 
Under the centrally planned economy in China, workers’ welfare provision was attached to 
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their hukou and was allocated by danwei (work units), in which a lifetime employment was 
formed, as well as receiving welfare (see Section 1.2).  The deeply rooted enterprise-based 
security and welfare system exerted a fundamental impact on urban workers’ mobility 
despite social welfare reform since 1996.  Knight and Yueh (2004) and Knight and Li (2005) 
used data in 1990s and presented evidence that the inter-firm mobility within and across 
region among urban workers remains low; however, the mobility rate of migrants greatly 
exceeds that of urban residents.  Most recent empirical work by Cao and Hu (2007) find 
that married women are more likely to have family oriented job changes and involuntary 
job termination, compared with the job changes for career advancements of male workers 
in China.  However, more research is needed to uncover job separation patterns amongst 
the large number of economic migrants (see Section 1.2). 
2.5 Conclusions 
Our examination of the existing literature on job search from developed countries confirms 
the positive influence of search effort on job obtainment.  This is very important 
considering the increased unemployment in 2009 caused by the world recession started in 
late 2008.  Take UK graduates for example; there was reported a 2% increase in the 
unemployment rate compared with that in the previous year49.  The situation is much worse 
in an emerging economy, China, where the graduate employment rate was reported being 
68%, which was similar to the level in 200850.  This, doubtless, exacerbates unemployment 
among millions of graduates having existed since 2003.  It is obvious that more research 
need to be done in order to investigate the determinants of graduate employment 
obtainment.  We present a detailed discussion on graduate job search in China in Chapter 3, 
in particular, an investigation on the relationship between job search effort and offers of 
employment in the context of the graduate labour market. 
A wide range of theories have been developed to explain the compensation arrangement 
and labour mobility in the world-wide labour markets, however, a shortage of personnel 
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  Jessica Shepherd, “Graduate Unemployment Figures Set to Rise by 22,000”, Guardian, 2 July 
2009. 
50
  The Ministry of Human Resource and Social Security announced that employment rate is 68% 
out of 6.17million graduates in 2009. 
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data has largely hindered research in this field world wide.  With an increasing number of 
economic migrants, and the surging growth of private enterprise, the Chinese labour market 
is forming.  Available empirical studies of this developing labour market present evidence 
that institutional barrier, such as hukou, still constrains job seekers’ choices on search 
methods and job destinations; Guanxi has been widely used to obtain vacancy information.  
However, the compensation within organization has been seriously under studied due to the 
nature of as a developing labour market. 
A large number of existing literatures on compensation mechanisms in the Chinese labour 
market focus upon State-owned enterprises; a smaller number of empirical studies on this 
topic bundle private enterprise together with township enterprise into one single category.  
Unsurprisingly, conclusions drawn from this bundled group throw hardly any light on 
practices in private enterprise due to the fundamental difference of ownership between 
them.  Private enterprise shares a common ground with firms in other countries in the sense 
that they are profit-driven; therefore, the understanding of personnel strategies in Chinese 
privately-owned firms would throw light on operation of internal labour markets.   
Hukou and Graduates’ Job Search in China                                                                             Chapter 3   
 
 
38
CHAPTER 3 
 Hukou and Graduates’ Job Search in China 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As we discussed in Section 1.1, graduates in China have faced fierce competition when 
seeking employment, and as a consequence, the high graduate unemployment rate has 
been raising social and economic concerns.   
Data from the China Education Ministry conveys the extent of the problems faced by 
graduates when searching for employment.  In 2001, the number of graduating students 
was around 1 million, and as a result of higher education expansion policy, this 
increased more than six-fold to 6.17 million in 2009.  As seen in Table 3.1, the graduate 
employment rate has remained at around 70% since 2001.   
Two important qualifications relate to the information in Table 3.1.  Firstly, the 
significant fall in the employment rate, 50% in the bracket, in 2003 was a direct result of 
the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), during which face-to-face 
contact was strictly forbidden.  Secondly, in 2003, as a consequence of SARS, the time 
of data collection was moved from July (straight after graduation) to September (three 
months after graduation), hence there are two figures for the employment rate for 2003.  
In the years since 2003, the data collection month has continued to be September51.  This 
change has had the effect of inflating the observed employment rate, since the job search 
period was effectively extended by three months.  This means that the apparent stability 
in the employment rate between 2001 and 2009 is deceptive. 
The statistics presented in Table 3.1 are only from State universities, of which there were 
1,792 in 2005.  These statistics have been used to obtain a forecast of 25 million 
graduate job seekers during the period 2007-201052.  Since employment rates are used to 
decide on the number of university admissions, some universities have been alleged to 
                                                      
51
  The data in 2009 being released in July is due to great pressure from the public. 
52
  “State Universities Graduates Employment Planning Meeting for 2006”, China Education 
Newspaper, 8 Dec 2005.  
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report exaggerated employment figures, a practice which has been condemned by the 
press53.  The result is that the employment figures in Table 3.1 may be upward biased.  
Moreover, there are more than 1,000 private higher education institutions in China, from 
which graduates find it even more difficult to gain employment.  This is another reason 
why the problems faced by graduates maybe even worse than suggested by the official 
figures54. 
Year Number of graduates 
(million) 
Employment rate (%) Number of unemployed  
(million) 
2001 1.15 70 0.35 
2002 1.45 64.7 0.51 
2003† 2.12 (50) 70† (1.06) 0.64 
2004 2.80 73 0.76 
2005 3.38 72 0.95 
2006 4.13 70‡ 1.24 
2007 4.95 70.9 1.44 
2008 5.59 68♥ 1.79 
2009 6.17 68♥ 1.97 
Table 3.1: Number of Graduates and Employment Rate in China (2001 to 2009) 
Source: China Education and Research Network55 
†  Two different employment rates were recorded in 2003: the first (in parentheses) is computed 
from data collected in July; the second from September. 
‡  Graduates’ employment rate is about 70%, BBC, 8 November 2006, [Online; cited May 2007,] 
Available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/simp/hi/newsid_6160000/newsid_6161900/6161908.stm. 
♥  The Ministry of Human Resource and Social Security released this figure in July 2009. 
♥  The Ministry of Human Resource and Social Security released this figure in July 2009. 
 
Meanwhile, only a very small proportion (5.2%) of the total population has received 
                                                      
53
  The official media, such as Xinhua News Agency, reported higher education institutions 
giving fake numbers on graduates’ employment rates, 2006, [Online; cited May 2007,] Available 
from http://career.eol.cn/article/20060621/3196360.shtml. 
54
  “40,000,000 Job Seeker in 2009”, it is officially estimated there will be 7 million graduates’ 
job seekers. Estimation by the Commercial Ministry, Finance Ministry and All-China Federation 
of Trade Union, 2009, [Online, cited 27th June 2009], Available from 
http://www.cec365.cc/html/24625.htm. 
55 
 Data from 2001-2005 is based on survey of graduates job search and employment attitude, 
2006, [Online; cited May 2007,] Available from 
http://www.eol.cn/jiuye_dy_4516/20060621/t20060621_184927.shtml 
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tertiary education56.  The higher education enrolment rate has risen steeply in recent 
years, reaching 21% in 2006 (See Section 1.1).  However, this is still low in comparison 
to the rates of around 50% seen in many developed countries such as Australia, the UK 
and Germany57and there is no evidence of large scale unemployment among graduates 
of these countries. 
One important aspect of the graduate unemployment problem in China is the labour 
market inefficiency caused by the hukou policy.  As we discussed in Chapter 1, hukou is 
not transferable even between cities.  For example, a Shanghai citizen is excluded from 
the Beijing municipal social welfare system even after working or living in Beijing for 
many years.  This institutional impediment to job seekers is expected to continue for at 
least another 15 to 20 years (see Section 1.2).  
The disadvantaged position of rural hukou holders is the central focus of this Chapter.  
The approach is analogous to that of Holzer (1987), who contrasts the effectiveness of 
job search between black and white youths in the United States, finding, that informal 
search methods, such as friends or relatives, and the direct application search method are 
more productive for whites than for blacks, in terms of the likelihood of gaining 
employment.  However, our study is different in at least two ways.  First, the concept of 
hukou and its effect on job search are peculiar to China.  Second, a key concept 
facilitating the route into employment in China, but less relevant in western countries, is 
that of “institutional embeddedness”.  This is a concept borrowed from Brinton and 
Kayia (1998), to capture the impact of university-related activities, such as: job fairs 
organized by the university; making CV templates available on the university website; 
university departments recommending graduates to potential employers; introduction by 
university faculty to external contacts who are potential employers; and alumni vouching 
for graduates from their institutions in the hiring process, that assist graduates in the job 
search process.  The university system in China has a long history as a job assignment 
                                                      
56
  2005 Population Census, China Statistical Yearbook 2006, China Statistics Press, 2006, 
Beijing. 
57
  Source: OECD (www.oecd.org/edu/eag2006). This is comparable for higher education gross 
entry rate in China since the statistics only include tertiary–education. 
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agency (see Section 1.1), and still has very important influence on a graduate’s job 
search outcome.  For these reasons, we consider it worthwhile to treat institutional 
embeddedness as a determinant of the search outcome in its own right. 
This Chapter is organized as follows.  Section 3.2 provides relevant institutional details; 
Section 3.3 presents a literature review; Section 3.4 outlines a theoretical job search 
model; Section 3.5 describes the data collection; Section 3.6 presents econometric 
results; Section 3.7 concludes. 
3.2 Institutional details 
3.2.1 The transformation of university students’ hukou status 
In this chapter, a graduate whose family is registered in an urban area is labelled as an 
urban hukou holder.  In contrast, a graduate who reports that his (her) family registry 
place is in a rural area is labelled as a non-urban hukou holder.  This is because his 
current hukou status is neither agricultural nor permanent urban.   
As we discussed in section 1.2, one important way to change hukou status is by investing 
in higher education.  Once students have been admitted to a State university, they 
temporarily acquire urban hukou status, equivalent to citizenship in the location of the 
university.  After graduation, which normally takes place by the end of June each year, 
there are three possible outcomes regarding a student’s hukou status, these outcomes are 
depicted in Figure 3.1.  The first is where the graduate finds a position with a company 
that has an urban hukou quota (such as a Beijing hukou).  This individual’s hukou can 
then be transferred to the company and the individual gains urban hukou status from this 
time on. One’s offspring (but typically not ones’ spouse58) will then be entitled to urban 
welfare.  The second possible outcome is where the graduate manages to find a formal 
job in a company but without urban hukou quota.  This individual’s hukou file will be 
kept at the community employment service office where the company is located, 
provided an administrative fee is paid; one is not given the right to urban welfare.  This 
is called mobile hukou; as long as the job-hopper keeps formal jobs, the mobile hukou 
                                                      
58
  If the graduate is considered highly desirable, the company might offer one of their quota 
positions to the spouse, endowing the spouse also with urban hukou status. 
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can be transferred between community employment service offices.  If the job-hopper is 
fortunate and later receives an offer with urban hukou quota, the mobile hukou turns into 
an urban hukou.  If the job-hopper is less fortunate and becomes unemployed, one’s 
hukou status becomes pending.  Although the final outcome in this case depends on 
individual circumstances, there is a possibility that hukou is returned to the original birth 
place.  The third possibility arises if the student takes a temporary job.  In this situation, 
the hukou will be kept at the university for one year, again subject to a fee.  Thereafter, if 
the graduate still does not have a formal job, the worst outcome comes into force: one’s 
hukou will be sent back to his original residential place.   
 
Figure 3.1: Possible Transformation of Graduates’ Hukou after Graduation 
 
Hukou of graduates from rural 
areas (Agricultural Hukou) 
Hukou of graduates from 
urban areas (Urban hukou) 
 Hukou is kept at 
a HEI during 
study; it is free 
of charge until 
the 30th June of 
the final year of 
study  
Accepted by a State Higher 
Education Institution (HEI) 
After 
graduation 
Hukou returned to 
original residential 
place  
Find a position 
with hukou quota 
Find a formal job 
without hukou quota 
Search for a formal 
job during the year 
following graduation 
Still no formal job one 
year after graduation 
Hukou is transferred to 
the company; the student 
gains urban hukou ☺ 
Mobile hukou with fee 
payable at a local labour 
market office; no urban 
hukou entitlements  
Hukou is kept at the 
university subject to 
payment of fee; no urban 
Hukou entitlements 
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This institutional feature is highly relevant to the objectives of this study.  Clearly, non-
urban hukou holders have just one year to secure formal employment.  If they fail, the 
penalty is an almost irredeemable relegation to their previous hukou status.  This 
explains why the pressure on non-urban hukou holders in the search for employment is 
so great59.  
3.2.2 History of graduate job search in contemporary China 
Job search is a relatively new activity for graduates in China.  This is because, 
traditionally during the period from 1949 to 1986, every student was guaranteed a job 
from the day they received an offer from a State university.  Universities, following 
guidelines from the former National Planning Commission, performed the role of job 
assignment agencies, individually assigning each graduate to a job with a particular 
Danwei (work unit).  Later on, a small number of students were allowed to seek jobs 
provided that paid their tuition fees (see Section 1.1).  This naturally led to a situation in 
which each university had a close relationship with certain enterprises.   
In 1997, the Chinese Education Ministry initiated a process of reform to establish a 
modern graduate employment system (see Section 1.1).  Hence, although job search was 
practiced in a minor way before 1997, it is only in the last decade that job search has 
become the dominant route into employment.  However, the close relationships formed 
between universities and employers under the previous regime have persisted, and, as 
we shall see, still play an important role in the job search process. 
Typically, a student’s “search period” is the whole of their final year of study.  Officially, 
the student leaves university at the end of June. 
3.3 Literature review  
The particular problems faced by graduates seeking employment have been identified in 
the context of other countries.  Saks and Ashforth (1999) conducted a survey of 384 
graduating students in one major city in Canada, and they find that active job search 
                                                      
59
  The above discussed situations remain valid in most areas though hukou policy has been 
experimented in 13 provinces and cities since 1997, most of these places are less developed 
areas or small cities and towns (see Section 1.2). 
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behaviour and higher job search intensity both have a positive effect on the search 
outcome.  Try (2005) used data from the Norwegian Graduate Surveys 1995-2000 to 
investigate the use of different job search strategies, finding that 70% of graduates 
respond to employers’ advertisements directly, and that the use of informal search 
methods is affected by the possession of social capital.  Another finding from this study 
is that graduates with poor job prospects (either in terms of poor initial quality or lower 
probability of employability) are more likely to seek employment through the “Public 
Employment Service” (job centre).  Saks (2006) analysed data on 225 recent graduates 
in one anonymous major city in Canada, and reports evidence that active job search 
impacts positively on the number of job interviews and offers.   
There is a paucity of empirical studies of graduate job search using data from China.  
This is for the previously discussed reason that job search has only become a widespread 
phenomenon in China in the last decade; furthermore, there are well-known problems 
with obtaining data in China.  However, a small number of empirical studies have 
recently been carried out by researchers at Beijing University, using a nationwide survey 
of graduate employment status conducted in June 2003.  A stratified sampling procedure 
was adopted, ex ante.  The stratification was firstly by region: three provinces would be 
selected from each region: East, Middle and West 60 .  Then, within each selected 
province, one or two institutions would be selected from each of the three types: key 
university, regular university, and college.  Then, from each of the selected institutions, a 
sample of 600 graduates would be taken in a way that ensured appropriate coverage of 
level (Bachelors, Masters or Research degree) and subject studied.  The planned 
stratification was followed with only partial success.  The western region was 
significantly over-represented, with 22 of the 45 participating institutions being from this 
region, of which 17 were from a single province-Yunnan.  The middle region was under-
represented, with only 6 participating institutions, all from the same province-Hunan.  It 
is reported that there were a total of 18,722 valid responses in the survey, implying a 
                                                      
60
  Mainland China is divided into three regions for the purposes of the nation’s economic 
planning: the East, the Middle and the West.  For other purposes, it is divided into 23 provinces 
(including Taiwan), 5 autonomous regions, 4 direct-controlled municipalities and 2 special 
administrative regions. 
Hukou and Graduates’ Job Search in China                                                                             Chapter 3   
 
 
45
response rate of around 60%. 
One study using this data is by Yue et al. (2004), who use logistic regression to 
investigate the determinants of the job search outcome, with “success” defined as one of 
the following: receiving a job offer; waiting for a job offer; choosing self-employment; 
undertaking further education; or planning to remain unemployed for a short time.  We 
consider this definition of success to be too wide, partly because the last three groups in 
the list include people who seem having not engaged in job search.  Their results show 
that both academic performance and job information provided by the university have 
beneficial effects on search outcome; but search intensity, search skill training courses, 
and graduates’ original residential places have no noticeable effect.  A second study 
using the same data is by Li (2004), who investigates the interaction of job search 
channels (formal versus informal) and educational level.  He uses a binary probit model, 
with search outcome as the dependent variable.  However, his definition of informal job 
search is questionable; it includes “recommended by University”, which we consider to 
be a formal channel.  A third study is by Zhou (2003) defines an ordinal (0-9) variable to 
represent the self-reported amount of help the graduate receives from their university 
and uses this as an explanatory variable in logistic regression analysis of the search 
outcome, although the definition of the dependent variable is not clear.  It is found that 
university help does have a positive effect on the probability of employment, while 
pecuniary investment on search by individual students has little benefit. 
The main concern with the survey data on which all of these studies are based is that it 
was conducted in June 200361.  As already mentioned in Section 3.1, the outbreak of 
SARS meant that face-to-face contact was forbidden between April and July of that year.  
Over the same period, all kinds of recruitment activity on campus, for example job fairs, 
were cancelled62.  Students were confined to the campus, and so were unable to engage 
                                                      
61
  The survey was repeated in 2005 by Bejing University, Yan et al. (2005) performed the 
analysis using the same definition of search success as Yue et al. (2004).  However, Yan et al. 
(2005) do not distinguish graduates with different hukou status; instead they simply divide 
graduates into two groups: those from large cities, and others.  Hence it is hard to draw 
conclusions from Yan et al. (2005) with respect to the effect of hukou status.   
62
  Mo, R and J, Liu, “Difficulties of Graduate Employment”, Fazhang (Development), 8, p65-
69, 2003. 
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in direct search activities.  For these reasons, results from studies of graduates’ job 
search based on this survey data are likely to be biased.    
3.4 Models of job search  
Standard search models (McCall, 1970; Mortensen, 1970; Kiefer and Neumann, 1979) 
assume that in any period of time, a job-seeker might, according to some probability 
duration receive one or more job-offers each with an offered wage.  The applicant 
accepts an offer if the offered wage is at least as high as one’s reservation wage; 
otherwise rejects the offer.  The search outcome, that is to say the receiving and 
subsequent acceptance of an offer, is positively related to the number of search methods 
available and to the level of search effort, and negatively to the job-seekers reservation 
wage.  The reservation wage is in turn determined by the level of unemployment 
benefits, the state of the labour market; search costs, the job-seeker’s rate of time 
preference, and the job-seeker’s initial wealth (see Section 2.2). 
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Figure 3.2: Increases of Higher Education Tuition Fee and Per Capita Income in 
China  
Source: Li (2006) and Education Minister’s speech63  
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 Former Vice-Education Minister’s Speech, Beijing Youth Daily, 24 February 2005. 
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Applying these ideas to the situation of graduates seeking employment in China, we first 
see, in Figure 3.2, that initial wealth has the potential to vary considerably according to 
hukou status.  This graph, constructed from data provided by Li (2006) and the education 
minister (since 2003) speech in 2005, shows that per capita income is 2-3 times higher in 
urban households than in rural households, and, moreover, has been rising much more 
rapidly in the former.  In the same graph we see that university tuition fees have been 
rising steeply, and since 1999, have exceeded per capita income in rural households.  
This means that it would be very hard for a typical rural household to finance a 
university education without incurring significant debt.  In contrast, in an urban 
household, since it is typical for both parents to work and for there to be only one child64, 
and for this child to get financial support from grandparents on both sides, the financial 
constraints of educating the child are considerably less severe.  This is one difference 
that leads to the prediction that non-urban hukou job seekers are likely to have a lower 
reservation wage. 
Another difference leading to the same prediction is entitlement to unemployment 
benefits.  As explained in Chapter 1, this is an automatic entitlement to urban regular 
hukou holders, but denied to those with temporary hukou.  Some cities recently 
implemented a system of providing subsistence expenses to all graduates seeking 
employment.  However, because the subsidy is distributed by local urban community 
administration centres, administrative barriers prevent rural graduates from claiming it. 
In terms of availability of job search methods, graduates from rural areas are believed to 
have more limited search opportunities than those from urban areas since the former 
have fewer work-related social ties.  They are also less likely to benefit from information 
and referrals from their close relatives, who are likely to be working in the fields or in 
inferior job in cities. 
It might be predicted that graduates with non-urban hukou put greater effort in their job 
search than their urban counterparts, in order to secure their attained hukou status and to 
compensate for their disadvantaged position in terms of available search means.   
                                                      
64
  One-child policy started in 1978, but applies strictly in urban areas. 
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With the preceding discussion in mind, we advance the following three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Graduates with non-urban hukou conduct more intensive job-search than 
those with urban hukou, ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis 2: Graduates with non-urban hukou have a higher probability of gaining an 
offer than those with urban hukou, ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis 3: Graduates with non-urban hukou have a greater propensity to accept a 
given offer than those with urban hukou, ceteris paribus. 
Note that these three hypotheses are inter-related.  In section 3.2, we explained the 
institutional reasons why there is more pressure on non-urban hukou job-seekers to gain 
employment in the period leading up to graduation, than on urban hukou holders in the 
same position.  This pressure derives from the fact that confirmation of non-agricultural 
hukou status is conditional on gaining formal employment within one year of graduation.  
Then, in section 3.4, we described a theoretical model of job search, and advanced 
several reasons why these institutional factors cause non-urban hukou holders to have a 
lower reservation wage.   
Hypothesis 1 derives straightforwardly from the first of these differences: a greater 
incentive to secure formal employment must lead to more intensive job search.  
Hypothesis 2 derives from both differences of incentive and targeted labour market.  As 
we discussed in Figure 3.1, due to the constraints of hukou, urban and non-urban hukou 
graduates are likely to target different labour markets.  The former intends to gain a 
position from what we might think of as the ‘primary’ labour market (desirable jobs with 
a desirable urban hukou quota in our data); whereas the latter will position themselves in 
the ‘secondary’ labour market (less desirable jobs as long as they fall within an urban 
hukou quota).  Therefore, controlling for job search effort, the latter is more likely to 
gain a job offer. 
Hypothesis 3 also derives from both differences: when offered a position at a given 
starting salary, the non-urban hukou holder is more likely to accept it, firstly because 
they are generally more eager to secure employment, and secondly because their 
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reservation wage is lower than that of their urban counterparts. 
Each of the three hypotheses is tested econometrically in Section 3.6. 
3.5 Data collection 
The data to be used is from our own survey, entitled Graduates’ Job Search and 
Outcomes (毕业生求职行为及其结果调查, Appendix), conducted in June 2005 by the 
career centres of three universities: China University of Geosciences (CUG), Huazhong 
Agricultural University, and Zhongnan Finance and Law University.  All three 
universities are situated in Wuhan, the capital city of Hubei province, where there are 85 
higher education institutions, turning out more than 143,000 graduates in 2005.  
In March 2005, a research proposal was presented to these career centres.  The officials 
showed an interest in the survey and were pleased to cooperate, partly because they 
themselves face great pressure to improve their own graduate employment rate.  They 
assisted by releasing 1,500 questionnaires and in collecting 512 responses. 
The survey questionnaire elicited detailed information on the respondent’s 
characteristics and background (e.g. gender, hukou status, and household income), their 
academic performance, and their recent job search activities and outcomes, or expected 
search outcomes.  An important part of the survey is on employment expectations, 
including questions about anticipated annual remuneration, desired type of employment, 
and desired location of employment.  Equally important is the job-search section, which 
asks about labour market experience, search methods used, vacancy information 
channels used, intensity of search, numbers of interviews attended, and offer acceptance 
criteria.  Respondents who indicate that they have had an offer are asked about the 
number of offers received, and whether an offer has been accepted.  Those who claim to 
have accepted an offer are then asked about the type and size of their employing 
company, their position within the company, and their starting salary.  
 Qualitative information is extracted on reasons for rejecting offers, reasons for setting 
up one’s own business, and the respondent’s assessment of employment services 
provided by these career centres.  Graduates who have decided to pursue further study or 
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who are not seeking employment are excluded from the survey. 
As Figure 3.3 illustrates, the majority of graduates in the sample (60%) are from rural 
areas.  The proportion of the agricultural population in China has decreased from 82% in 
1978 to 57% in 200565.  It therefore appears that our sample is representative of the 
population.  However, the distribution of university students by hukou background does 
not appear to be representative.  Tong (2006) reported that students with non-urban 
hukou only accounted for 18% of the prestigious university student population in 1999 
in Beijing66.  In complete contrast, it is reported by an official website – Xinhuanet - that 
the vast majority (around 80%) of students in local higher education institutions in 
Qinghai (an impoverished western province) in 2005 have non-urban hukou status.  This 
suggests that there are significant regional imbalances in the proportion of rural students 
in receiving higher education. 
131 (30%)
43 (10%)
262 (60%)
Rural areas Medium or small cities Capital city of a province or municipality
Figure 3.3: Proportions of Family Registration Places in the Sample 
                                                      
65
  China Statistical Yearbook 2005, National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistics Press, 
2006, Beijing.  
66
  Survey of 2,000 Students at Key Universities in Beijing, China Youth Newspaper, 22 Jan 
2006. 
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The three universities in our survey enjoy a national reputation and have students from 
all over the country; hence there is a balanced distribution of students in the sample 
across hukou status.  We consider this to be a virtue of our dataset, given that the 
purpose of our study is to analyse differences of job search behaviour between graduates 
with non-urban and urban hukou.  Two of the three universities surveyed, CUG and 
Huazhong, were originally founded as single discipline universities, respectively 
geology and agriculture.  However, in recent years, as a result of the decline in 
importance of the centrally-planned curriculum, and also in response to labour market 
demand, teaching at these institutions has become much more diverse, including fields, 
for example, degree studies in economics, law and computer sciences, which are 
booming at both universities.  
3.6 Data analysis 
3.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.2 shows summary statistics on search choices, and other variables, for graduates 
with non-urban and urban hukou separately.  The results of independent sample t-tests 
for differences between these two groups are also shown in each row.  The key 
conclusions from this table are that the non-urban hukou job-seekers have a significantly 
higher chance of gaining employment (as represented by receiving of at least one offer; 
p=0.003), and also appear more likely to have accepted an offer (p=0.003).  These 
results could be attributed to greater job search effort among non-urban hukou graduates.  
We also see in Table 3.2 that non-urban respondents use a wider variety of search 
methods, contact more employers, than do their urban counterparts, although neither of 
these tests is statistically significant. 
Another significant difference between the two groups is in standard of living.  Average 
household income is almost twice as high for urban respondents as for non-urban 
respondents (p=0.000), and this confirms the wealth disparity between rural and urban 
areas discussed in Section 3.3.  
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Variables Mean 
T 
Sig.(2-
tail)  
Graduates 
with non-
urban hukou 
Graduates 
with 
urban 
hukou 
Employability (at least having an offer) 0.836 0.713 2.981***  0.003 
Offer acceptance 0.767 0.632 2.997*** 0.003 
Annual Household income in ¥1,000   18.664 32.040 -6.11*** 0.000 
Different job search methods used 3.095 2.914 1.182 0.238 
Number of employers contacted 9.49 8.63 0.898 0.370 
Any labour market experience (0 or 1) 0.905 0.856 1.549 0.122 
Graduate academic profile: 
Average grade achievement 77.653 77.414 0.316 0.752 
Passed College English Test Band 4 (0 or 1) 0.500 0.529 -0.587 0.558 
Passed College English Test Band 6 (0 or 1) 0.344 0.305 0.846 0.398 
Succeeded in Degree (0 or 1)   0.885 0.874 0.376 0.707 
Major in social science  0.405 0.448 -0.903 0.367 
Major in natural science 0.546 0.500 0.937 0.349 
Major in agriculture 0.050 0.052 -0.098 0.922 
Expected annual income in ¥1,000 † 31.309 30.057 1.629 0.104 
Actual annual income in ¥1,000 ‡ 21.954 24.981 -2.075** 0.039 
The most important information channel used lead to an offer (all variables are binary): 
From university 0.553 0.477 1.565 0.118 
From websites 0.290 0.293 -0.068 0.946 
From traditional media 0.023 0.034 -0.723 0.470 
From other social contacts 0.130 0.190 -1.700* 0.090 
From others  0.004 0.006 -0.291 0.771 
Job search methods used (all variables are binary): 
Attending job fairs in Wuhan 0.679 0.649 0.649 0.517 
Attending job fairs organized by university 0.882 0.810 2.066** 0.039 
Attending job fairs in expectant work places 0.290 0.287 0.061 0.951 
Releasing CV on career centre website 0.286 0.328 -0.919 0.359 
Releasing CV on commercial websites 0.366 0.299 1.459 0.145 
Recommendation by lecturers 0.282 0.178 2.589*** 0.010 
Rely on Relationship built while study 0.122 0.080 1.387 0.166 
Rely on other relationships 0.168 0.253 -2.105** 0.036 
Other methods 0.000 0.029 -2.262** 0.025 
The most important methods used at least generate an offer (all variables are binary): ♦ 
Going to regional job fairs 0.248 0.305 -1.300 0.194 
Institutional embeddedness ♣ 0.599 0.511 1.804* 0.072 
Social contacts 0.080 0.126 -1.588 0.113 
Via websites 0.050 0.040 0.458 0.647 
Other methods 0.023 0.017 0.406 0.685 
Sample size 262 174 
  
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
Table 3.2: Comparison of Job Search Behaviour between Graduates with Non-
urban and Urban Hukou (independent samples t-test for each variable individually) 
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  In most Chinese universities, to attain a degree, students have to meet two criteria.  One is no 
failure in course work; the other is to pass College English Test Band 4 (CET4), the latter is a 
national exam and taking twice a year.  
†  “Expected annual income in ¥1,000” is obtained from this survey question: “what annual 
income do you expect to receive in your first job?”  Respondents are invited to select an income 
range as their reply.  
‡  “The actual annual income in ¥1,000” is collected by asking respondents who declared to 
accept an offer to choose an income range, there are 305 observations. 
♦  These variables are generated from responses by indicating one of the above listed search 
methods is the most important one defined as at least producing a job offer  
♣  The variable used to represent “institutional embededness” is one that indicates that the most 
important search method is one of the following: job fair organised by university; 
recommendation by faculty members; use of CV template on career centre website; networking 
while studying.  
 
The difference in academic performance between the two groups, as measured by 
English proficiency, success in degree, average grade, and major, is not statistically 
significant.  It appears, therefore, that the difference in search success between these two 
groups cannot be explained by any differences in academic performance.  This is in 
contrast with Yue et al. (2004) and Yan et al. (2005), who both provide evidence that 
graduates’ academic performance greatly improves employment prospects.   
When looking for differences in choice of job search method between the two groups, 
we focus on the method reported by the respondent as being the most important, in terms 
of potential to result in an offer.  Here, the one significant difference is in institutional 
embeddedness67: non-urban respondents appear to attach significantly more importance 
to this type of search method (particularly recommendation by lecturers, and attendance 
at job fairs organised by the university) than do their urban counterparts (p=0.07).  In 
contrast, urban respondents appear to attach more importance to other social contacts 
(p=0.11).  These patterns are consistent with the idea that social capitals are a privilege 
that only urban hukou holders are in a position to enjoy, and non-urban hukou holders 
therefore need to rely on any such assistance as is provided by their institutions. 
                                                      
67
  Institutional Embeddedness was defined in Section 3.1.  In the survey, respondents were not 
asked directly about the importance of institutional embededness.  The variable used here is a 
combination of variables obtained from the survey responses.  For details, see the notes below 
Table 3.2. 
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Meanwhile, there is a telling difference in the starting salary between the two groups.  
Graduates with urban hukou, on average, take higher-paid positions; this is consistent 
with the findings of Yan et al. (2005).  However, we also notice that there are no obvious 
differences in the expected annual income between these two groups.  This suggests that 
graduates with non-urban hukou, despite being equally optimistic as their urban 
counterparts about their future, are willing to accept a lower starting salary when the 
offer actually comes (they have a lower reservation wage); we conjecture that this is due 
to the pressure resulting from their hukou status. 
More details of this dataset see Appendix A1 (1).  
3.6.2 Econometric analysis 
In Section 3.4, we described a theoretical model of job search in which greater intensity 
of job search results in more offers being received.  An obvious way to measure search 
intensity is using the number of employers contacted within a certain period (Blau and 
Robins, 1990).  Analysis of such a variable is made easy in the case of Chinese 
graduates due to the fact that they are engaging in search subject to the unofficial but 
generally accepted deadline of 30th June each year, so the period of search is effectively 
the same for all individuals in the population of interest.  Since the number of companies 
contacted within this period is a count variable, taking only non-negative integer values, 
we estimate a Poisson regression model. 
The results are shown in Table 3.3.  The second specification in Table 3.3 includes 
interactive variables. The coefficients of the interacted variables are not statistically 
significant apart from the interaction between using the internet to search for a job and 
with having a rural hukou status.  This shows that rural students are less likely to use the 
web; computers were not widely accessible in 2005 in China and this result may reflect 
family background which would explain why this group were even less likely to have 
access to computers.  However, there are only 25 students in this group.  Despite of this 
difference, there is no noticeable difference in the coefficients of these two specifications.  
Our interpretations therefore are based on results from the first specification. 
The central result is that individuals with non-urban hukou conduct a significantly more 
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intensive job-search, ceteris paribus, than their urban counterparts, reflecting the greater 
pressure that they are under to secure a position.  This provides evidence in favour of our 
Hypothesis 1. 
Dependent variable: number of employers contacted Coef. (Std. Err.) Coef. (Std. Err.) 
  
Constant 1.216***(0.222) 1.156***(0.228) 
Hukou status (1=non-urban; 0=urban) 0.075**(0.036) 0.139 (0.126) 
Gender (1=female;0=male) 0.040 (0.040) 0.040 (0.040) 
Passed College English Test Band 4( 0 or 1) -0.079 (0.047) -0.079 (0.047) 
Passed College English Test Band 6( 0 or 1) 0.060 (0.052) 0.063 (0.052) 
Any labour market experiences (0 or 1) -0.013 (0.051) -0.002 (0.051) 
Succeed in degree (0 or 1) 0.429*** (0.059) 0.436*** (0.059) 
Average grade achievement -0.003 (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) 
Expected annual income in ¥1,000 0.010*** (0.002) 0.010*** (0.002) 
Family annual income in ¥1,000  0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
Communist Party Member (0 or 1) -0.050 (0.034) -0.041 (0.034) 
 
The most important job search method used (excluded category: family ties and other methods): 
Attending regional job fairs 0.490***(0.068) 0.521***(0.101) 
Institutional embeddedness 0.295***(0.066) 0.294***(0.099) 
Releasing CVs on commercial websites -0.111(0.099) 0.362***(0.140) 
Major (excluded category: agriculture):  
Social sciences 0.292***(0.082) 0.284***(0.082) 
Natural sciences 0.109 (0.081) 0.110 (0.082) 
 
Preferred employment location(excluded category: no limitation for employment place): 
Work in Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen 0.121 (0.075) 0.112 (0.075) 
Work in capital city of a province or large city in 
coastal area 
0.077 (0.070) 0.071 (0.071) 
Work in medium or small city in coastal area 0.018 (0.083) 0.029 (0.083) 
Work in medium or small city in the middle and west 
areas 
-0.523***(0.111) -0.523***(0.111) 
 
Hukou status interact with the most important job search method 
Hukou*attending regional labour market   -0.058 (0.137) 
Hukou*institutional embeddedness for job search  -0.012 (0.133) 
Hukou* releasing CV on commercial website  -0.830***(0.197) 
 
  
Log-likelihood -2564.607 -2551.441 
Sample size 436 436 
Note: * p<0.1;**p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Table 3.3: A Poisson Regression Model of Number of Employers Contacted  
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The significant coefficient of the variable “succeed in degree” 68  indicates that the 
prospect of academic success is associated with more intensive job search.  This is 
expected; students who fail their degree are required to retake the failed components in 
the following year, clearly a hindrance to the employment process.  Expected annual 
income has the expected positive effect: the higher the status to which the individual 
aspires, the more effort they are prepared to invest to attain it. 
Social science students appear to search harder than students in other disciplines.  This is 
consistent with recent reports 69  that social science graduates face more difficulties 
finding employment.  In particular, those majoring in law 70 , economics and 
administration face the problem that they are part of a significant excess supply, since 
almost every university sets up these degrees as part of the higher education expansion 
initiated in 1999. 
Moving to the final section71 of Table 3.3, we see that individuals who wish to work in 
smaller cities in the middle or the west region engage in less intensive job search than 
those who wish to work in large cities, or in the coastal area.  This is consistent with the 
idea that it is harder to get a job in the coastal area, or in large cities, because of higher 
demand of positions in these locations.  The higher demand is partly because hukou 
status in large cities in the coastal area is more valuable, in terms of the various benefits 
for the holder and for the holder’s offspring.  Hence those who are prepared to work in 
the middle or west region do not need to search so intensively. 
Table 3.4 shows gender differences in terms of job search behaviour.  Generally male 
graduates tend to be more active than female graduates in terms of contacting employers. 
                                                      
68
  See Table 3.2 for the definition of this variable. 
69
  See Guomin, Bai, and Yuejin, Ma, 2006 , “The Employment Difficulty Faced by Social 
Science Students”, on Dean’s Forum, [Online; cited, June 2007,] Available from 
http://www.chinalawinfo.com/Fxyluntan/gq1.html 
70
  Law is still the lowest employment rate in a survey among 2008 graduates. See section 3.2 for 
detail. 
71
  This categorisation is based on patterns observed in surveys (such as “Graduates’ ideal 
employer survey” in 2001 and 2004) conducted by the magazine Chinese Student Career, which 
is published by China Education Ministry. 
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This reflects the fact that women from wealthier family backgrounds contact fewer 
employers, while the reverse is true for young men from similar backgrounds.  Male 
students from rural areas are likely to contact more employers.  Male students who wish 
to work in the middle or west areas contact fewer employers.  Male CCP members are 
quite passive in terms of contacting employers.   
Number of employers contacted Coef. (Std. Err.) Coef. (Std. Err.) 
 Female Male  
Constant 0.661 (0.591) 1.520***(0.259) 
Hukou status (1=non-urban; 0=urban) 0.001 (0.075) 0.101**(0.042) 
Passed College English Test Band 4( 0 or 1) 0.153 (0.143) -0.111**(0.052) 
Passed College English Test Band 6( 0 or 1) -0.025 (0.142) 0.111*(0.059) 
Any labour market experiences (0 or 1) -0.276**(0.136) 0.038 (0.056) 
Succeed in degree (0 or 1) 0.299**(0.137) 0.374***(0.072) 
Average grade achievement -0.004 (0.005) -0.004 (0.003) 
Family annual income in ¥1,000 -0.004**(0.002) 0.002**(0.001) 
Expected annual income in ¥1,000 0.034***(0.005) 0.004*(0.002) 
Communist Party Member -0.041 (0.074) -0.096**(0.040) 
 
The most important job search method used (excluded category: family ties and other 
methods): 
Attending regional job fairs 0.598***(0.143) 0.446***(0.078) 
Institutional embeddedness 0.293**(0.146) 0.270***(0.075) 
Releasing CVs on commercial websites 0.496***(0.177) -0.423***(0.127) 
 
Major (excluded category: agriculture): 
Social sciences 0.464(0.430) 0.319***(0.084) 
Natural sciences 0.514 (0.424) 0.079 (0.084) 
 
Preferred employment location(excluded category: no limitation for employment place): 
Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen -0.211(0.179) 0.126 (0.084) 
Capital city of a province or large city in coastal 
area 
-0.044 (0.165) 0.073 (0.079) 
Medium or small city in coastal area 0.057 (0.185) -0.080 (0.094) 
Medium or small city in the middle and west areas -0.085(0.207) -0.725***(0.142) 
  
Number of observations 104 332 
Log likelihood -579.247 -1922.27 
Note: * p<0.1;**p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Table 3.4: A Poisson Regression Model of Number of Employers Contacted 
between Male and Female graduates 
Also in Table 3.4, both female and male graduates used regional labour market contacts 
quite extensively and benefited from institutional embeddedness when approaching 
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employers, the former tends to depend more on the internet for job search than the latter.  
However, as we explained before, this is a small group. 
Next we turn to an analysis of the number of offers received.  This also is a count 
variable, with an added complication.  The variable is the response to the question “how 
many offers have you received until now?” and the possible responses are: none; 1 offer; 
2 offers; 3 or more offers.  This means that the count variable is upper-censored at 3, and 
in order to identify its determinants, we require the upper censored Poisson regression 
model, which is described in the Appendix 1(3). 
The results are presented in Table 3.5.  First of all, note that we are including the number 
of employers contacted as an explanatory variable, since this is obviously a key 
determinant of the number of offers received.  As expected, it has a significantly positive 
effect, confirming that job search is richly rewarded72.  We further see that, controlling 
for the number of employers contacted, a non-urban hukou holder is expected to receive 
more offers than an urban hukou holder with otherwise the same characteristics.  This 
provides evidence in favour of our Hypothesis 2; employers favour non-urban hukou 
holders because of their dedication and their willingness to work for lower remuneration.  
Another interpretation of this effect is that urban-hukou holders have less success 
because they tend to rely more heavily on social contacts which are a less effective job 
search method (see t-test for “rely on other relationships” in Table 3.2).  Zeng and Cui 
(2008) present evidence that formal job search methods largely contribute to 
employment success among skilled workers in urban China.  One interpretation in our 
data is that the majority of urban hukou holders in the sample are from medium or small 
cities (see Figure 3.3), but they inevitably prefer to work in large cities.  Social 
networking is more likely to be more effective in the job-searcher’s home-city. 
Employers’ apparent favouring of non-urban hukou holders could also be interpreted in 
terms of sample selection.  A well-known inequity in the Chinese higher education 
system is that entrance requirements are higher for non-urban hukou holders (Wang, 
2004).  It follows that it is reasonable to expect non-urban graduates to be academically 
                                                      
72
  Although Yue et al. (2004) and Yan et al. (2005) disagree with us on this point. 
Hukou and Graduates’ Job Search in China                                                                             Chapter 3   
 
 
59
stronger, on average, than urban graduates.  Employers may thus be using a form of 
“statistical discrimination” (Elliot, 1991) in favouring the former. 
Dependent variable: number of offers received (upper censored at 3) Coef. (Std. Err.) 
  
Constant -0.585**(0.179) 
Hukou status (1=rural; 0=urban) 0.199**(0.087) 
Gender (1=male; 0=female) 0.106 (0.100) 
Passed College English Test Band 6 (0 or 1) -0.123 (0.122) 
Passed College English Test Band 4(0 0r 1) -0.106 (0.133) 
Any labour market experience (0 or 1) -0.089 (0.122) 
Average grade achievement 0.017***(0.004) 
Number of employers contacted 0.003*(0.002) 
Family annual income in ¥1,000 0.004**(0.002) 
Communist Party member (0 or 1) 0.120 (0.084) 
Average Academic Grade<70 
Average Academic Grade >70 0.049 (0.132) 
Average Academic Grade >80 0.263*(0.140) 
Average Academic Grade >90 0.517***(0.179) 
Number of degrees♦ (excluded category: no degree): 
One degree 0.304*(0.179) 
Two degrees 0.595***(0.179) 
The most important job search method used (excluded category: family ties and others): 
Attending regional job fairs 0.094 (0.179) 
Institutional embeddedness 0.050 (0.179) 
Releasing CV on commercial websites 0.215 (0.179) 
Major (excluded category: agriculture): 
Social science -0.007 (0.179) 
Natural science 0.126 (0.179) 
 
Log-likelihood -566.381 
Sample size 436 
Note: * p<0.1;**p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
Table 3.5: An Upper-Censored Poisson Regression Model of Number of Offers 
Received  
 The method used to estimate this model is described in Appendix A1 (2) 
♦After the second year at university, students can apply for a second degree course.  Whether the 
application is approved is based on their grade achievement during the two years of their first 
major. Once approved, students are required to take 6-7 extra courses for the second degree, in 
addition to those for the first degree.  These extra courses for the second degree are mainly 
attended at weekends, in order to avoid timetable clashes.  The most capable students tend to 
have two degrees after four years of study, and they use this as a positive signalling device in the 
labour market.  For some students it takes an additional year (i.e. a fifth year) to complete the 
second degree. 
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The effect of institutional embeddedness (defined in Section 3.1) is statistically 
significant.  The positive coefficient shows that it is a more effective job search method 
than any of the others.  On this point, we agree with Zhou (2003), Yue et al. (2004), and 
Yan et al. (2005).  
Next, we turn to the decision by the job-searcher on whether or not to accept an offer.  
Since this is a dichotomous choice, a probit model is used.  For this purpose, we only 
use data on the 305 respondents who received at least one offer.  The model can be 
represented as follows: 
 ( ) ( )1,,,, iiiriiAAi YXHukouwSMPP =  
where PAi represents the probability of offer acceptance, conditional upon receiving one, 
by individual i.  SMi denotes the search method they consider to be most useful; wri is 
the individual’s reservation wage.  Hukoui is, as in previous models, a dummy variable 
taking the value 1 if individual i is non-urban, zero if urban.  Xi is a vector of individual 
characteristics, such as gender, grade achievement, and household income, English 
proficiency.  Yi is a vector of variables representing factors affecting the probability of 
gaining an offer, such as search intensity and labour market experience.   
The results are presented in Table 3.6.  As we can see, close to the bottom of the table, 
once graduates received an offer, they are very likely to accept across different search 
methods and subject background.  This reflects the pressure of employment faced by 
these job seekers.  However, compared with the willingness of accepting an offer gained 
via using other methods (i.e. attending job fairs organized by other than universities and 
online application), graduates are significantly likely to accept an offer obtained via 
formal job search channels, such as job fairs or university support activities.  An offer 
received via informal job search channels, namely other social contacts in the regression, 
is also more likely to be taken compared with the control category; this partly supports 
the argument that using social contacts may produce a better paid position (see Chapter 
2).  Most importantly, empirical evidence shows that graduates with non-urban hukou 
have a higher probability to accept an offer, ceteris paribus; this provides support for our 
Hypothesis 3.  
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Dependent variable: 1=accept; 0=not accept Coef. (s.e.) 
 
Constant -1.011 (1.416) 
Hukou status (1=non-urban; 0=urban) 0.379* (0.229) 
Gender (1=male; 0=female) -0.03 (0.256) 
Communist party membership (1=member; 0=non member) 0.191 (0.229) 
Passed College English Test Band 6 (0 or 1) 0.286 (0.339) 
Passed College English Test Band 4( 0 or 1) 0.533* (0.309) 
Any labour market experience (0 or 1) 0.038 (0.367) 
Family annual income in ¥ 1,000 0.001 (0.002) 
Average grade achievement -0.009 (0.017) 
Number of employers contacted 0.024 (0.015) 
Number of different job search methods used -0.11 (0.076) 
Number of different information channels used -0.095 (0.092) 
 
Number of degrees (excluded category: no degree): 
One degree 0.490 (0.403) 
Two degrees 0.338 (0.504) 
 
Major (excluded category: Social science): 
Agriculture 0.770** (0.355) 
Natural science 0.467** (0.230) 
 
The most important job search method used (excluded category: other method): 
Attending regional job fairs 1.833*** (0.623) 
Institutional embeddedness 2.030*** (0.621) 
Via social contacts 1.863** (0.745) 
 
Log-likelihood 
Sample size 
-89.8966 
305 
Note: * p<0.1;**p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Table 3.6: A Probit Model of Offer Acceptance (Conditional on Receiving at Least 
One Offer) 
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In addition to the number of offers received, another short-term outcome of job search is 
the level of starting salary.  Here, we only consider the 305 respondents who accepted 
offers.  The starting salary was recorded as interval data, that is, all that is known about a 
respondent’s starting salary is that it is in a particular range of values.  Accordingly, we 
use the interval regression model, and the results are given in Table 3.7.  Two 
specifications are adopted: the second specification includes additional variables 
representing the type of employer.  Surprisingly, type of employer is found to be 
insignificant, although the significance of company size does indicate that large 
companies tend to pay higher starting salaries. 
Turning to the focus of the analysis, both specifications indicate that non-urban hukou 
status significantly and negatively relates to starting salary.  In particular, from 
specification 1, we see that the starting salary for a non-urban hukou holder is ¥3, 355 a 
year lower than that for an urban hukou holder with otherwise the same characteristics.  
This result is consistent with our Hypothesis 3.  Non-urban hukou holders appear 
willing to accept lower offers, and this is in turn consistent with the notion that they have 
a lower reservation wage73. 
Students who have passed College English Test Band 6 and with one or two degrees are 
usually offered higher starting salary, confirming that academic achievement is highly 
pecuniary rewarded in the graduate labour market.  
Graduates with higher expected annual income, unsurprisingly, receive higher starting 
salaries, suggesting that individuals are a good judge of their own potential or that they 
prioritize this expectation in the job search.  
We conducted Chi-squared tests to investigate the joint impact of job search method and 
type of employer on starting salary, the result for the former is ( )2 3 0.93χ =  with p-
value 0.82; for the latter is ( )2 4 6.96χ =  with p-value 0.14, these confirm that there is 
no significant influence of these two groups of dummy variables on the starting salary. 
                                                      
73
  Note that reservation wage is not the same as starting salary; the former is a lower bound to 
the latter. 
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Dependent variable: starting salary in ¥1,000♣ Model 1 Model 2 
 
Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) 
 
Constant 8.316 (7.207) 7.956 (7.328) 
Hukou status (1=non-urban; 0=urban) -3.355*** (1.245) -3.49*** (1.259) 
Gender (1=male; 0=female) -0.98 (1.420) -1.18 (1.430) 
Communist Party membership (0 or 1) 0.391 (1.160) 0.464 (1.166) 
Passed College English Test Band 6 (0 or 1) 5.511*** (1.933) 5.665*** (1.937) 
Passed College English Test Band 4 (0 or 1) 2.885* (1.746) 2.971* (1.764) 
Any labour market experience (0 or 1) 0.329 (2.010) -0.073 (2.041) 
Family annual income in ¥1,000  0.005 (0.011) 0.006 (0.012) 
Average grade achievement -0.016 (0.088) -0.01 (0.089) 
Company size in number of staff 0.005*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 
Number of employers contacted -0.138** (0.059) -0.137** (0.060) 
Expected annual income in ¥1,000 0.095*** (0.029) 0.091*** (0.030) 
 
Major (excluded category: agriculture): 
Social science -0.241(1.740) -0.532 (1.793) 
Natural science 1.540 (1.593) 1.345 (1.610) 
 
Number of degrees (excluded category: no degree): 
One  5.934*** (2.150) 6.134*** (2.219) 
Two degrees 6.903*** (2.705) 7.129*** (2.803) 
  
 
The most important job search method used (excluded category: social contacts): 
Attending regional job fairs 0.512 (2.579) 0.354 (2.612) 
Institutional embeddedness 1.585 (2.457) 1.633 (2.504) 
Releasing CVs on commercial websites 3.047 (3.869) 3.644 (3.922) 
Other methods used 3.451 (6.216) 2.618 (6.247) 
 
Type of employer (excluded type: others, such as joining the army):  
State-owned company  1.567 (2.558) 
Institutions  0.362 (2.587) 
Private company  -0.140 (2.428) 
Foreign and Join Venture company  2.039 (2.485) 
Government such as civil servant  0.499 (3.816) 
  
 
/lnsigma 2.204 (0.048) 2.201 (0.048) 
Sigma 9.058 (0.437) 9.034 (0.437) 
 
Log-likelihood 
Sample size 
-456.07037 
305 
-453.62224 
305 
Note: * p<0.1;**p<0.05; *** p<0.01.. 
Table 3.7: Interval Regression of Starting Salary  
♣ Starting salary is recorded in the following intervals: less than ¥15,000 per annum; ¥15,001-
¥20,000; ¥20,001-¥30,000; ¥30,001-¥50,000; more than ¥50,000. 
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In our data set, 40% of the students report being CCP members. I have consulted (in 
February 2010) party secretaries who are in charge of selection of CCP members at three 
universities where our data collected in China.  I was informed that approximately 50% 
of graduates are CCP members.  Among students studying certain subjects, such as 
engineering, geology and management engineering, the proportion is closer to 100%.  
This is because since 2000 the Chinese Communist Party has targeted university 
students in recruitment.  This is also reported by Simon et al. (2009) who note an 
increase of CCP membership from 3.8 per cent of China’s population in 1978 to 5.2 per 
cent (66 million members) in 2002. 
A number of empirical studies report a wage premium associated with CCP membership, 
using data on the urban workforce ( for a review, see Simon et al. (2009) ).  In particular, 
Li et al. (2007) used a survey of urban Chinese identical twins observed in 2003.  They 
found a wage premium of around 11 per cent using OLS analysis, but this effect falls 
almost to zero when a within-twin-pair fixed-effects model is used.  They also report no 
CCP wage premium for younger workers even using OLS. 
This partially explains the insignificant effect of CCP membership in our data; graduates 
are fresh arrivals in the labour market.  In addition, most of them are from rural areas.  
They have not established their networks which might relate to their unobservable 
characteristics which lead them to become CCP members; therefore they have not been 
able to reap this type of benefit if there is any. 
3.7 Conclusions 
In Section 3.4, we advanced three Hypotheses, each concerning the difference between 
graduates of non-urban and urban hukou status.  In Section 3.6, we reported econometric 
evidence in favour of all three Hypotheses, using data from graduate job-seekers in 
Wuhan.  The first was that non-urban hukou holders engage more intensively in job 
search, and this was confirmed using a count data model of the number of employers 
contacted.  The result was interpreted in terms of the higher pressure placed on non-
urban hukou holders to secure employment; this pressure comes as a direct consequence 
of certain features of the institutional framework, discussed in Section 3.2.  The second 
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Hypothesis was that non-urban hukou holders have a higher probability of receiving an 
offer, and we found evidence for this using a count data model of the number of offers 
received.  This was interpreted in terms of various reasons why we believe that non-
urban hukou holders are more desirable to employers than urban hukou holders.  The 
third and final hypothesis was that non-urban hukou holders are more likely to accept an 
offer, and we found evidence of this using a binary data model of offer acceptance.  The 
interpretation of this result is in terms of the lower reservation wage of non-urban hukou 
holders, which is a consequence of a number of institutional factors connected with 
hukou status; these were explained in Section 3.4.  Further confirmation of the difference 
in reservation wage was found in a model of starting salary, in which we found that non-
urban hukou holders accept significantly lower starting salaries, on average. 
This chapter has established evidence that effort put into job search is rewarded in China.  
This is important because job search is a relative new phenomenon among graduates in 
China, a small amount of previous researches in this area has, for a variety of reasons, 
not provided a definitive answer on the effectiveness of search.  This chapter is, by our 
knowledge, the first showing the empirical evidence of positive relationship between 
search effort and search outcome, though the Chinese labour market is still under 
developing.   
The chapter has also demonstrated that university activities play an important role in 
assisting graduates in the transition from university into the labour market, suggesting 
that universities themselves have the potential to increase the graduate employment rate.  
Although other social contacts have been revealed to be an important job search method 
to access urban jobs (see Section 2.2), our empirical result shows that it does not seem 
efficient among graduates.  We suggest that graduates tend to work at large cities which 
are far away from the origin of most of them, in our sample 90% job seekers being from 
small cities or rural areas, therefore it is unlikely that they have quality social contacts 
which partially attribute to its subtle influence.  We will investigate the deep impact of 
social contacts on compensation and job separation as it presents in the following 
chapters.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Compensation in a Privately-Owned Firm in China 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The determination of compensation within an organisation has been a growing 
research area within labour and personnel economics.  However, empirical 
investigations are still rare due to the confidentiality of personnel records.  For 
example, Baker and Holmstrom (1995) have observed that the study of Internal 
Labour Markets has “too many theories, and too few facts”.  Lin (2005) reviewed 
empirical studies in this field, by which time there were only 28, 19 of which had 
been undertaken since 1999.  No wonder Herpen et al. (2006) stated that empirical 
research in personnel economics “has just left its infancy”.  Furthermore, most of the 
documented empirical work is from western countries, predominantly the USA, and 
there is a distinct lack of empirical work on the subject from eastern countries.  So far, 
the literature includes one study based on a Japanese firm (Ariga et al., 1999), and a 
second using data from a Taiwanese firm, on which Japanese culture has great 
influence (Lin, 2005).  To the best of our knowledge, there have been no such studies 
of firms in mainland China. 
As discussed in Section 1.3, Domestic Privately-Owned Enterprises (DPOEs) have 
been regarded as an important driving force in China’s rapid economic growth.  This 
is particularly true in the case of the textile industry which is one of the traditional 
pillars of the Chinese national economy, and makes China the world’s most 
prominent garment producer.  Domestic privately-owned enterprises account for 63% 
of the total number of textile firms.  The remainder are collectively owned, foreign-
owned, and State-owned74.  This is attributed partly to the textile industry being one 
of the first industries to be granted permission for private ownership; this was in the 
1980s (Zhang, 2005).   
In view of the importance of DPOEs in the textile industry and also throughout the 
wider economy, it is essential to understand the compensation mechanisms that arise 
                                                      
74
  China Statistical Yearbook 2008, National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical 
Press, 2009, Beijing. 
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within this type of enterprise.  Of course, we could note that DPOEs can be compared 
with firms in western economies in the sense of being profit-driven75.  However, it 
must be remembered that DPOEs are operating within a transitional economy, and 
face a hostile institutional environment.  They had been suppressed for nearly 30 
years since 1949.  Although they were legalised in 1978, it took more than a quarter 
of a century, until 2005, for them to be officially granted the same treatment as State-
owned enterprises, and currently still being in disadvantaged as a market player (see 
Section 1.3).   
A deep influence on Chinese culture is Confucianism; one key concept is Guanxi, 
which still permeates Chinese society (Buckley et al., 2006).  As already explained in 
Section 1.4, Guanxi is used by individuals to their advantage in job search; being 
related to someone senior in the same organization improves one’s career prospects.  
Also, Guanxi is widely used by employers as a means of reducing uncertainty in job 
matching and discouraging opportunistic behaviour such as shirking.  Hence we are 
motivated to examine the quantitative impact of Guanxi on salary in a typical private 
firm. 
With 1,100 personnel records from one representative domestic privately-owned firm 
covering a 12-year period, we assess which of human capital, tenure and Guanxi 
weighs most heavily in the determination of salary.  Historically, the stereotypical 
view of DPOEs was one of a “sweat-shop” environment in which the labour of 
poorly-skilled migrant workers is exploited.  However, since the 1990s, the face of 
the private workforce has been changing; this is because that a large number of 
workers whom made redundant from State-owned enterprises have moved over to the 
private sector.  In particular, since the new millennium, private employers have taken 
on the largest numbers of graduates among all types of enterprises (see Section 1.5).  
For these reasons, it will be interesting to investigate the importance of human capital 
in the determination of remuneration.  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and an 
Instrument Variable (IV) models are used for this purpose. 
                                                      
75
  State-owned enterprises and township village enterprises are still heavily regulated by 
government, and operate according to social objectives, such as employment instead of profit 
maximum. 
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We also consider which of the above factors has the greatest influence on the 
likelihood of receiving a Deferred Compensation Package (DCP, consisting of old-
age insurance, medical insurance and unemployment insurance in this study).  Binary 
Probit models are used to identify the determinants of whether a DCP is received, and 
of whether such a package is being received for the first time. 
The rest of this Chapter is arranged as follows.  Section 4.2 is the literature review; 
Section 4.3 investigates the actual deferred compensation packages in the context of 
the Chinese private sector; Section 4.4 introduces the firm studied and data, Section 
4.5 describes our empirical strategies; Section 4.6 outlines the empirical results, and 
our conclusions are presented in Section 4.7. 
4.2 Literature review 
Discussions on Internal Labour Markets date back to Doeringer and Piore (1971).  An 
individual’s compensation is affected not only by their human capital, promotion, 
position, and other hidden information, such as social capital within an organization, 
but also by organizational rules and culture.  Payment is, to a large extent, free from 
the pressures of external labour markets, but it does interact with external labour 
markets through certain ports of entry and exit. 
As discussed in Section 2.3, a wide range of economic theories have attempted to 
explain the complex compensation arrangements within the Internal Labour Market, 
and hence to uncover what happens within this “black box”.  The specific human 
capital model (Schultz, 1961; Becker, 1962; Mincer, 1974), argues that the specific 
human capital accumulated by senior workers makes them more valuable to the 
current firm, resulting in seniority being rewarded with higher remuneration.  The 
learning and matching approach highlights the benefits, in terms of increases in 
productivity, of suitable matching between particular employers and employees 
(Jovanovic, 1979).  The job-assignment model (Sattinger, 1993) focuses on the 
presence of comparative advantage of individual workers, and on the "scale-of-
operations" effect (workers with higher ability being assigned to jobs in which 
decisions have an impact over a larger scale of operations) in determining the job 
assignment and the associated remuneration.  Gibbons and Waldman (1999) 
integrated these three models and found their framework could explain a wide range 
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of stylised facts relating to wage and promotion dynamics within firms. 
Another class of model is the incentive models.  These are related to the idea that 
compensation is structured to induce effort.  Holmstrom (1979) and Shavell (1979) 
used payoffs to resolve the principal-agent problem; Lazear and Rosen (1981) 
constructed the tournament model to explain the use of comparative incentives 
(promotions) to motivate employees; Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) proposed the 
efficiency wage model in order to induce workers’ effort.  Lazear (1995), who, 
incidentally, coined the phrase Personnel Economics, explicitly focused on the 
incentive effect of wage design, and argued that senior workers receive higher wages 
as compensation for their hard work in the early stages of their career within a firm. 
However, these areas of research still suffer from a scarcity of empirical work due 
partly to personnel data often being considered as an important business secret, 
consequently very difficult to access.  The small amount of empirical study on 
personnel economics that has been done, has been surveyed recently by Lin (2005), 
who summarizes the type of firms being studied, the country of origin, the time 
period, the worker types, the dependent variable (wage, bonus, pension), and the 
main conclusions drawn.  There were 28 studies covered in this survey, most of 
which had been undertaken since 1999 - a confirmation of the infancy of this area of 
research.  There have since been at least two other major studies using personnel 
records to examine the internal labour market.  Pfeifer (2008) uses personnel records 
from one German firm to obtain the results that: wages are positively correlated to 
human capital and are largely, but not exclusively, explained by job levels; 
promotions are associated with wage increases.  Seltzer and Sammartino (2009) 
provide evidence that salaries were determined by job tenure and position by 
examining personnel records of two large firms between 1890s to 1900s in Australia.  
In China’s transitional economy, uncertainty and enforcement difficulties increase 
transaction costs.  For example, private property was not legally recognised until 
200776; the legal system is constantly under major review and development, resulting 
in uncertainties.  In particular, it took decades for the private economy to be legalised 
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  China’s Real Right Law was passed in the Tenth National People’s Congress in March 
2007, and took effect in October 2007.  
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and to be officially given the same recognition as State-owned enterprises in 2005.  In 
2009, it is still the case that domestic privately-owned firms face institutional 
discrimination ranging from difficulties in obtaining finance, to restricted access to 
factor and product markets (as discussed in Section 1.3).  This partly explains why 
private firms have behaved in the manner of “sweat shops” in which the labour of 
low-skilled migrant workers is exploited (Lin, 2006; Sung, 2007).   
However, the nature of the private workforce has been changing along with its rapid 
growth.  In the 1990s, the private sector took on millions of skilled workers laid off 
by State-owned enterprises.  Moreover, in the period since 2000, private employers 
have offered more positions for graduates than any other employer types (details see 
Section 1.5).  A large number of empirical studies using aggregate data have 
uncovered a low private return rate to education, for a review see Heckman (2005).  
Against this background, it will be interesting to examine the contribution of human 
capital to earnings in private firms.   
It is expected that guanxi exerts an impact on workers’ effort through cultural 
practices (see Section 1.4).  The vital importance of maintaining a good guanxi is to 
protect a person’s mianzi (dignity and prestige) which is defined as the recognition by 
others of an individual’s social standing or position (Lockett, 1988).  This will 
enormously enhance the social standing of the referee, who is viewed as a capable 
and respectable person.  On the one hand, the offer of a job to an applicant who has 
been recommended (by phone or face to face) by a referee within the same 
organisation is perceived to give mianzi to the referee (in the sense that the employer 
is giving approval to the judgement of the referee).  On the other hand, the appointee 
in this situation is then indebted to the referee, and is culturally obliged to protect and 
enhance the referee’s mianzi (the term aihumianzi refers to the actions taken by the 
appointee in this endeavour).  The obvious way for the appointee to do so is to be a 
good employee over a long tenure, as this will vindicate the referee’s wisdom in 
selecting suitable candidates.  
In addition, the referee may apply pressure on the appointee to produce a good 
performance or a longer tenure in order to maintain their own mianzi.  If the outcome 
of the appointment is disappointing, for example, if the appointee shirks or resigns 
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shortly after employment, there would be a record of failure associated with the 
recommendations of this referee.  It would not just deny further recommendation 
(diumianzi is the term for loss of mianzi), but would also diminish this referee’s 
credibility in other aspects of the organisation and the referee might be perceived as 
being dishonest or (if the appointee is a relative) engaging in nepotism.  We find 
evidence of this within the studied firm: a referee was fined ¥200 because the worker 
left shortly after being hired.  This suggests that the firm implements strict rules in 
order to improve the reliability of references. 
Guanxi might improve one’s career prospects in the same way that social capital does 
in other countries.  Granovetter (1995) provided a literature review of the influence of 
social capital from the employee’s point of view.  Empirical work done in the USA by 
Simon and Warner (1992) and Seidel et al. (2000) presents evidence that social 
contacts increase an individual’s earnings.  Using survey data in urban Shanghai, 
Cheung and Gui (2006) found a positive relationship between strong ties and earnings.  
Fernandez et al. (2000) considered similar issues, but from the employer’s point of 
view.  They use data on the dollar costs of screening, hiring and training, from a call 
centre in the USA, and find that employers gain economic return from hiring 
applicants who have been recommended by current employees because the screening 
cost is reduced.  Kugler (2003) uses data from survey data in the USA to estimate a 
matching model, in which it is found that higher wages are earned by referred 
workers because a referral acts as a passport to a good job.  However, there has been 
no empirical work using personnel data to investigate the impact of social capital on 
workers’ compensation in China.  With detailed information on personal connections 
within the firm, we will be able to discover the impact, if any, of Guanxi on earnings. 
There is a paucity of empirical studies investigating the determinants of pension 
rights.  Seltzer and Merrett (2000) used personnel records of entry cohorts between 
1888 - 1900 at the Union Bank of Australia, they found that at that time, pension size 
was in direct proportion to employees’ ultimate tenure within this bank.  Using survey 
data of firms and workers in Norway, Hernas et al. (2006) constructed a framework 
considering the tax benefits to both employers and employees from offering pension 
contributions instead of cash payments.  They found that occupational pensions tend 
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to be associated with larger firms which require their employees to undergo long 
periods of training, and for which average tenure is longer.  However, there are no 
studies of the determinants of pension rights within a firm.  Our study will contribute 
empirical results on this issue. 
As discussed in Section 2.3, the few existing empirical employment studies related to 
DPOEs in China (Meng and Miller, 1995; Smith, 1995; Dong, 2005) have bundled 
domestic privately-owned enterprises and Township enterprises into a single category, 
labelled Township, Village, and Private enterprises (TVPs).  However, due to the 
fundamental difference in ownership between the Township/village enterprises 
(collective ownership), and the private enterprise, empirical outcomes from this 
bundled category are unlikely to shed light on practices that are particular to 
privately-owned enterprises.   
Using personnel records from a typical domestic privately-owned enterprise, this 
chapter will contribute to the literature by uncovering the determinants of 
compensation in modern Chinese private enterprise, and by revealing some of the 
operation strategies within these organisations.  This will not only be useful to policy-
makers in forming an understanding of DPOEs, but also for multi-national companies 
which operate, or are considering doing so, in China. 
4.3 Deferred compensation packages in the private sector  
There are two types of insurance in China, commercial insurance and State social 
insurance.  The former is a business activity and forms a contract between an 
insurance company and an individual.  The latter was introduced in 1991, finally 
taking effect in 1997, as an important step in the welfare provision transition from 
central planned to market economy77 .  The ultimate aim was to ensure that all 
workers could have a basic standard of living while being unemployed due to aging, 
disease, work-related injury, or otherwise losing the capacity to work.  For workers in 
                                                      
77
  Before the reform of State-owned enterprises in 1990s, the vast majority of urban workers 
were well looked after by enjoying benefits from housing, education, health care to a pension 
scheme.  A large number of State-owned enterprises were shut down in the early 1990s; it left 
a huge gap in urban workers’ social security provision.  This policy initialled to put a new 
welfare system in place.  This has been the first time that workers in the private sector in 
China would be included by the social security system since 1949. 
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urban areas 78 , it includes old-age insurance (pension), medical care insurance, 
unemployment insurance, industrial injury insurance, and maternity insurance.  For 
those in rural areas, a “rural insurance”, in the form of a piece of land, is provided by 
the local authority (for more detail see Section 1.2)79.   
State social insurance is compulsory for those working in the public sector.  This 
insurance was extended to the private sector in 1996 to provide social insurance for 
workers.  It was not compulsory for private sector workers, and taken up only in 
situations in which it was affordable to both the firm and the individual80.  Taking the 
old-age insurance as an example, it includes a pay-as-you-go pension, whereby 
today’s workers pay for current pensioners, on the understanding that the next 
generation will do the same for them when their time comes and a funded individual 
account to which both employers and employees make mandatory contributions.  The 
share required from firms is very high; the national standard, on average, is 20% of 
the agreed base payment; 8% from an individual.  However, 21% is required from 
private firms by local government in the region in which our subject company is 
located, making this a significant cost for firms.  Private firms, of course, were very 
reluctant to commit to making this contribution. 
As a result of the increasing friction between employers and workers in the private 
sector, arising for reasons such as the “sweatshop” working conditions, from 1999 
private enterprise has been obliged to provide a flexible type of social insurance for 
their workforces 81.  Instead of having to offer all five types of insurance, private 
firms are allowed to offer combinations of the three most basic types (old-age 
                                                      
78
  Self-employed workers are not counted by the State pension policy; their pensions are 
contingent upon local policy.  
79
  Workers in rural areas still make up nearly half of the total labour force, but never had 
national social security coverage. Due to huge income disparity and the increasing awareness 
of equality, medical insurance has been promoted by local governments in rural areas since 
2004, however the scheme usually covers in-patient treatment and the reimbursement rate 
remains very low. “Improving New Type of Medical Insurance in Rural Areas”; 2007, 
[Online; cited May 2009,] Available from http://www.cnss.cn 
80 
 “The Enterprise Old Age Insurance Policy”, [Online; cited May 2008,] Available from: 
http://202.99.171.21/baoxian/qiyeylbx.htm 
81
  “Regulation of the State Social Insurance Payment”, 22 January 1999, The People’s 
Republic of China, Document [259]. 
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insurance, medical care insurance, and unemployment insurance).  They are not 
required to offer all three insurance-types at the same time and can provide these 
sequentially.  For example, old-age insurance may be provided as part of the 
appointment compensation package for newly hired employees who have skills which 
are desirable for firms.  For less desirable employees, this type of insurance might be 
provided only after a certain number of years of tenure (typically 3).  Provisions of 
the other types of insurance are delayed even more as a consequence of the extra 
costs incurred by the firm (even though these costs are lower than those for old-age 
insurance).  For medical care insurance, the required contribution of the firm is 10% 
of the base payment, with 2% from the individual.  Unemployment insurance requires 
2% from the firm and 1% from the individual.  The above requirements are for 
private enterprise in Jiangsu province, these vary slightly across regions.   
In particular, at the conception of the scheme, in 1999, private employers were 
required to provide insurance cover for only a certain proportion (perhaps 10%) of 
their workforce, with a required percentage increasing each year (by perhaps 5% per 
year subject to its industry, firm size and profitability).  Therefore, whether a 
particular employee receives these deferred benefits is entirely the decision of the 
individual private firm, and, accordingly, offering these types of insurance can be 
very selective.  Hence, we regard these benefits as being firm-specific benefits, 
offered as part of the deferred compensation package.   
As three quarters of workers did not provide a pension, who live on their savings or 
are forced to work for survival (Ling and Chi, 2008), these packages could act as a 
strong incentive to current employees.  However, when we take a closer look at the 
State social insurance mechanism, we see that it is principally designed to maintain a 
basic living standard in retirement for lower income groups.  Especially the private 
sector is allowed to pay the minimum pension contribution, regardless of the worker’s 
actual wages.  This therefore makes it less of a motivational stimulus for workers in 
the higher income bracket.   
4.3.1 Individual pension contribution  
Each province sets its own local standard pension payment as the average monthly 
salary of urban workers in the previous year.  Since the company being studied is 
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located in Jiangsu province and was observed from 1994, we shall use this province 
as an example.  In Jiangsu province in 199682, the average monthly salary was ¥55083, 
and this became the standard base of workers’ premium payment in urban areas in 
1997.  In the public sector, the base of individuals’ premium payment in the current 
year is categorized into low, middle or high income groups, depending on the average 
monthly salary of each group in the previous year (see Table 4.1).  Details of this 
categorisation are as follows.  The low income group covers those whose monthly 
earnings, in the previous year, were less than 60% of the local standard base.  The 
threshold, 60% of the standard base, then becomes the base of their premium 
payment in the current year.  The middle income group covers individuals whose 
monthly earnings, in the previous year, were between 60% and 300% of the local 
standard base.  For them, actual salary in the previous year determines the base of 
their premium payment in the current year.  The high income group covers those 
whose monthly earnings, in the previous year, were more than three times the local 
standard base and their base of premium payment is capped at three times the local 
standard base.  Therefore, to continue with the example, in the public sector in urban 
areas in Jiangsu Province, the base of premium payment of the three groups in 1997 
would be, respectively, ¥330, actual income, and ¥1,65084. 
Income group Salary per month in the 
1996 (¥) 
Base for calculating 
Pension and Personal 
Account (¥) 
Low 0-330 330 
Middle 330-1,650 actual salary 
High >1,650 1,650 
Table 4.1: Pension Contribution by Salary Category (Jiangsu Province; 1997) 
Individual pension contributions, in Jiangsu Province in 1997, were calculated using 
the base amounts derived from Table 4.1, as follows: 
                                                      
82
  Our calculation starts from 1996 because that we found records that workers offered old-
age insurance in the private company studied since 1996. 
83
  China Statistical Yearbook 1997, National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistics 
Press, 1997, Beijing. 
84
  “Jiangsu Province Urban Workers Old-Age Insurance Regulation”, 1 April 1998, Jiangsu 
Provincial government document [139]. 
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• Employers’ contribution: 21% of base amount85. 
• Employee’s contribution: 7% of base amount86. 
Provided that both firms and individuals have paid their share of the premiums, the 
local social insurance agency allocates 11% of the base amount to the individuals’ 
personal pension account; the remaining part of the total contribution (i.e. 17% of the 
base amount) enters the pay-as-you-go State pension system.  
In contrast, in the private sector, employers are allowed to set the base of their share 
of premiums anywhere within the range of the local standard base (60% to 300% of 
the local standard base) regardless of a worker’s actual wage.  Clearly, in order to 
minimize costs, an employer would choose to contribute according to the lowest 
possible base of their premium payment, namely 60% of the local standard base. 
4.3.2 The value of individual pensions  
After 15 years of payment of premiums, at the required rate, and on reaching the legal 
retirement age (currently 60 years old for men, and 55 years old for women), an 
individual is eligible to claim a pension every month.  An individual’s pension is 
composed of: 
• The base pension: around 20% of the average monthly wage in the local area 
in the year previous to retirement, fixed from the day of the first payment, and 
payable as long as the individual is alive87.  This is the return from the pay-as-
go pension system. 
• Pension from a personal account: the monthly pension sum from the personal 
                                                      
85
  The premiums paid by public sector will ultimately not exceed 20% of the total wage bill 
of the enterprise.  This figure varies slightly across the country; it is required to be 21% from 
private firms in Jiangsu province. 
86
  It was started from a lower rate, 4%, and was expected to be increased as 2% annually, 
then reach 8% of the base among urban workers in the public sector.  In the private sector in 
Jiangsu Province, this figure has been 7% since 2000.  The joint premium payment is tax 
exempt.  Workers are allowed to pay more premiums, but the amount over 8% is subject to 
income tax.  
87
  This has been reinforced by two documents issued by the Central Government in 1997 and 
2001. “Increasing Payment of Old-age Insurance Are not Allowed in Any Region”, Central 
government document [26] in 1997and [50] in 2001. 
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account is 1/120th of the total accumulated sum in the personal account.  This 
total includes the value of the personal pension savings, which have been 
deposited at 11% of the individual base amount every month (see Section 
4.3.1), and the accrued interest revenue (based on the annual interest rate of 
the central bank, and tax-exempt).  The divisor, 120, is interpreted as an 
estimated life expectancy (in 1996), in months, beyond the legal retirement 
age.  Individuals stop receiving this at the end of this 10-year period. 
Ten years after retirement (the actual average life expectancy is 75.5 years in the 
region in 200888); individuals will only receive the base pension and therefore need to 
rely on their own savings.  This is one of main reasons (others include children’s 
education and medical treatment), that the saving rate in China is very high (He and 
Cao, 2007). 
To illustrate the effect of policy on different income groups, we structure a typical 
case to represent each group; further details are provided in Appendix A2.  Consider 
workers in Jiangsu province who started paying premiums in 1997, so that their base 
of premium payment is determined by their earnings in 1996.  Let us consider a “high 
income” worker whose monthly salary in 1996 was ¥2,000; a “middle income” 
worker whose salary was ¥600; and a “low income” worker whose salary was ¥300.  
Let us further assume that these workers reach the legal retirement age in 2012, so 
that they have, by this time, paid the required 15 years of premiums.  These workers 
will receive monthly incomes (adjusted for inflation) of ¥1,776, ¥1,051 and ¥865 for 
the first 10 years of retirement, respectively.  In comparison with a prediction of the 
average local salary in 2012, ¥3,20089 , the pension received by the high-income 
group is slightly above half of the predicted local average salary, making it very 
difficult for these people to maintain their lifestyles90.  Even worse, if in the private 
                                                      
88
  Chen Jia and Xiao Wei, 2008. “The Average Life Expectancy is Estimated to be 75.5 Years 
in Changzhou in 2008”, Yangzi Economic Newspaper, Nanjing, 13 Nov 2008. 
89
  This calculation takes into account both local wage growth rate and inflation rate, see 
Appendix A2. 
90
  Due to fixed pension and with local annual wage growth rate being more than 10%, it is 
difficult for all pensioners.  These pressures are reflected by a further reform, 2007 scheme, 
which took inflation and real wage growth into consideration.  In addition, to help pensioners 
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sector, all three pensioner types in the example would receive the amount of the low-
income group, ¥865, due to the fact (noted in Section 4.3.1) that domestic privately-
owned firms tend to pay the minimum premium regardless of workers’ actual income.  
The amounts received by the middle and lower income groups are quite agreeable 
considering their former incomes and contributions.  But for the high income workers 
(usually the highly skilled), this deferred compensation package is unlikely to serve 
as an employment incentive. 
4.4 Data collection 
4.4.1 The company under study 
The company studied is a textile company91 located in Hutang town, Changzhou city, 
Jiangsu province (see Section 1.2).  Jiangsu province has hosted the largest number of 
private enterprise, of all provinces in China, since 200192.  As a consequence, Jiangsu 
province has provided most of the survey data for compensation studies of non State-
owned enterprises in China (Meng and Miller, 1995; Dong, 2005; Nielsen et al., 
2005).  In addition, Jiangsu province is one of the top six Chinese textile industry 
clusters (Figure 4.1).  These six clusters, namely the provinces of Jiangsu, Shandong, 
Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang and municipality of Shanghai, together contributed 
84% of the total national textile sales income in 2004, and their textile exports made 
up 77% of the total national textile exports (Xu, 2005).  
The Changzhou area not only has a long history of a private economy, but also has a 
flourishing private sector.  It is one of the pioneering areas in terms of establishing 
both township and private enterprise in the 1980s; this partially contributes to the fact 
that it has now become the economic hub of Jiangsu province, for the famous “Su 
(Suzhou) Xi (Wuxi) Chan (Chanzhou)” economic golden triangle in China as 
outlined in Section 1.2. 
                                                                                                                                                       
who are still within the 1996 scheme, the Jiangsu government announced a 10% pension rise 
in January in 2009. 
91
  A confidentiality agreement with the company prevents the identity of the company being 
disclosed in this thesis. 
92
  “Non-government Sector Keeping a Rapid Economic Growth”, 2008, States 
Administration for Industry and Commence, [Online; cited May 2008] Available from URL: 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/zwxxq/zwdt/gsyw/zjyw/t20080225_31696.htm 
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Hutang has been a weaving town for centuries.  In 2008, it accommodated 2,806 
companies engaged in textile and apparel, 95% of which were in private ownership; 
total employment in these firms was more than 30,00093. 
 
Figure 4.1: Textile Industry Bases in China (The delineated area is Jiangsu 
Province) 
Source: China National Textile and Apparel Council, 2007, Beijing [Online; cited 
June 2007,] Available from: http:// www.ctei.gov.cn  
 
The particular company under study has been in existence since 1994 with only 8 
employees, it has grown to a large size with 1,600 regular employees by 2007.  It had 
compiled 12 years of personnel records, and therefore is well-established.  It has a 
registered capital of ¥300 million with annual sales revenue of over ¥500 million.  
Because annual sales revenue greatly exceeds the threshold of ¥5 million, this 
company is classified as a Chinese statistical unit, and is termed an “above-
designated-size” private firm.  The average business life for above-designated-size 
private firms is 2.9 years in 2006 (Liu, 2007), smaller firms tend to have a shorter 
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  “An Introduction of Hutang Town”, 2008, Xinhua News ,[Online; cited Nov 2008,]  
Available from : http://www.js.xinhuanet.com/subject1/jhmz/hutang.htm 
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business life.  On average, 2,000 new private enterprises were registered each day, 
meanwhile 700-800 closed down (Liu, 2007).  With a lifetime of 15 years, this 
company is amongst the very successful private enterprises. 
Of the 675,500 domestic privately owned enterprises in Jiangsu province in 2007, 
only 1,600 (less than 1%) had more than 500 employees94.  Hence the company under 
study (with 1,600 regular employees) is well above the 99th percentile of the firm-size 
distribution.   
Moreover, the company set up as a Private Limited Corporation after merging with a 
township enterprise in 2001 (it had originally been founded as a partnership in 1994).  
Private Limited Corporation is the main form of ownership in the private sector in 
China, accounting for 79% of all total domestic privately-owned enterprises in 200895.   
With such a large number of employees, a comparatively long history, and in addition 
a representative type of ownership, conclusions drawn from the analysis of data 
provided by this firm are expected to shed light on the success of domestic privately-
owned enterprises more generally. 
The company’s production includes weaving, fabric dyeing and producing denim.  
The company serves both domestic and international markets.  The personnel records 
were computerised in 2001; this gave us 4,034 workers.  However we are 
unfortunately unable to trace workers who resigned before 200196.   
We were not provided with salary information on three quarters of workers; but we 
were offered compensation information for 681 staff working in the company 
headquarters; in addition, in response to our special request, similar information was 
                                                      
94 
 “Report on the Development of Private Enterprises in 2007”, Jiangsu Province Statistic 
Bureau, 2008, Nanjing [Online; cited May 2009,] Available from: 
http://www.tjcn.org/jiangsu/jjfx/8462.html. 
95
  “Report: Non-Government Sector Keeps a Rapid Development”, 2008, The States 
Administration for Industry and Commence, Beijing [Online; cited March 2009,] Available 
form: http://www.saic.gov.cn/zwxxq/zwdt/gsyw/zjyw/t20080225_31696.htm. 
96
  We have full information on workers who were hired before 2001, provided that they were 
still with the firm in 2001.  We also have full information on all workers hired after 200l. 
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provided on 547 skilled workers97 (most of who left during our study period).  The 
two samples were merged, and after deleting repeated records, formed a dataset with 
1,100 independent observations with salary information. 
The personnel records are not panel data; the data provides detailed information for 
each employee and uses an additional column to record any dynamic change, such as 
wage change; promotion; the date at which DCP is offered; personal connections 
within the firm, any penalties imposed and disciplinary action taken.   
These recodes could be grouped as following: 
• Personal characteristics, such as date of birth, gender, hukou status, marital 
status, schooling, birth place, eyesight and height.  
• The worker’s internal job history including method of recruitment, date of 
starting employment, initial position and department, any promotion or 
advancement, vocational qualifications achieved, date when a DCP was 
offered, leaving date (and department and position at that time), current 
position (if still works for the firm), method of payment. 
• Salary information including starting salary of each worker, leaving wage of 
salaried workers and the average payment over the last three months for a 
piece-rate or commission paid worker.  There is no salary data for each single 
month, but if there is a change in salary, it will be recorded.  
• Personal connections within the firm.  The human resource division of the 
firm recorded workers’ guan-xi-wang (network of connections), such as 
immediate family members, relatives, and other types of connection (school 
friends and workers of the same geographical location), there appears to be a 
rule that the owners’ connections are not revealed.  We then coded workers 
with such recorded connections as having guanxi in the organization.   
Chinese Communist Party membership is a formal political connection, members 
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  These workers are categorised as “skilled” because they have either a tertiary education or 
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meet regularly and formally.  In our work we aimed to capture the more nuanced and 
informal dimension of guanxi which might be seen as the same as networking in the 
West which developed via personal connections (details see Section 1.4).  Therefore, 
we did not include CCP membership as part of such personal connections 
4.4.2 The hierarchy and remuneration policy in the firm 
The firm has its own hierarchy and organizational structure.  More than half of 
employees are production workers.  This is reflected in our sample, in which 573 
(52%) are production workers.  Only 90 (8%) of the sample are managerial workers.  
When we group positions, based on hierarchical level, the firm fits into the familiar 
pyramid structure shown in Figure 4.2.  
 
Figure 4.2: Hierarchical Structure of the Firm  
(actual numbers of employees are given in parentheses) 
Level 1 contains 645 workers; the majority of these are production line workers, with 
a small number of logistic staff, such as cleaners (9), cooks (6), security guards (10), 
Level 1 (645) 
Production line workers; logistics division workers (chefs, security guards, cleaners, 
and drivers) 
Level 2 (365) 
Office staff (administration and production offices) 
Levels 3-5 (83) 
Operational managers 
Level 6-7 (7) 
Senior managers 
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and drivers (15).  Immediate supervisors of level 1 employees, and team leaders, are 
grouped in the higher level 2 (365 workers), which also includes staff working in 
production or functional offices.  Level 3 (46 workers) is composed of assistant 
production line managers and support managers of functional offices.  Level 4 (26 
workers) contains line managers, senior technicians of the production division, and 
managers or head officers of functional department.  Level 5 includes 11 directors of 
the production division and the functional departments (the Information Computing 
and Technical Centre, the General Office, the Company Image Office, and the Human 
Resource Management Division).  Level 6 contains the 6 vice-CEOs, each of whom 
is in charge of one of the following divisions: Finance; Research and Development; 
Purchases and Sales (including domestic and international sales); the weaving factory; 
the fabric-dyeing factory; and the denim factory.  The Chief Executive Officer is 
alone at level 7.  As explained above, workers from level 3 upwards are in managerial 
positions.  Levels 6 and 7 make up the senior management team. 
The firm implements three payment structures: piece-rate, salary and salary plus 
bonus.  Workers on the production line are normally paid entirely at a piece rate.  
However, a worker whose productivity is difficult to quantify, for example an 
electrician, might be paid a salary, in accordance with the qualifications and 
experience of the individual in question.   
Office workers (level 2) are on a contract, receiving a monthly salary.  A salary is also 
paid to some of those in the logistics section (level 1, chefs, security guards and 
cleaners).  The payment structure is mixed for sales people (43) and drivers (15), who 
receive a basic salary plus commission.  Due to the small numbers of these, we treat 
them as salaried workers.   
Managerial positions (levels 3 to 7, 90 workers, and see Figure 4.2) receive salary 
plus bonus.  The proportion of bonus in one’s payment increases with the hierarchical 
level.  As we were not given bonus information, with assistance from managers at the 
Human Resource Division, we adjusted managerial workers’ salaries.  However, as 
bonuses are likely to be a significant contribution to the salaries of senior managers 
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(level 6-7) 98 ; these seven employees were excluded from the sample, leaving a 
sample size of 1,093.    
Turning to the senior management team, we find that there are three owners: Owner A 
is the CEO; Owner B is the vice-CEO in charge of the finance division and raw 
material provision (owner B is the wife of Owner A); Owner C is the vice-CEO in 
charge of the research and development division.  Owner C is also responsible for 
product design and quality checks, these being administered independently of each of 
the three factories.  
While the distribution of raw materials is also the responsibility of Owner B, the 
purchasing of raw materials is the duty of the vice-CEO in charge of the purchase and 
sales division (who is the cousin of owner B).  The authority of this vice-CEO is 
limited since he has to report to a manager who is directly supervised by Owner B. 
We can clearly see that the most important positions within the company are occupied 
by owners and their relatives, leaving outsiders with limited promotion opportunities.  
This is a very common managerial arrangement among private companies in their 
early stages of development.  For this reason, we do not expect to observe a large 
number of promotions in the data.   
4.4.3 Data description 
Variable definitions and summary statistics are shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3.  It is seen 
that nearly half of the employees are male; around half are married; around half are 
piece-rate paid workers.  48% of workers have been offered a DCP, and nearly half of 
these workers are first-time recipients of such a package.  In the data, a worker is 
recorded as receiving a DCP once the old-age insurance has been offered (see Section 
4.3).  Just under two thirds of the workers are employed by the company at the time 
of data collection; the remainder are ex-employees who have left the company.  Only 
6% are recorded as acquiring a professional qualification during our study period.  
More than half of the workforce was recruited via informal channels, that is, through 
introductions by employees or business partners (see Section 2.2).  The remainder, 
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  The size of a bonus is strictly private information known only by the recipient of the bonus 
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43%, were hired through formal channels, such as school recruitment fairs, labour 
market agencies, or an online applicant pool. 
The starting age for employment in the company ranges from 15 (3 individuals) to 65 
years.  There has been a series of labour legislation issued since 1994 in which 
employers are forbidden to recruit workers age under 1699.  Our date offers a glimpse 
of child labour in the private sector in China.   
Variables Number of 
observations 
mean Std. (Dev.) Min. Max. 
      
Male workers  1093 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Married workers 1093 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Paid by piece rate 1093 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Managerial position 1093 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Deferred compensation package 1093 0.48 0.50 0 1 
First- time recipient of a DCP 1093 0.24 0.42 0 1 
Local hukou status 1093 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Quit 1093 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Having a vocational qualification 1093 0.06 0.25 0 1 
Informal recruiting channel 1093 0.57 0.49 0 1 
Tenure (months) 1093 27.56 25.06 1 156 
Age when start employment 1093 25.50 7.40 15 65 
Labour market experience (years)† 1093 8.84 7.71 0.5 47‡ 
Monthly start salary (¥) 1093 1255.67 723.07 120 8000 
Monthly Current salary (¥) 1093 1570.65 1102.70 0♠ 8000 
Table 4.2: Data Description 
† We used age minus years of schooling less 6 (which is the legal age to start schooling in 
China) as a proxy for labour market experience. 
‡ A worker with this much labour market experience is likely to have acquired most of it 
outside the textile industry, for example in agriculture (since rapid industrialization did not 
occur until the 1990s in China.) 
♠ These 7 cases of zero payment are possibly due to workers breaching their contract, such as 
resigning before the expiry of their contracts.   
 
The retirement age, in the State-owned, collectively owned enterprises and other 
public sector, have been 60 for men, 55 for women in managerial positions; and 50 
for female workers since 1955.  On reaching the above age and other requirement, 
such as a certain working years, a person could claim pension from the State.  
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  The People's Republic of China Labour Law, 5 July 1994, passed by the Eighth National 
People's Congress Standing Committee on the eighth meeting. 
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Workers in the private sector initially had been covered by the social security system 
in 1996 (see Section 4.3); the requirement of their retirement age is thus much 
flexible.  In the workforce there are two men aged over 60, and one female over 55, 
each has a degree100. 
 
Figure 4.3: Local hukou Definition in This Study 
(People originating from the darker area are considered as local hukou residents)  
 
Nearly one third of the sample lived locally, labelled as local hukou.  Our definition 
for local hukou is quite wide, including not only Hutang town but also the rest of the 
Sunan area (south of Jiangsu province), both urban and rural hukou status (see Figure 
4.3).  As we discussed in Section 1.2, Sunan is a well developed area in China.  
Residents in this area enjoy a better local public welfare compared with most of 
residents in the rest of China.  In addition, these workers are able to have it since they 
live nearby.  In contrast, a worker, for example, Hukou registered in Lianyungang city 
(in the North corner of Figure 4.3), is entitled an urban welfare, since welfare is not 
portable, this worker can not actually have it (local welfare see Section 1.2).  
Using 2001 as the base year, the nominal wage has been adjusted using the local 
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  Due to the shortage of qualified workers in China, skilled workers (a degree or vocational 
certificate) can work over legal retirement age. 
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Consumption Price Index (CPI).  The distribution of the real wage is shown in Figure 
4.4, with an interval width of ¥100.  The distribution is multi-modal, with the highest 
mode at ¥1,200 per month, and the second highest at ¥1,500 per month.  The 
distribution is also skewed to the right, with only a small proportion of workers 
earning more than ¥4,000 per month. 
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Figure 4.4: Real Monthly Payment Distributions in the Firm 
 
Table 4.3 shows that around 46% of the workforce have received a higher education 
(including a diploma, a vocational certificate or a degree); about one tenth have had 
secondary schooling (senior high school); the remainder (41%) have only attended 
primary or middle schools, and spent less than 9 years in education.  The table also 
shows that more than 50% of workers are on the production lines, and less than 10% 
of the workforce work at the logistic section (including, as mentioned in Section 4.4.2, 
security guards, cooks, cleaners and drivers).  Only 38 people (3.5%) have other 
family members working within the same company; another 139 (12.7%) were 
recorded as having been connected to someone who is more senior in the firm (being 
alumni of the same school or college, being from the same origin, or having some 
other social link to that person).  These two categories are grouped as having Guanxi 
in the firm.   
As can be seen from Table 4.3, majority of the workforce remain their initial 
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employment, 57 workers experienced job changes at the same hierarchical level.  
Only 28 workers had promotions due to limited managerial positions in this 
manufacture (see Figure 4.2).   
 Variables Freq. % 
Schooling 
Primary schooling (<9 years) 464 42.45 
Senior high school (9-12 years) 119 10.89 
Diploma and certificates 435 39.80 
Degree and above 75 6.86 
Working department 
Production line 573 52.42 
Production office 300 27.45 
Functional office 138 12.63 
Logistic section 82 7.5 
Guanxi  
No bond 916 83.81 
Family ties 38 3.47 
Friends ties 139 12.72 
Promotional records 
No change of position 1008 92.22 
Position changes 57 5.22 
Promotions 28 2.56 
Communist party member status 
No political affiliation 450 41.17 
Young pioneers 366 33.49 
China Communist Party member 46 4.21 
Unknown political affiliation 231 21.13 
Total 1,093 100 
Table 4.3: Categorical Variable Definition 
Table 4.3 also shows that the confirmed CCP membership is 46 employees, 
accounting for 4% of the workforce; although more than 33% of the sample are 
Young Pioneers, which is the communist organization for the youth, an individual 
will be very likely to become a Young Pioneer if they ever attended a junior high 
school or above.  These results are unsurprising given the relative youth of our 
sample, the average age being 25.  The largest group, 45%, have no political 
affiliation.  The rest, 21% (231) of the sample, have with unknown political 
affiliations.   
This unknown political affiliation group stands a very small chance to be one of other 
eight political party members due that these parties represent people from middle 
level and senior intellectuals in the fields of culture, education, economic, publishing, 
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science and technology 101.  In addition, there are reports of activities of these CCP 
members on the company’s website, this indicated CCP members are well recognized 
in the firm.  Therefore, the unknown political affiliation group in our data are more 
likely to be Young Pioneers or to have no political affiliation.   
4.5 Empirical strategies 
There are no records of firm-specific training in the firm studied, apart from a few 
hours of induction and one or two days of business courses for managers (these 
having become available on an irregular basis in recent years).  Therefore, most 
workers are without firm-specific human capital.  In addition, there is a shortage of 
skilled workers in the private sector.  For example, a survey of 3,309 private 
enterprises in the Changzhou area in 2006 showed that skilled workers only account 
for 13% of the workforce of these firms102.  Hence, we would expect that general 
human capital, such as schooling, may play a big part in determining salary. 
Referring back to the histogram of monthly salary in Figure 4.4, we see that a small 
number of workers appear to earn unusually low salaries; in fact, 7 workers earn 
salaries of zero!  They are excluded from salary analysis. 
( ) ( )ln 1i i i i iE PC PF OTHβ γ δ ε′ ′ ′= ∗ + ∗ + ∗ +  
Where i indexes the individual worker, PCi is a vector of productivity characteristics 
of individual i, such as schooling, labour market experience, and tenure.  PFi is a 
vector of performance indicators pertaining to individual i, such as a managerial 
position and receiving a DCP103.  OTHi are all other relevant variables, such as gender, 
hukou status, Guanxi status, and whether receiving a piece-rate payment, ε i  is the 
error term. 
                                                      
101
  National Committee of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, 2010, [Online: 
15 March 2010] Available from http://www.china.org.cn/english/chuangye/55437.htm 
102
  “Analysis of Payment in Private Enterprise in Changzhou, Jiangsu Province Statistical 
Bureau”, 2006, [Online: 26 March 2007,] Available from: 
http://www.jssb.gov.cn/jssb/tjfx/sxfxzl/1200703270025.htm. 
103
  A deferred compensation package (pension) is a sign that the recipient is highly valued by 
the firm.  
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Apart from the analysis of the level of remuneration discussed above, we would also 
like to investigate the structure of remuneration.  As already seen in Section 4.4.3, 
nearly half of the sample are paid according to a piece-rate, with the other half being 
paid a contracted salary (and bonus).  So, we find it natural to ask what characteristics 
of workers make them more likely to be paid by piece-rate.  Here, we hypothesize 
that unskilled workers are more likely to be paid by piece-rate, because such workers 
are more likely engaged in jobs where productivity tends to be easier to measure than 
that for more skilled workers.   
A DCP is a useful means for a firm to encourage a desirable worker to remain with 
the firm, and hence to reduce the significant explicit and implicit costs of staff 
turnover104.  Therefore, a desirable worker will be more likely to receive a DCP.   
To deal with the potential endogeneity associated with receiving piece-rate payment 
and a DCP, we used probit models to estimate probability of being paid by a piece-
rate and receiving a DCP.  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )4,,,1
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2,,,1
, iiiiii
iiiii
iiiii
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ZXpromotiontenurefDCPP
ZXdepartmenttenurefratepieceP
==
==
==
 
Equation (2) represents the probability of worker i being paid by a piece rate; (3) 
represents the probability of having a DCP; equation (4) represents the probability of 
being a first-time recipient of the DCP.  Tenure denotes firm specific tenure 
(measured in months).  Department is a categorical variable which includes 
production line, production offices, functional offices and logistic sections.  Xi is a 
vector of productive characteristics, such as schooling, labour market experience and 
vocational qualification.  Zi is a vector of variables representing other factors, such as 
hukou and Guanxi status.   
Promotion is a categorical variable which consists of workers who remained on their 
initial employment positions; experienced position changes within the same hierarchy 
or promoted.  We use the promotion dummy as an explanatory variable in the 
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 “Growing Textile Firms are suffering from a High Staff Turnover”, 2005, [Online; cited 
May 2007,] Available from: http://www.yfu.cn. 
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likelihood of having a DCP or being a first time recipient of a DCP.  The reason for 
this is that managerial workers receive bonuses as part of their remuneration (see 
Section 4.4.2); promotions carry a probability of receiving an increased proportion of 
bonus as their payment; this is unobservable.  Therefore, we are unable to observe the 
full effect of promotion via earnings.  However, promotion will be reflected in other 
components of the compensation package, such as the increased probability of being 
offered a DCP.  
From these probit equations, we obtain predicted probabilities of being paid by piece-
rate and receiving a DCP for the entire sample.  These predicted probabilities are 
included in an OLS regression in place of the piece-rate and DCP dummy variables.  
This is an Instrumental Variable (IV) regression. 
We have records of whether a worker is offered a DCP; this may be a continuation of 
the package provided by the worker’s previous employer; alternatively, it may be that 
this firm is offering the worker their first DCP.  This distinction is important because 
it reveals not only the signal function for a worker to have a DCP but also the firm’s 
motives for offering a DCP to an employee.  If an employee had a DCP with a 
previous employer, this is a signal of the value of this employee, and may well have 
been a contributory factor in the firm’s decision to hire the employee and to pay a 
higher salary.  Naturally, once the employee has been hired, the firm will be willing to 
continue the offer of the DCP.   
If an employee arrives without a DCP, the firm faces the decision of whether to offer 
this employee their first DCP.  However, the firm is likely to use this to their 
advantage by making the offer of a DCP conditional on a number of years of 
satisfactory service.  Hence the prospect of a DCP becomes an incentive for the 
employee to remain with the employer for at least the required duration, and also to 
work hard over this period.  As discussed in Section 4.3, DCPs are usually offered to 
such employees after three years of service.  We therefore hypothesize that all 
employees have the possibility of being offered a DCP once they have completed a 
sufficient period of loyal service.   This will be tested by equation (4). 
An extensive literature places an emphasis on the labour market segmentation that 
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arises from the hukou system, with regular urban residents facing a better labour 
market outlook, and receiving higher remuneration, than their migrant counterparts 
(Knight and Song, 1999; Cao, 2001; Meng and Zhang, 2001; Zhang and Song, 2003; 
Knight and Yueh, 2004; Knight and Li, 2005; Liu, 2005; Lu and Song, 2006).  During 
our study period, Jiangsu province has been experimenting with hukou reform.  Three 
significant changes have been made.  Firstly, on 1 May 2003, migrant workers were 
officially granted a local hukou contingent on a legal residence and a regular income 
(see Section 1.2)105.  Secondly, in 2004, migrant workers were taken into the State 
social insurance system, which provides for old-age, medical care and unemployment, 
provided that the necessary contributions are being paid by the employer (see Section 
4.3)106.  Thirdly, on 1 January 2005, the children of migrants were given equal rights 
to compulsory education to their non-migrant counterparts107 .  Unfortunately for 
migrant workers, these improvements do not extend to their entitlement to local 
benefits.    
Local workers are typically, through local knowledge and connections, able to access 
better-paid occupations and jobs than migrant workers.  For this reason, we 
hypothesize that local workers receive higher remuneration (this is the first part of 
Hypothesis 6).  In addition, being local may be perceived by employers as a signal 
that a worker will stay longer with the firm; this increases their prospects of receiving 
a DCP (this is the second part of Hypothesis 6). 
In the framework of the econometric models (1)-(6), we aim to test the following six 
hypotheses:   
Hypothesis 1: Human capital has a positive impact on remuneration. 
Hypothesis 2: Guanxi has a positive impact on remuneration. 
                                                      
105
  “Further Deepening Hukou Registration Management System Approved by Jiangsu 
Provincial Government”, Jiangsu Province Government Document [142] in 2002, Nanjing, 
2002. 
106
  “Rural Migrant Workers Benefit from the New Social Insurance Policy by Receiving 
Unemployment Subsidy”, Changzhou Daily, 11 Sept 2006, Changzhou. 
107
  “Notice of Compulsory Education towards Migrant Children”, 2005, Changzhou 
Municipal People’s Government, document [3] in 2005, Changzhou. 
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Hypothesis 3: Unskilled workers are the most likely to be paid by piece rate. 
Hypothesis 4: Workers with high human capital are more likely to have a DCP. 
Hypothesis 5: Workers with longer tenure are more likely to be first-time recipients 
of a DCP. 
Hypothesis 6:  Local hukou status has a positive influence on both remuneration and 
the likelihood of receiving a DCP. 
4.6 Empirical findings 
Table 4.4 shows the results from an OLS regression and an IV regression, with log 
current payment (or log of leaving salary if a worker resigned) as the dependent 
variable.  As can be seen from Table 4.4, having a DCP appears to be an important 
determinant for earnings in the OLS, but it is not statistically significant in the IV 
regression.  Meanwhile, a worker who is paid by piece-rate has significantly lower 
earnings when the possible endogeneity is controlled for in the IV regression.  To 
select the appropriate specification from these two models, we conducted a Hausman 
test. 
Table 4.5 presents the result of a Hausman test comparing IV and OLS regressions, 
with 2 10.39χ = , p-value = 0.79. We accept that DCP and receiving a piece rate 
payment are exogenous variables.  Since the OLS regression is preferred to the IV 
regression if we have no endogeneity problem108, our interpretations are, therefore, 
based on results of the OLS, in which it confirms the contributable signal effect of 
DCP for earnings. 
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  One of the principal weaknesses of the IV estimator is that it tends to display high 
standard errors relative to OLS. 
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Ln (earning) OLS IV regression 
 Coef. (Std. Err.) Coef. (Std. Err.) 
 
Constant 6.59***(0.05) 6.68*** (0.10) 
Ln (tenure in month) ) 0.07***(0.01) 0.07***(0.02) 
Labour market experience(year) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Male worker 0.07***(0.02) 0.08***(0.02) 
Deferred Compensation Package† 0.15***(0.03) 0.21 (0.16) 
Local hukou status 0.09***(0.03) 0.07*(0.04) 
Guanxi  0.15***(0.03) 0.15***(0.04) 
Managerial position 0.68***(0.05) 0.63***(0.05) 
Having a vocational qualification 0.06 (0.05) 0.06 (0.05) 
Paid by piece rate‡ -0.04(0.03) -0.14*(0.08) 
Only having primary schooling 
Senior high school 0.09**(0.04) 0.06(0.04) 
Diploma and certificate 0.26***(0.03) 0.22***(0.04) 
Degree and above 0.36***(0.06) 0.28***(0.08) 
Non-political members 
Young Pioneers 0.07**(0.03) 0.06**(0.03) 
CCP members -0.04 (0.06) -0.05 (0.07) 
Unknown political membership 0.09***(0.03) 0.09***(0.04) 
  
 
 
Number of observations 1086 1086 
Adj R-squared  0.46 0.45 
 Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
Table 4.4: OLS and IV Regressions of Earnings  
† In the IV regression, this is predicted probability based on results from a Probit model (see 
Table 4.8 on page 100). 
‡ In the IV regression, this is predicted probability based on results from a Probit model (see 
Table 4.7 on page 99) 
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Coefficients 
 IV 
regression 
(b) 
OLS 
regression 
(B) 
Difference 
(b-B) 
Sqrt 
(diag(V_b-
V_B)) 
S.E. 
Ln (tenure in month) ) 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.01 
Labour market experience(year) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Male worker 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.00 
Deferred Compensation Package♦ 0.21 0.15 0.06 0.16 
Local hukou status 0.07 0.09 -0.02 0.02 
Guanxi  0.15 0.15 0.00 0.01 
Managerial position 0.63 0.68 -0.05 0.03 
Having a vocational qualification 0.06 0.08 -0.02 0.01 
Paid by piece rate♠ -0.14 -0.04 -0.09 0.07 
Only having primary schooling 
Senior high school 0.06 0.09 -0.03 0.01 
Diploma and certification 0.22 0.26 -0.05 0.03 
Degree and above 0.28 0.36 -0.08 0.05 
Non-political affiliation 
Young pioneers 0.06 0.07 -0.01 0.01 
CCP members -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 
Unknown political membership 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.01 
 
Chi2(12) 10.39 
Prob >chi2 0.79 
Table 4.5: Hausman Test Comparing IV and OLS Regressions 
♦ In the IV regression, this is predicted probability based on results from a Probit model. 
♠ In the IV regression, this is predicted probability based on results from a Probit model. 
 
Table 4.4 shows that Young Pioneers received a wage premium when compared with 
workers with no political affiliation; CCP members appear to have lower earnings 
though the relationship is not statistically significant; the group with unknown 
political membership also have higher earnings.  Lam (2003) used a survey of 
workers in Shanghai in 1996.  She found a premium for CCP membership exists in 
State Owned Enterprises and collectives but not in private enterprise.  Li et al. (2007) 
reported no wage premium among young CCP members.  Simon et al. (2009) used 11 
years of survey data to analyze the apparent wage premium of CCP membership; they 
argue that CCP membership is endogenous to education (see the high proportion of 
CCP membership among graduates in Chapter 3), experience, and occupation; they 
find little evidence of a wage premium for CCP members.  Our results are based on 
personnel records.  In the same industry, after controlling for education and 
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experience, it shows that Young Pioneers received a wage premium.  This may  
supplement results for the above literature; however, in order to be able to draw a 
solid conclusion, we need further investigation which is not possible within the 
existing data set given the large proportion of the workforce for whom information on 
party membership is missing.  
From Table 4.4, as expected, human capital (represented by more schooling and 
having a vocational qualification) has a positive effect on remuneration.  For example, 
workers with a degree or above are paid 43% more than workers with only primary 
level schooling, ceteris paribus.  Though, this is a small group (with 75 observations).  
Workers (40% of the sample) with collegiate-level schooling are paid 30% more than 
the control group.  This provides evidence to support Hypothesis 1, and also provides 
empirical evidence that this private firm values skilled workers.   
Taking into account the transaction costs of hiring and turnover, and the agency cost 
of shirking, employers might prefer staff with guanxi to those without (see Section 
1.4 for a detailed discussion of the concept of guanxi).  The coefficient in Table 4.4 
shows that guanxi is definitely an advantage: those with such contacts earn 16% more 
than those without, ceteris paribus.  This result supports Hypothesis 2.   
Managers appear to earn a significant premium, receiving 97% more than an ordinary 
worker.  This indicates that payment in the firm is closely related to position.  This is 
in line with findings by Pfeifer (2008) and Seltzer and Sammartino (2009). 
Despite the clear improvements to the labour market outlook of migrant workers 
discussed in the Section 4.5, our empirical results indicate that those with local hukou 
status still earn more than migrant workers.  On the one hand, we suggest that being 
non-local, migrant workers might be perceived by employers as having a higher 
likelihood of leaving, and are therefore discriminated against in terms of 
compensation.  On the other hand, being non-local also indicates less strong 
connections (guanxi) with workers at senior positions within the firm.  Of course, 
guanxi is also present in the model, and therefore controlled for.  However, if some 
connections benefiting local workers are unobserved, this would provide a partial 
explanation of the positive effect of local hukou status seen in Table 4.4.  This 
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provides evidence to support the first part of our Hypothesis 6. 
An OLS regression has been estimated separately for men and women.  The results 
are presented in Table 4.6.  The results show that payment by piece-rate is negatively 
related to earnings for men only, and that women achieve a greater benefit from 
schooling than men.  Male Young Pioneers received a wage premium. 
Ln (earning) Coef. (Std. Err.) 
 Male Female 
   
Constant 6.75***(0.08) 6.46*** (0.07) 
Ln (tenure in month) ) 0.06***(0.02) 0.09***(0.02) 
Labour market experience(year) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Deferred Compensation Package 0.17***(0.04) 0.13***(0.03) 
Local hukou status 0.05 (0.04) 0.11***(0.04) 
Guanxi  0.16***(0.05) 0.14***(0.05) 
Managerial position 0.64***(0.06) 0.74***(0.08) 
Having a vocational qualification 0.09 (0.06) 0.01(0.09) 
 Paid by piece rate -0.15***(0.04) 0.08**(0.04) 
Only having primary schooling 
Senior high school 0.04 (0.05) 0.20***(0.08) 
Diploma and certification 0.21***(0.05) 0.34***(0.05) 
Degree and above 0.27***(0.08) 0.45***(0.09) 
Non-political affiliation 
Young pioneers 0.11***(0.04) 0.03 (0.04) 
CCP members -0.02 (0.08) 0.00 (0.15) 
Unknown political membership 0.15***(0.05) 0.08*(0.04) 
 
Number of observations 531 555 
Adj R-squared  0.46 0.44 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table 4.6: OLS Regression of Earning between Male and Female workers 
Chi and Li (2008) argue that women are paid less in the non-State sector in China 
partly due to their own productivity characteristics (less schooling and shorter tenure) 
and through occupational segmentation (i.e. women being destined for jobs as 
production workers or other low-paid job).  The female workers in our data appear 
similarly disadvantaged: they are under-represented at higher levels of the hierarchy 
(see Figure 4.2) – while 51% of employees are female in the firm, only 33% of 
workers in levels 3-5 are female.  Also, the average tenure for females is 4 months 
shorter than that of males.  In addition, they are over-represented among less well-
educated workers: 52% of females have only primary schooling, compared with 33% 
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for males. 
Table 4.4 shows that male workers are paid better.  This could be due to men being 
more concentrated in a specific occupation in this industry.  Occupations with high 
risk, such as dyeing, are paid well, and are more likely undertaken by male workers.  
However, since gender discrimination is not of central interest in this dissertation, we 
do not test any particular hypothesis relating to gender in this Chapter. 
Our empirical results also show that the return to tenure is small, although significant.  
The “tenure elasticity of earnings” is only 0.07.  This could be due to the fact that the 
firm is involved in mass production, with no significant training offered to workers, 
and therefore little potential for workers to accumulate specific human capital.  Of 
course, the company wants to encourage long tenure of workers, but it appears not to 
be doing this by rewarding long tenure with higher wages; instead, it may be using 
the offer of a DCP to encourage long tenure, as explained in Section 4.5.   
The results from a probit model of whether workers are paid by a piece rate are 
shown in Table 4.7.  We see that migrant workers, short-tenured workers, and those 
with less labour market experience, are more likely to be paid piece rate.  
Unsurprisingly, managers are least likely to be paid piece rate.  Workers with 
vocational qualification or more years of schooling are more likely to be paid by 
salary.  Office workers and workers in the logistic section are exclusively paid by 
salary.  All of these results contribute to evidence in favour of Hypothesis 3 above. 
Towards the bottom of Table 4.7, we see when comparing with workers with no 
political affiliation, Young Pioneers and CCP members are less likely to receive a 
piece rate payment, and unknown political members are more likely to receive a piece 
rate payment.  However, none of these coefficients is statistically significant. 
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Paid by piece rate=1 Coef. (Std. Err.) 
  
Constant 2.32*** (0.22) 
Ln (tenure in month)  -0.06 (0.05) 
Labour market experience(year) -0.02***(0.01) 
Local hukou status -0.19* (0.11) 
Guanxi  0.15 (0.14) 
Managerial position -1.44*** (0.23) 
Having a vocational qualification -0.60*** (0.20) 
Only having primary schooling 
Senior high school -0.66*** (0.17) 
Diploma and certification -0.95*** (0.15) 
Degree and above -1.35*** (0.24) 
Working at Production line 
Production office -0.97*** (0.12) 
Functional offices -2.19*** (0.19) 
Logistic section -1.38*** (0.17) 
Non-political affiliation 
 
Young pioneers -0.04 (0.12) 
CCP members -0.02 (0.27) 
Unknown political membership 0.15 (0.14) 
 
Number of observations 1086 
Log likelihood -397. 24 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
Table 4.7: a Probit Regression of Receiving Piece-rate Payment  
Turning now to the determinations of receiving a DCP, the results from two probit 
specifications are reported in Table 4.8.  The first has receipt of DCP as the dependent 
variable; the second has first-time receipt of DCP (see Section 4.5 for the importance 
of this distinction).  Specification 1 provides evidence that workers with local hukou 
status, in a managerial position, with a tertiary education, and those working in 
offices, are all significantly more likely to have a DCP.  This supports a similar 
conclusion made by Nielsen et al. (2005), based on survey data, also from Jiangsu 
province, who find that firms are more likely to contribute to social insurance for 
skilled migrants.  These results also provide evidence in favour of Hypothesis 4. 
Tenure has a significant positive impact on both having, and being a first-time 
recipient of, a DCP, with a much stronger effect in the second case.  As explained in 
Section 4.3, a worker being offered a DCP is most likely to be offered it after 3 years’ 
service, although in the case of a highly desirable worker, a DCP may be used as part 
of the compensation package from the first day of employment.  Therefore, we see 
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confirmation that the DCP is being used to screen and reward workers likely to 
remain for a longer period at the company.  The large and significant coefficient of 
log(tenure) in the second specification provides strong evidence in favour of 
Hypothesis 5. 
Variables Having DCP First-time recipient 
 Coef. (Std. Err.) Coef. (Std. Err.) 
Constant -1.25***(0.16) -2.13***(0.32) 
Ln(tenure) 0.17***(0.04) 0.88***(0.09) 
Labor market experience(year) 0.00(0.01) 0.02**(0.01) 
Local hukou status 0.34***(0.10) 0.22 (0.17) 
Guanxi 0.17 (0.12) -0.02 (0.18) 
Managerial position 0.45**(0.21) -1.11***(0.29) 
Having a vocational qualification  0.18 (0.18) 0.52**(0.26) 
No position change 
Experienced position change 0.58***(0.20) 0.46 (0.30) 
Experience promotion 0.71*(0.39) 1.27***(0.43) 
Only having primary schooling  
Senior high school 0.02(0.14) -0.13 (0.27) 
Diploma and certification 0.40***(0.12) -0.41**(0.21) 
Degree and above 0.97***(0.23) -1.10***(0.32) 
Working at production line 
Production offices 0.39***(0.10) -0.40**(0.17) 
Functional offices 0.58***(0.15) -0.91***(0.23) 
Logistic section -0.08 (0.16) -0.51 (0.32) 
Non-political affiliation 
 
 
Young Pioneers 0.18*(0.10) -0.06 (0.17) 
CCP members 0.29 (0.24) 0.11 (0.37) 
Unknown political affiliation 0.21*(0.12) -0.63***(0.21) 
 
Number of observation 1086 522 
Log-likelihood -621.76 -204.95 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
Table 4.8: Probit Models of having, and being a first-time recipient of a DCP 
As shown in Table 4.8, being local has a significant positive impact on having a DCP.  
This result is in line with the second part of our Hypothesis 6.  We also see that with 
labour market experience and a vocational qualification positively relate to the 
probability of being a first time recipient of DCP; this provides evidence that 
employers use DCPs to reward desirable workers. 
From the first column of results in Table 4.8, we see that higher education has a 
significant positive impact on the probability of having a DCP.  However, in the 
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second set of results, we see that higher education has a significant negative impact 
on being a first-time recipient.  We suggest that this is because those workers with a 
higher educational background are more likely to have been offered such a package 
when starting employment for the first time.  If such a worker had a DCP with a 
previous employer, the current employer is likely to continue paying the firm’s share 
of contributions; such a worker is clearly classified as having a DCP, but is not a first-
time recipient.  This applies to situations as being on managerial position or working 
at offices.  This strong discrepancy in the coefficients of these variables confirms the 
importance of the distinction between “having a DCP” and “being a first-time 
recipient”. 
Table 4.8 shows that, in both equations, the probability of a DCP depends positively 
and significantly on the worker having experienced a positional change or promotion.  
Again, the effect appears much stronger in the determination of “first-time recipient”.  
Hence, it seems that first-time offers of DCPs are being used as a form of reward for 
good performance, as well as being an automatic reward for long service.  
Finally, note that when compared with workers with no political affiliation, those 
with a stated political affiliation are more likely to receive a DCP, though the 
coefficient is not statistically significant for CCP members.  In terms of the 
probability to be a first time recipient of a DCP, the group with unknown political 
affiliation is significantly less likely to be a first-time recipient, a result which is not 
surprising given that this group is more likely to be paid by piece rate.   
4.7 Conclusions   
With personnel records from a fairly typical domestic privately-owned textile 
company in China, we have examined the compensation arrangements within the firm.  
Our econometric results show that salary is largely determined by position and human 
capital.  Guanxi has a significant positive impact on earnings, and this has been 
attributed to the use of guanxi by the firm as a means of reducing shirking and staff 
turnover.  Tenure also increases earnings, but the smallness of this effect has been 
noted. 
A stable workforce is desired by the employers, who, on the evidence of this study, 
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appear to utilize Deferred Compensation Packages (DCPs) to encourage longer tenure.   
The shortage of skilled workers in the private sector is reflected in the significant 
positive effect of being highly educated not only on remuneration, but also on the 
probability of receiving a DCP.  On the basis of this evidence, we may infer that 
human capital is highly valued in the private sector. 
However, we have also presented evidence that being local generates a wage 
premium and gives one a better chance of receiving a DCP, even after controlling for 
social capital, human capital, and position.  This reflects the absolute advantage of 
being local, which is consistent with results obtained in other Chapters of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 5  
Job Tenure in One Chinese Private Company 
 
5.1 Introduction   
Domestic privately-owned textile enterprises have built up their market position primarily 
by supplying low-value and low-priced products in the domestic and international markets.  
Recent cuts in tax rebates together with appreciation of the Chinese currency have, however, 
left many of these companies on the edge of bankruptcy109.  The need to develop value-
added products has been identified as the key to revitalising this sector, but firms are 
struggling to develop their ability to innovate; one important reason for this has been 
identified as high workforce turnover (Liu, 2007).  This issue has been well recognized by 
private firms.  In 2005, domestic privately-owned textile enterprises called for industrial 
action to boycott and to blacklist workers with a history of short tenure, and they even 
petitioned the legislating agency to amend business law in order to enforce longer tenure110. 
Job tenure is directly determined by a specific employment relationship between an 
employer and an employee and empirical studies require a firm-based data set.  To the best 
of our knowledge, there has been no other empirical study using personnel records to 
investigate labour turnover in the private sector in China.  With 12 years of personnel 
records from the same firm as studied in Chapter 4, amounting to 4,034 workers with 4,356 
observations, we apply duration models to examine the length of single and multiple 
employment spells and to explore the determinants of voluntary job separations in this 
organization111.   
The remainder of this Chapter will be organized as follows: Section 2 uncovers existing 
studies on the determinants of job tenure; Section 3 describes the data; Section 4 presents 
our empirical strategy; Section 5 presents the empirical results; Section 6 concludes. 
                                                      
109
  The Speech by Huai-Bin SUN (spokesman for the China National Textile Industry Council) at 
the Textile Industry Annual Conference, March 2006, Beijing. 
110
  “Growing Textile Firms are suffering from a High Staff Turnover”, 2005, [Online; cited May 
2007,] Available from: http://www.yfu.cn.  
111
  We excluded records of firing (4) and retirement (6). 
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5.2 Literature on determinants of job tenure 
Broadly speaking, there are two categories of job-separation model (see Section 2.4).  One 
is the “inspection-good model of turnover” (Burdett, 1978; Mortensen, 1978); and the other 
is the “experience-good model of turnover”(Jovanovic, 1979; Viscusi, 1980).  The former 
accepts on-the-job searches and regards jobs purely as searching goods.  It assumes that 
current employer-employee relationships could dissolve on receipt of information of a 
potentially superior match.  The experience-good model asserts that the quality of the 
match between an individual worker and an employer is revealed ex-post and that job 
separation is the result of a bad match. 
Pissarides (2000) proposed the stochastic job matching model where the quality of a job 
match is influenced by unobserved characteristics of jobs and workers.  That is to say, until 
an actual appointment is established, two different workers appear identical to the firm, and 
two vacant jobs from two different firms appear identical to the worker.  Pissarides refers to 
these situations as “the ex ante homogeneity of firms and workers and the ex post resolution 
of all uncertainty”.  This model helps to explain the business practice of using social 
contacts to reduce uncertainty.  Fernandez and Castilla (2001) summarized three types of 
benefits of using social contacts for recruitment.  Firstly, referred applicants require less 
screening, because more information is available on them.  Secondly, referred applicants 
tend to be well-informed about the pecuniary aspects of the employment and are better 
matched to the work.  Finally, connections of newly hired workers with referees (especially 
referees who are current employees) can ease job transitions and create additional loyalty 
and attachment to the company.  Empirical evidence from the USA seems to support the 
above arguments.  Simon and Warner (1992) used survey data to show that workers hired 
via the “old-boy network” are more durable in comparison to those hired via advertisement, 
private agency or other means.  Using data from a call centre of a large bank, Fernandez et 
al. (2000) present evidence of reduced costs of hiring through the use of referrals.    
Meyer and Allen (1991) defined “normative commitment” of a worker as their sense of 
obligation to continue in the employ of the organization.  Normative commitment seems 
very natural in situations in which workers are hired via social contacts, especially if these 
contacts are employees of the hiring organization.  Kugler (2003) argues that referees exert 
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peer pressure on referred workers, which lowers monitoring costs and allows firms to pay a 
lower efficiency wage.  The generation of normative commitment or peer pressure from the 
referee is in the same spirit as guanxi and mianzi as discussed in Section 1.5 and 4.2.  Yao 
and Wang (2006) used survey data on 242 employees from 14 high-technology companies 
in Beijing, China, and argue that normative commitment, measured using the 
Organizational Commitment Scale (Allen and Meyer, 1990), has strong negative effect on 
employees’ (self-reported) job-hopping behaviour.  Based on a survey of 1,160 workers in 
foreign-invested enterprises in China, Wang (2008) provides evidence that emotional bonds 
with both supervisors and co-workers are related to a lower propensity to “jump ship”.  
However, the organizational outcomes of normative commitment within these studies are 
measured by a self-reported turnover history or turnover intention.  In our data, we have the 
advantage of actual turnover records.  With these, we are able to examine the true influence 
of guanxi on tenure.  Since it is an established feature of Chinese culture (detailed in 
Section 1.4) that guanxi generates an obligation to stay with an organisation, we 
hypothesize that guanxi has a positive impact on employment duration. 
Deferred Compensation Packages (DCPs) have been structured to encourage long tenure 
(Salop and Salop, 1976; Jacoby, 1990).  Existing empirical work with aggregate data from 
developed countries shows that the offer of pension rights accomplishes the desired 
outcome of longer tenure (Ippolito, 1991; Gustman et al., 1994; Hernas et al.2006).  
Workers in the private sector in China were first offered DCPs in 1996 (see Section 4.3).  
As of 2009, around one third of the Chinese population is covered by a pension plan112.  
However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has so far been undertaken to explore the 
influence of DCPs (e.g. pension rights) on job tenure in China.  Detailed records of DCP 
offers will allow us to conduct such an investigation at the level of individual workers.  
Given the challenge faced by private textile firms raised at the start of this Chapter, we 
hypothesize that such firms are using DCPs explicitly to bring about longer tenure in the 
firm, and that such a strategy is successful. 
Migrant workers constitute the majority of the workforce in the private sector in China.  For 
example, a survey of 3,309 private enterprises in the Changzhou area in 2006 showed that 
                                                      
112
  “China’s Predicament”, The Economist, 27 June 2009. 
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migrant workers make up 61% of the workforce of these enterprises, and that these workers 
are mainly concentrated in the manufacturing and construction industries113.  As detailed in 
Section 1.2, migrant workers have been restricted in their access to employment and in the 
degree to which they are able to settle in their destination, and have also been excluded 
from local welfare systems.  Undoubtedly, this sort of discrimination is likely to contribute 
to shorter tenure.  Knight and Yueh (2004) used data extracted from a national urban 
household survey in 1999, and found that urban residents have a longer tenure. 
With the rapid development of the eastern and coastal areas, and the resulting heavy 
demand for migrant workers, Jiangsu province pioneered a series of experiments in hukou 
policy (already outlined in Sections 1.2 and 4.6).  The uniqueness of our data, in terms of 
not only being collected from this experimental region, but also covering this period of 
significant hukou reform, enables us to investigate the effect of hukou reform on 
employment duration.  However, disappointingly, we find that migrant workers remain 
excluded from the local welfare system despite hukou reform.  Furthermore, as we saw in 
Section 4.6, employers continue to discriminate against migrant workers in terms of 
offering less attractive remuneration and deferred compensation packages.  For these 
reasons, we hypothesize that migrant workers are more likely to undertake on-the-job 
search, and that they exhibit a higher turnover pattern, than their local counterparts. 
As discussed in Section 1.5, the private sector has become the major employer of graduates 
since 2000.  Since the reform in 2003, graduates with degrees114 have been granted local 
hukou if they have been offered a position with a local firm, while those with certificates 
can apply for local hukou after two years of working in the area.  Hence it is fair to say that, 
in the time since reform, graduates have not been constrained by their hukou status in 
Jiangsu province.  Consequently, the job separation pattern of these skilled workers 
(defined by having a certificate or degree) is likely to be a reflection on labour market 
conditions, rather than on their reaction to institutional features.   
                                                      
113
  “Analysis of Payment in Private Enterprises in Changzhou”, Jiangsu Province Statistical Bureau, 
2006, [Online; 26 March 2007,]  Available from: 
http://www.jssb.gov.cn/jssb/tjfx/sxfxzl/1200703270025.htm  
114
  A degree is awarded by a University, while a certificate is awarded by a vocational college. 
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In 2006, a survey in the Changzhou area showed that the average payment in privately-
owned firms (data on its payment was excluded from the national statistics115) is only 55% 
of that of urban workers116.  This provides a glimpse of the low average payment in the 
private sector.  In order to maintain a reasonable living standard in this flourishing area, we 
would expect that skilled workers will continue to search for better paid positions.  For this 
reason, we hypothesize that skilled workers in the private sector have a higher propensity to 
leave the firm than unskilled workers. 
We therefore propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: There will be a lower rate of turnover amongst those with Guanxi compared 
to those without.  
Hypothesis 2: There will be a lower rate of turnover amongst workers receiving a Deferred 
Compensation Package (DCP) compared to those without. 
Hypothesis 3: There will be a higher rate of turnover amongst migrant workers than local 
workers.  
Hypothesis 4: There will be a higher rate of turnover amongst skilled workers than 
unskilled workers. 
5.3 Data collection 
The data is personnel records from the same company as that described and analysed in 
Chapter 4.  However, while in Chapter 4 the focus was on salary, in this Chapter salary 
information is not required.  This enables us to use the full data set of personnel records on 
4,034 employees, amounting to 4,356 observations.  Computerisation of personnel records 
from 2001 means that it has been possible to obtain complete records of the workforce 
between February 1994 and January 2007, with the exception of those leaving before 2001.   
                                                      
115
  In October 2009, it was reported that national statistics bureau will start to include workers’ 
wage in the private sector in the national statistics. “After 50 Years, Wage in the Private Sector will 
be Compiled in the National Statistics”, 28 October 2009, East Morning. 
116
  “Analysis of Payment in Private Enterprise in Changzhou”, Jiangsu Province Statistical Bureau, 
2006, [Online; 26 March 2007,]  Available from: 
http://www.jssb.gov.cn/jssb/tjfx/sxfxzl/1200703270025.htm 
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There are 14 years in our data; we attempted to show difference of survival rate among 
workers recruited in different years; there would be too many groups on the diagram.  As 
some years are of more interest than others, in Figure 5.1, we grouped workers into 5 
categories based on the year they started employment in the firm.  The categories are 
workers who started  
• between 1994 and 2000 
• 2001 (merging occur, see section 4.4)  
• 2002-2003 (before hukou policy, see section 5.5)  
• 2004-2005 (after hukou policy)   
• 2006.   
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Figure 5.1: Kaplan-Meier Estimates by Year of Starting Employment  
 
The Kaplan-Meier estimates show that the more senior the worker is (in terms of tenure 
within the firm), the more likely they are to stay.  The workers who started between 1994-
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2000 present the highest survival rate.  Workers who started in 2001 have maximum 5 years 
tenure when the data was collected in 2007.  When workers started employment later, such 
as in 2004, their tenures in the diagram appear to be prolonged than they should be, this is 
because we have time varying variables (see Table 5.3) which recorded the event change as 
time elapse.   
To make it clear, a typical worker with time-varying variable is showed in Table 5.1.  This 
typical worker started employment on 18 February 2001, was offered a DCP on 1 February 
2004 and resigned on 2 March 2006.  In the data, the worker is recorded with identification 
number 4051; the dynamic change is recorded as shown in Table 5.1: the worker has no 
DCP (coded as 0) between February 2001 and February 2004; and had a DCP (coded as 1) 
between February 2004 and March 2006.  The worker would be included both in 2001 and 
2004 year groups; however, this worker’s tenure will be only 35.9 months in the year group 
of 2001; the rest of tenure will be recorded in the 2004 year group.  Therefore, in Figure 5.1, 
it appears that this worker started in the 36th month and stayed until 61 months.  This would 
not affect our duration regression since we use stratification to indicate the total duration, 
61 months, is one employment spell (see Table 5.6 for detail) 
ID Start date Quit date DCP status _t0 (enter time) _t (analysis time) 
4051 18-Feb-01 01-Feb-2004 0 0 35.9 
4051 01-Feb-04 02-Mar-2006 1 35.9 61.3 
Table 5.1: A typical worker with a time varying variable 
The studied firm implements the policy that each worker has a probationary period of 3 
months.  After this trial period, with mutual consent, a three-year contract is arranged which 
effectively indicates the commencement of a permanent employment relationship.  
5.3.1 Data description  
Table 5.2 presents summary statistics on durations.  It is seen that there are 4,034 workers, 
with 4,356 observations in total.  Tenure ranges from less than one month to 156 months117 
(13 years), with an average tenure of 21 months.  The maximum number of employment 
spells is 3, indicating that these particular workers resigned from the company twice before 
                                                      
117 
 The maximum tenure (156 months) is due to 30 days being used as the scale of one month.  The 
actual tenure of this record is 13 years less 12 days.  
Job Tenure in One Chinese Private Company                                                                            Chapter 5 
  
 
 
110
re-starting employment.  There are 56 workers with gaps in their employment spells, the 
period of the gap ranging from 1 month to 38 months.  Among these 56 workers: nearly 
90% are migrant workers; more than 85% were recruited through acquaintance’s 
introduction; 7 of them have received a higher education; 10 of them work in the 
production offices. 
Category Total Per subject 
 
 mean minimum median maximum 
Number of workers 4034     
Number of records 4356 1.08 1 1 3 
(first) entry time  0.00 0 0 0 
(final) exit time  20.86 .5 11 156.67 
workers with gap 56     
time on gap if gap 658.90 11.77 1 10 38.3 
time at risk 83485.6 20.70 0.5 11 156.67 
failures 2371.00 0.59 0 1 2 
Table 5.2: Description of the Dataset 
Variable constant varying Never missing 
Deferred compensation packages 3783 357 4040 
Marital status 4007 33 4040 
Working departments 3994 46 4040 
Position  4012 28 4040 
Table 5.3: Time-varying Variables 
Table 5.3 summarises changes over time in the study period.  357 workers were offered a 
DCP for the first-time by the firm, the definition of a first-time recipient is discussed in 
Section 4.3.  There are 46 records of change in departments and 27 changes in the position 
categories (from a worker to a manager) respectively.  There are also 33 records of changes 
in marital status (from single to married). 
The variable definitions and data descriptions are given in Tables 5.4 and 5.5.  As can be 
seen from Table 5.4, this is a female dominated workforce (unsurprising given the nature of 
the textile industry), with 56% female workers.  We found evidence that the majority of 
female workers are among the less well-educated group; the proportion among female 
workers in the middle school or lower education category is 77%.  This is nearly 30 
percentage points higher than that of male workers.  Moreover, female workers, on average, 
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are 3 years younger than male workers, they also account for more than 60% of unmarried 
workers in the factory.  Married workers account for 46% of the 4,356 observations.   
Only 13% of the workforce, 577 records, is offered a deferred compensation package.  The 
turnover rate is as high as 54% in the sample.  There is a young workforce in the company 
being discussed, with an average starting age of 25; this includes 26 workers who started at 
the age of less than 16 years old (the youngest being 14 years old, 6 cases).  This offers a 
glimpse of child labour in the Chinese private sector.  The oldest age in the sample is 65; 
there are 4 male workers aged over 60, and 1 female worker aged over 55 (the relaxation of 
legal working age in the private sector in China was discussed in Section 4.4).  
Variable Obs Mean Std. (Dev.) Min Max 
Male workers 4356 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Married workers 4356 0.46 0.50 0 1 
With deferred compensation 4356 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Informally recruited 4356 0.84 0.36 0 1 
Managerial position 4356 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Proportion of leaving 4356 0.54 0.50 0 1 
With guanxi in the company 4356 0.04 0.20 0 1 
With local hukou status 4356 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Age when started employment (years) 4356 25.00 7.43 14 65 
Table 5.4: Dichotomy variables Definition and Data Description 
More than 80% of the sample was recruited via informal channels (introduced by an 
acquaintance).  However, only 4% is recorded by the human resource division as having 
Guanxi within or with the firm.  The same small proportion has ever been employed in a 
managerial position. 
The hukou definition in this dataset is as the same as that in Chapter 4.  About 17% are 
workers with a local hukou status.  This is unsurprising since empirical studies show 
migrant workers are likely to take up jobs that the local populace do not want.  Nationally, 
male migrants dominate mining and construction industries, female in textiles and 
sanitation (Meng and Zhang, 2001; Feng et al., 2002).  Locals tend to work in other sectors 
where better payment and working conditions are found.   
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Variables Freq. % 
Education background 
Primary schooling (less than 9 years education) 2,794 64.14 
Secondary Schooling ( between 9 to 12 years education) 756 17.33 
Vocational education (9-13 years) 467 10.72 
Tertiary education (Diploma and degree)  339 7.78 
Working sectors 
Production line 3,199 73.44 
Production offices♦ 613 14.07 
Administration and sales workers 314 7.21 
Logistics (cook, cleaner, security staff, driver) 230 5.28 
 
Total observations 4,356 100 
Table 5.5: Categorical Variables Definition  
♦ These offices are research and development, designing, planning, laboratory, quality 
control and machine maintaining office. 
 
Table 5.5 shows that more than 60% of the sample has had less than 9 years schooling.  
This reveals one feature of human capital in privately-owned manufacturers where the 
workforce is typically composed of unskilled workers.  Workers with a degree only made 
up 8% of the workforce in this company; this is in line with a survey result that technicians, 
on average, accounted for less than 13% of the workforce among 3,309 private enterprises 
in Changzhou in 2006118.  In addition, more than 70% of these observations are production 
line workers, only 14% of the sample work in the production offices.  Administrative staff 
and support workers make up the rest of its workforce.   
5.3.2 Graphical exploration 
Figure 5.2, uses the Kernel smoother to show that the cumulative job separation probability 
changes with length of tenure, the probability starts to rise in the first year, and then 
gradually decreases with the accumulation of tenure.  The general pattern of workforce 
mobility in this firm seems to be consistent with the predictions of the job match model of 
Jovanovic (1979).  
                                                      
118
  “Analysis of Payment in Private Enterprise in Changzhou”, Jiangsu Province Statistical Bureau, 
2006, [Online: 26 March 2007,] Available from: 
http://www.jssb.gov.cn/jssb/tjfx/sxfxzl/1200703270025.htm 
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Figure 5.2: Monthly Smoothed Hazard Rate 
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Figure 5.3: Hazard Rates of Different Hukou Status 
 
In Figure 5.3, the smoothed hazard is presented by different hukou status.  It shows that 
migrant workers (non-locals) have a higher separation hazard regardless of length of tenure.  
The job separation pattern of this group mirrors the general trend of the whole sample.  On 
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the other hand, the job separation rate of local hukou steadily decreases after the initial 
increase. 
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Figure 5.4: Hazard Rates One-year after hukou Reform in 2003 (by different hukou 
status) 
 
The essential hukou reform in Jiangsu province, took effect on 1 May 2003, allowed 
migrant workers to settle in provided that they have a legal residence and a regular income.  
Allowing for one-year delay of implementation, we investigate the effect of hukou reform 
on job tenure.  Figure 5.4 shows a sub-sample which excludes workers who left before 1 
May 2004.  It shows the degree of volatility has diminished for short tenured workers; 
however, it seems that the policy has less effect on longer tenured migrant workers.   
We notice some volatility in tenure between 60 and 96 months across all the figures, which 
is inconsistent with generally predicted job separation pattern.  We examined the external 
labour markets and found that since 2004 there were significant shortages of migrant 
workers in the manufacturing industry, especially in the eastern and coastal areas of China, 
such as Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong provinces.  A survey estimates that firms 
were short of 384,000 workers across 12 cities in these four provinces in the second quarter 
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in 2004.119  This provides one explanation for the job separation pattern in Figure 5.4.  
Migrant workers who face discrimination have a greater opportunity cost when there is a 
shortage of labour in the external labour markets, this stimulates an exodus among migrant 
workers.  Therefore, in our sample the effect of the hukou reform, if there is any, has been 
offset by labour shortage in the external labour markets.   
As can be seen in Figure 5.5, reported by Xinhua News agency, as an example, no 
applicants are at a job fair site in 2005.  Causes of the shortage of migrant workers have 
been widely examined.  The following explanations are generally accepted.  Firstly, 
domestic privately-owned enterprises usually operated as a sweatshop environment and 
offered very low payment in order to exploit low skilled migrant workers, forcing them to 
live in extreme poverty (see Figure 5.6 showing the deplorable living conditions of migrant 
workers).  A survey in 2005 showed that the average monthly payment of migrant workers 
in the Zhujiang economic delta was almost the same as ten years ago120.  Secondly, the 
central government has started to reduce and, in some regions, to exempt rural agricultural 
taxes since 2004, as an attempt to maintain arable lands and to reduce the income disparity 
between urban and rural residents.  Therefore a large number of low skilled workers have 
returned to the agricultural sector (Yang, 2005; Barboza, 2006).  Thirdly, the supply of 
young labour in China has started to level off due to the one child policy (started in 1978) 
while manufacturing is still expanding (Barboza, 2006).  Fourthly, inland economic 
development is taking place in areas of former migration.  Some migrants have returned to 
these areas and started their own business after working in areas that were developed earlier.  
As a consequence, jobs become available locally which reduces the supply of migrant 
workers.  The shortage of migrant labour has been eased temporarily due to the fall in 
overseas demand of the global recession since late 2008. 
                                                      
119
  “Labour Shortage Alarms Manufacturing in China”, 28 March 2005, Xinhua News. 
120
  “Labour Shortage Threatens Manufacturing in China”, 28 March 2005, Xinhua News. 
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Figure 5.5: Employers Anticipating Recruiting Workers, but Facing Limited 
Choices121 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Low Salary, Migrant Workers Live in Crowded Condition  
Source: Beijingnews.com 
 
                                                      
121
  “Labour Shortage Alarms Manufacturing in China”, 28 March 2005, Xinhua News. 
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These fluctuations among Figures 5.2-5.4 presumably reflect the reactions of the workforce 
of the company being studied to the shortage in the external labour markets.  In Figure 5.7, 
among the less well-educated group, migrant workers present a higher rate of turnover than 
that of local workers despite controlling for tenure.  There is again a distinctive rise in 
months 84-96 which indicate a much stronger reaction to labour shortage in the external 
labour market among low skilled migrant workers.  A survey showed that in the capital city 
of adjacent to Jiangsu province, Hangzhou, on average, a male worker can choose from 8 
job vacancies, and a female worker can choose from 15 vacancies in 2005122.  Such a high 
number of vacancies are likely to encourage job separations amongst migrant workers who 
are most likely to be engaged in low paid employment. 
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Figure 5.7: Hazard Rates of Less Well-educated Group (by different hukou Status) 
 
5.4 Empirical strategies  
In our model, voluntary leaving is treated as a “failure” (other types of leaving, for example, 
firing or retirement, are disregarded as there are only 10 cases).  If there is a permanent 
separation, a worker will only have a single record with the same employer, this is called a 
single-spell data.  In this case, the traditional, (standard), survival analysis will be adequate 
                                                      
122
  “Labour Shortage Alarms Manufacturing in China”, 28 March 2005, Xinhua News. 
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to investigate determinants of job tenure.  However, in our dataset, a small number of 
workers, 56, have repeated records of resignation, (recurrent data), where workers have 
returned to the same employer after a period of separation.  This forms a dataset including 
multiple employment spells in which correlation in resigning behaviour of each individual 
may arise.  This would violate the assumption of independence of leaving behaviour 
required in the traditional duration analysis.  One possible approach of analysing multiple 
quit data is to examine the first spell of employment, disregarding any subsequent spells.  
This may not be considered sufficiently accurate as there is a risk of missing possibly 
relevant information.  Therefore, we will conduct single-spell data and multiple-spell data 
analysis. 
5.4.1 Single failure data analysis 
To begin with, a gamma frailty model is employed, not only to examine tenure determinates, 
but also to explore the possible heterogeneity among individuals which could not be 
controlled for using independent variables.  Based on Gutierrez (2002), for each individual 
i=1,..,n , the triple records are organized as (t0i, ti, di) for the ith observation, its 
corresponding time span (t0i, ti], with either failure occurring at time ti (di = 1) or the failure 
time being right-censored at time ti (di = 0).  For this random spell, T, if the possibility 
density function for T is ( )tf  and the cumulative distribution function as ( ) ( )tTptF ≤= , 
then the survival function is given by ( ) ( ) ( )tFtTPtS −=>= 1  and the hazard function by 
( ) ( ) ( )tStfth /= .  The frailty is usually assumed to follow a gamma distribution123 with unit 
mean and variance θ.  The log likelihood is a combination of the failures and the censored 
observations is given by: 
( ){ } ( ){ } ( )[ ] ( )∑
=
+−=
n
i
iiiiiii thdtstsLLn
1
0 1lnln θθθ  
where we use the subscript θ to allow for the possibility of heterogeneity, for example 
hθi(t)=hθ(t/χi).  When θ does not equal 0, there are possibly unexplained reasons exerting 
impact upon workers’ tenure, which are not captured by the covariates in the model. 
                                                      
123
  It could also follow an inverse Gaussian distribution which will make duration analysis more 
complicated, and not attempted here. 
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Since we are more interested in parameter estimates than the shape of hazard, the standard 
Cox Proportional Hazard (PH) model is employed to examine the hazard ratio.  Its hazard 
function and corresponding partial likelihood function are given by 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )3exp
exp
2exp0
∏
∑
>
′
′
=
′=
uncensoredi
ij
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ii
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X
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Xtt
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Where ( )t0λ  is an unspecified baseline hazard function, β ′  are coefficients and Xi is a 
covariate vector. 
5.4.2 Multiple failure data analysis 
We plan to examine the influence of the initial exit on the second exit or simply allow for 
the possibility that they are related.  In addition, we are interested in why these workers, 56, 
have returned to the same employer, which might indicate particular job match elements 
among migrant workers.  To capture the possible dependence of correlated recurrent events 
on the same individual, the gamma shared frailty model is utilised (Lim et al., 2007).  
For data consisting of n individual with the i-th individual comprising ni observed spells, 
the unobservable effect (frailty) αi on the hazard is introduced which is assumed to follow a 
gamma distribution.  Conditional on frailty, the hazard function is: 
( ) ( ) ( )4| thth ijiiij αα =  
Where  i=1,…, n, j=1,…, ni with ( ) ( )ijij xthth |= .   
That is, for any spell of the i-th group, the standard hazard function is now multiplied by 
the shared frailty iα .  Since it is reasonable to expect some correlation between the two 
failures, (events), for a given individual, this is usually modelled as a shared frailty model 
where the sharing takes place at the individual level.  
The likelihood of job separation of the observed data is obtained by calculating the 
individual level to the conditional likelihoods and integrating of the frailty.  Suppose we 
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have data consisting of the tri-variate response (t0ij, tij, dij), which indicate the start time, end 
time and failure/censoring for the jth spell of one individual.  If we define ∑
=
=
in
j iji dD 1 , the 
probability density function of the frailty follows a gamma distribution, the likelihood of 
the ith group, (which in our case is the individual worker), can be obtained by 
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When θ does not equal zero, there are possible unexplained reasons for each individual 
affecting one’s job separation, but these reasons are not explained by covariates in the 
model. 
The P-W-P (Prentice et al., 1981) models124 are employed to examine multiple-spell data 
when we are more interested in the hazard ratio between different groups.  The P-W-P 
models share the same spirit as the Poisson regression using the counting process style of 
data input.  Each subject is recorded as a series of observations.  With the same assumptions 
as the Cox proportional hazard model, the P-W-P model stratifies each employment spell 
by the use of time-dependent strata, so that the hazard baseline is allowed to vary from 
event to recurrent event.  Therefore, it captures the possibility that the current event may be 
affected by the previous event (Therneau and Grambsch, 2001).  
We outline the model as follows.  Assuming the ith individual (i=1.., n) with a maximum 
number of failure J (j=1,.., Ji), (the failure type in our data being the same). Let Tij be the 
time when the jth failure occurs and Cij be the corresponding censoring times on the ith 
worker.  Assume t0ij is the start time, then t= Tij- t0ij or t= Cij - t0ij is the respective survival 
time.  Assume that Tij and Cij are independent, conditional on the covariate vector (Xij) of 
size p.  Define Zij = min (Tij, Cij), that is to say, Zij equals Tij if a worker leaves, or Cij  if a 
worker remains.  Let ( ) { }tZItY ijij ≥=  is the risk set indicator.  Defines ( )ijijij CTI <=γ  
where I (.) is the indicator function and takes the value 1 when ijij CT < and 0 otherwise.  
Let jβ ′ be of unknown regression coefficients of Xij.    
                                                      
124
  Prentice, L, B. Williams, A. Peterson, On the regression analysis of multivariate failure time 
data, Biometrika,1981,vol.68, p373-379.  
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 Total time scale Gap-time scale   
ID Time0 Time Time0 Time Status Stratification 
1 0 12 0 12 1 1 
1 14 20 0 6 1 2 
1 21 42 0 21 0 3 
Table 5.6: Data Arrangement under Different Time-scales of the PWP Model 
There are two time scales for the P-W-P models, the total time (the time since entry) and 
the gap-time.  The former records each event as an elapsed time, the latter counts each spell 
from the time of the previous event, that is to say, the clock is set to zero after each failure.  
Assume one subject has three employment spells as in Table 5.6.  ID gives the person a 
unique identification number in the dataset.  Status takes value 1 if a resignation is observed 
by the end of this period, 0 if an employment relationship still exists.  The value of 
stratification is used to record the order of employment spells.  Under the total time scale, it 
records the recurrence as time passes, within the gap time scale, the order of each spell is 
recorded. 
Firstly, under the total time scale, the risk set indicator ( ) { }jijiij ZtZItY ,1, ≤≤= − , the hazard 
function and its corresponding partial likelihood function are: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where ( )tj0λ  is an unspecified baseline hazard function, which varies from one event to 
another. 
Secondly, under the gap-time scale, ( ) { }tGItY ijij ≥=  by definition, the hazard function and 
its corresponding partial likelihood function are: 
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Where ( )tYij  is a risk set indicator and tj-1 is the time of the (j-1)th failure, and 
1,, −−= jiji ZZG ij is the inter event or gap time (Lin and Wei, 1989; Lin, 1994). 
5.5 Empirical findings 
For the single-spell data analysis, the lognormal distribution with the gamma frailty model 
is used to investigate both the determinants of job tenure, and the existence of heterogeneity 
among individuals in the dataset.  The reason for using the lognormal distribution is that the 
assumption of a non-monotonic hazard shape fits the pattern of the job matching process 
(Jovanovic, 1979).  Also the standard Cox PH is employed to examine the hazard ratio 
among different groups.   
In Table 5.7, all specifications demonstrate that most variables impact significantly on 
workers’ tenure.  In addition, the gamma frailty model with δˆ =1.53 shows the degree of 
skewness of probability density function of the lognormal distribution and captures the 
general trend of job matching process; this is also supported in Weibull model, where 
1/p=1.09, which shows that the Weibull probability density function at first increases then 
decreases.  However, =θˆ 0 and =θˆ 0.09 in these lognormal and Weibull regressions 
respectively and significant likelihood ratio tests reject the assumption of possible 
unexplained reasons beyond independent variables in our regressions.   
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Tenure Lognormal 
distribution 
(Gamma frailty) 
Weibull 
distribution 
(Gamma frailty) 
Cox 
Proportional 
Hazard  
model 
 Coef. (Std. Err.)125 Coef. (Std. Err.)126 Coef. (Std. 
Err.) 
Constant 3.35***(0.22) -3.53***(0.19)  
Guanxi  0.92***(0.15) -0.75***(0.13) -0.74***(0.13) 
Deferred Compensation Package 0.25**(0.11) -0.24***(0.08) -0.23***(0.08) 
Male workers 0.25***(0.06) -0.22***(0.05) -0.22***(0.05) 
Age when start employment -0.03***(0.00) 0.02***(0.00) 0.02***(0.00) 
Married workers 0.47***(0.07) -0.43***(0.06) -0.42***(0.05) 
Managerial position 1.15***(0.16) -0.99***(0.14) -0.97***(0.13) 
Recruited via informal channels 0.41***(0.15) -0.29**(0.12) -0.27**(0.12) 
Local hukou status 0.16*(0.08) -0.18***(0.07) -0.18**(0.07) 
Working department (excluded category: administration and sales staff):  
Production line -0.45***(0.12) 0.47***(0.10) 0.47*** (0.11) 
Production office -0.57***(0.13) 0.56***(0.11) 0.55***(0.12) 
Logistics section -0.60***(0.16) 0.62***(0.14) 0.60*** (0.14) 
Educational background (excluded category: primary schooling):  
Secondary schooling  -0.11(0.08) 0.09(0.06) 0.10 (0.06) 
Vocational schooling  0.04 (0.15) -0.02(0.12) -0.01 (0.12) 
Higher education  -0.48**(0.19) 0.54***(0.15) 0.52***(0.15) 
  
δ
 
1.53 (0.23)   
θ
 
0.00 (0.00) 0.08  
1/ρ  1.09  
  
Number of subjects 4,033 4,033 4,033 
Number of observations 4,299 4,299 4,299 
Log likelihood -5369.38 -5369.83 -17348.10 
    Note:*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01  
Table 5.7: Duration Regression of Single Spell Data 
To assess the suitability of the lognormal or Weibull regression, we run a Gamma 
distribution regression see Appendix A4 and conduct the Wald tests.  The Wald test for the 
suitability of the Weibull model is to test 1=κ ;  
21





 −
se
k
, se is the standard error. 
                                                      
125
  The coefficient is accelerated failure-time form. 
126
  The coefficient is log relative-hazard form. 
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The Gamma model estimated 48.0=κ (standard error is 0.08) in Appendix A3, 
therefore 25.421
2
=




 −
se
k
, this result provides strong evidence against the null hypothesis 
that k=1 which suggest that the Weibull model is not suitable for the data.  The Lognormal 
model requires a Wald test for 0=κ . The results from Gamma model 
estimate ( ) 20.3312 =χ  and p=0.001, this present strong evidence to reject the hypothesis 
0=κ 127.   
The scaled Schoehfeld and the nonscaled Schoenfeld residuals were saved, in order to test 
the proportional hazard assumption of the standard Cox hazard model; both individual 
coefficients and a global test reject the proportional hazard assumption, which is 
unsurprising since our data contain time-varying variables.  In addition, these tests only 
apply to data with one employment spell. Our data includes multiple employment spells.  
Therefore, the tests were conducted on the regressions using single spell data. Our 
interpretations are based on the extended Cox Hazard model, the P-W-P model; this model 
allows the baseline to vary (details see Section 5.4.2). 
Table 5.8 presents results of regression of multiple-spell data.  These models utilised 4,356 
observations.  The Lognormal distribution with Gamma shared frailty model is used not 
only to investigate the determinants of job separation, but also to measure the dependence 
of recurrences within each returner.  It shows that the hazard shape of multiple spells data 
fits the predicted job match pattern with δˆ =1.52.  However =θˆ 0 and a likelihood ratio test 
reject the presence of random effects among these returners.  Since there is no record of 
changes in position category after their return, we suggest that these returners confirm the 
view that migrant workers access jobs via informal channels, and connections with the firm 
via referees, play a certain role in the decisions of workers’ resignations, and even 
contribute to the return of skilled workers. 
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Tenure Lognormal 
regression 
Gamma 
shared frailty 
P-W-P time 
from entry 
P-W-P time from 
previous event 
 Coef. (Std. 
Err.) 
Coef. (Std. Err.) Coef. (Std. Err.) 
Constant 3.33***(0.22)   
Guanxi  0.91***(0.15) -0.72***(0.13) -0.72***(0.13) 
Deferred compensation package 0.26*(0.11) -0.25***(0.08) -0.25***(0.08) 
Male workers 0.25***(0.06) -0.22***(0.05) -0.22***(0.05) 
Age when start employment -0.03***(0.00) 0.02***(0.00) 0.02***(0.00) 
Married workers 0.46***(0.07) -0.42***(0.05) -0.42***(0.05) 
Managerial position 1.14***(0.16) -0.97***(0.13) -0.96***(0.13) 
Recruited via informal channels 0.41***(0.15) -0.26**(0.12) -0.27**(0.12) 
Local hukou status 0.17*(0.08) -0.18***(0.07) -0.18***(0.07) 
Working department (excluded category: administration and sales staff): 
Production line -0.44***(0.12) 0.47***(0.11) 0.46***(0.11) 
Production office -0.57***(0.13) 0.54***(0.12) 0.54***(0.12) 
Logistics section -0.59***(0.16) 0.60***(0.14) 0.59***(0.14) 
Educational background (excluded category: primary schooling ): 
Secondary schooling -0.11(0.08) 0.11(0.06) 0.10 (0.06) 
Vocational schooling 0.04 (0.15) -0.00 (0.12) 10.00 (0.12) 
Higher education -0.48***(0.19) 0.53***(0.15) 0.53***(0.15) 
 
δ  1.52 (0.02)   
θ  0.00(0.00)   
 
Number of subjects 4,034 4,034 4,034 
Number of observations 4,356 4,356 4,356 
Log likelihood -5393.35 -17385.22 -17412.22 
   Note:*p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01  
Table 5.8: Duration Regression of Multiple-spell Data 
As can be seen in Table 5.9, individuals with Guanxi are significantly less likely to leave; 
the separation ratio is only half of that of those without, ceteris paribus.  On average, their 
tenure is twice as long as those who have no Guanxi.  Even for those who were hired via 
informal recruitment channels; their probability of leaving is nearly a quarter lower than the 
comparable group, who were recruited via formal channels.  We argue this average 
prolonged tenure among workers with Guanxi is not only evidence in support of its 
function in reducing uncertainty of job match and favouring career prospects, but also the 
commitment to Guanxi in Chinese culture.  This provides evidence to support our 
Hypothesis 1.  
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Variables  Hazard ratio 
Guanxi  0.49 
Deferred compensation package 0.78 
Male workers 0.80 
Age when start employment 1.02 
Married workers 0.66 
Managerial position 0.38 
Recruited via informal channels 0.77 
Local hukou status 0.83 
Working department (excluded category: administrative and sales people): 
Production line 1.60 
Production office 1.72 
Logistics section 1.81 
Education background (excluded category: primary schooling): 
Secondary schooling 1.11 
Vocational schooling 1.00 
Higher education 1.69 
Number of subject 4,034 
Number of observation 4,356 
Log likelihood -17385.22 
    
Table 5.9: Hazard Ratio between Different Groups (Based on multiple-spell data 
regression, P-W-P model, time from entry) 
Workers who start employment in the firm at an elder age show a higher probability of 
leaving.  Offering a deferred compensation package reduces the probability of resignation 
by almost a quarter, ceteris paribus.  This empirical evidence is in favour of our Hypothesis 
2.  Married workers seem to make much more stable employees than single workers.  
Workers in managerial positions are significantly less likely to leave, although they 
represent a very small proportion, 4%, of the workforce.  
It can also be seen from Table 5.9, that women are more likely to pose a higher hazard, with 
a 20% greater risk than men of leaving, ceteris paribus.  An argument based on a survey of 
rural migrant workers in Jiangsu province in 2007 states that girls in rural areas are 
discriminated against by their parents and receive less education than boys.  Therefore, girls 
join the workforce at a younger age than men.  After marriage, these less well-educated 
women will usually return and remain in their original residential areas and engage in 
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childrearing and homemaking 128 .  Migrant female workers in our dataset share some 
features with this survey data.  However, we also suggest that they might be more likely to 
engage in on-the-job searching.  Given the regional shortage of female labour faced by 
manufacturers since 2004, see Section 5.3.2, female workers therefore demonstrate a higher 
job separation pattern.  
Having a local hukou status presents a significantly lower leaving hazard rate compared to 
those with non-local hukou status (see Table 5.9).  We argue that these local workers have 
already occupied better paid jobs - as seen in our empirical results in Section 4.6.  This 
supports our Hypothesis 3. 
In terms of the leaving hazard ratio across departments, we use the non-production sector as 
the base group.  This group includes workers in administration, marketing and information 
technology support, with a higher level of general human capital than those who work in 
the production sector.  Our results show that workers (cleaners, chef, drivers, and security 
guards) in the logistics section have an 81% higher chance of leaving than workers in the 
base group.  We suggest these workers, usually with lower general skills might be ready to 
switch jobs at any time.  Surprisingly, production officers present a significantly higher 
hazard (72% greater probability of leaving than that of the base group), ceteris paribus.  
These technicians are often key innovators; their high turnover is a serious problem for a 
manufacturer.  In addition, workers with tertiary education show a significantly higher 
separation rate, that is to say, 69% greater than the base group (workers only with primary 
schooling).  This provides evidence to support our Hypothesis 4.  Production line workers 
present a significantly higher probability of leaving, 60% higher than its control group. 
In Table 5.10, we attempt to investigate the impact of hukou reform in 2003 on employment 
duration, this dataset excludes workers who left, 717 workers with 720 records, before the 1 
May 2004.  The most noticeable difference is that the leaving hazard ratio between a local 
worker and a migrant worker has reduced dramatically from 83% (in Table 5.9) to 68%.  
Since our definition of local is Sunan area, this decreased ratio of leaving suggests that the 
                                                      
128
  There are more female workers of the age range 16-24 years old, but more male workers in the 
range 25-34 based on survey of rural migrant worker in Jiangsu in 2007, Jiangsu Statistics Bureau. 
Available from http://www.jssb.gov.cn/jstj/fxxx/tjfx/200808/t20080804_105700.htm  
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hukou reform has exerted greater impact on workers from adjacent areas, where residents 
already have a similar level of welfare (Section 1.2).  In addition, they have been in favour 
of receiving a more beneficial compensation package from the firm studied compared with 
migrant workers (see Section 4.6).  As far as our non-local employees are concerned, they 
are excluded from the local welfare system which is subject to one’s precious hukou 
category, and have been discriminated against by their employers.  The regional labour 
shortage since 2004 (See Section 5.3.2) has presented a higher opportunity costs for them to 
stay, therefore, the effect of hukou reform on migrant workers, if any, has been offset by 
changes of external labour market, as illustrated in Figure 5.4. 
Tenure Hazard ratio 
Guanxi 0.40 
Deferred Compensation Package 0.91 
Local hukou status 0.68 
Male worker 0.82 
Age (when start employment) 1.02 
Married 0.63 
Managerial position 0.37 
Recruited via informal channels 0.79 
Working department (excluded category: non-production section): 
Production line 1.55 
Production office 1.62 
Logistics section 1.97 
Education background (excluded category: primary schooling): 
Secondary schooling (10-12) 1.08 
Vocational schooling (12-13) 0.94 
Higher education (more than 13 years) 1.77 
 
Number of subjects 3,341 
Number of observations 3,643 
Log likelihood -11812.35 
Table 5.10: Duration Regression after Hukou Policy Change (P-W-P Model (time 
from entry)) 
The other remarkable change, in Table 5.10, is the impact of offering a deferred 
compensation package on tenure.  This reduces the probability of leaving only by 9% in 
Table 5.10, when compared to the result of 22% in Table 5.9.  We suggest the firm’s tactics 
to make minimum pension contribution, as analysed in Section 4.3, limits its incentive for 
high-income workers who usually are skilled workers.  Considering the lower average 
payment and the shortage of skilled labour in the private sector in this area, we argue that 
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capable workers will keep searching for a better paid job.  Therefore the effectiveness of 
the deferred compensation packages is reduced in this sub-dataset.  Apart from these 
differences, the empirical results in Table 5.10 still support our four hypotheses. 
5.6 Conclusions 
This chapter uses firm level data to investigate job separation patterns in a domestic 
privately-owned enterprise in China.  The empirical results show that workers with guanxi 
within the firm have half the probability of leaving of those without.  This confirms the 
benefits of social contacts in terms of producing or encouraging longer tenure.  Offering a 
deferred compensation package could reduce the probability of leaving by a quarter.  These 
results provide evidence that offering deferred rewards in this firm serve its purposes well 
in terms of reducing turnover. 
We also present evidence that migrant workers have a higher turnover at any time in 
comparison with its local counterparts.  We suggest they are more likely to be engaged in 
lower-paid jobs due to the potentially high turnover perceived by employers and shortage 
of good connections to acquire well-paid positions.   
In addition, we examine the impact of hukou reform in 2003 on tenure, empirical evidence 
shows that the amended policy reduced turnover among short-tenured workers.  However, 
it does not have an impact on longer tenured migrant workers.  On the one hand, we 
suggest that since the hukou reform does not change one’s welfare entitlement, which 
therefore limits its impact.  On the other hand, the shortage of migrant labour since 2004 in 
this region have stimulated job change activities, hence, the effect of hukou reform on 
tenure, if there is any, has been offset by the latter. 
We also find that skilled workers who no longer face the hukou barriers in Juangsu 
province always pose a significantly higher turnover (see Tables 5.6 and 5.7).  We argue 
that this is partially due to a lower average payment in the private sector in this area.  
Skilled workers have been underpaid in this firm with about 7% private return rate to an 
additional schooling compared with those with secondary schooling (in Chapter 4).  This is 
much lower than a 12% return rate reported by Qian and Smyth (2008).   
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The widely shortages of skilled workers in the private sector is still a focus in China in 
2010.  Thirteen Chinese newspapers historically launched a joint appeal for social reforms 
on hukou policy on 1 March 2010, in which they demand the right to migrate freely129.  As 
our research shows that elimination hukou title is far from enough, it is essential to separate 
welfare provision and hukou status.  In addition, we suggest that having few and 
insubstantial internal promotion opportunities in the private sector also contribute to the 
instability among skilled workers in this organization (detail see Section 4.4.2). 
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 Tania Branigan, Chinese Newspaper in Joint Call to End Curb on Migrant Workers, 2 March 
2010, The Guardian. 
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CHAPTER 6  
Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
6.1 Conclusions 
The unifying thread that runs through this thesis is an examination of the impact of 
institutions, such as hukou policy and guanxi, on labour markets and labour mobility in 
contemporary China.  This has two strands, the first of which is to investigate determinants 
of job offers in the graduate labour market.  We present evidence that graduates with non-
urban hukou status conducted a higher intensive job searching and received more offers, 
most importantly; they are more likely to accept an offer.  The key job acquisition channel 
for graduate job seekers is via institutional embeddedness, that is to say, supportive 
activities from higher education institutions. 
As we show in Section 1.1, in later 2008, the Chinese central government assured graduates 
that it would give top priority to graduate employment in 2009.  Following this statement, 
in January 2009, local government (apart from centrally administrated cities 130 ) was 
required to abolish the hukou constraint on non-State sector and small or medium 
enterprises when recruiting graduates131.  Given the review of hukou reform and this recent 
progression, the policy conclusion from our research, is to develop a flexible labour market 
by separating welfare from hukou status.  We argue this will reduce tangible and intangible 
benefits associated with a hukou of developed areas, thus reduce opportunity costs for 
graduates of accepting offers from less-developed areas.  Therefore, it will resolve the 
problem of graduate surplus in developed areas and shortage in less-developed areas.  This 
will essentially increase net graduate employment. 
In addition, for decades, universities had worked closely with enterprises in facilitating 
recruitment before the large scale job search among graduates occurred in 1997.  These 
organizational contacts make universities important in terms of helping graduate attain 
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  This includes Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing cities; presumably also includes two 
special administrative regions, namely Hong Kong and Macao. 
131
  “Abolishing Hukou Constraint on Graduate Employment (except centrally administrated 
Cities)”, People’s Daily, 23 January 2009. 
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employment.  This could be due to personal social contacts, guanxi, which are more likely 
to be strong in the place of graduates’ origin.  Most students in our sample are from rural 
areas but who, evidently, seek jobs in urban areas across the country; therefore, guanxi 
seems less effective in terms of employment obtainment.  However, once a job obtained via 
guanxi, graduates seems more likely to accept it. 
The second strand examines the compensation and labour mobility within settings of 
privately-owned organizations, using a case study of a typical domestic privately-owned 
textile company.  Empirical results show that when compared to migrant workers, those 
with local hukou status are better paid and are more likely to receive a deferred 
compensation package.  Workers with guanxi also receive a wage premium.  As a 
consequence, local workers and those with guanxi in the firm present a much lower 
propensity to leave.   
The resistance to allowing free labour mobility in China is based on such arguments that 
hukou and its interlocked welfare provision system had prevented poverty and crime in 
urban areas during industrialization132, which had been observed in this process in other 
countries, such as India and Mexico.  However, nearly 200 million transient populations in 
China indicate the failure of using hukou policy to block migrating.  This is mainly because 
that more employment opportunities are in urban areas (Liu et al., 2008).  With the 
increasing awareness of equality, it would be even difficult to maintain the system.  The 
fact that a magazine named Huji Guancha (Observation of hukou Registration System) was 
published in May 2009 by a group of lawyers and scholars who provided evidence of 
growing unease133.  It is specialized in tracking hukou reform and its relevant unfairness.  
The announcement in January in 2009 to remove the hukou constraint on graduate 
employment in large cities triggered national concern to bring hukou system to an end134.  
Empirical evidence from our research shows that elimination of the hukou system is not 
enough, the essential reform is to equalize the welfare entitlement.  This will increase 
                                                      
132
  “The Household Registration System will not be abolished, though Hukou on Migration will 
continue to be Relaxed”, The Ministry of Public Security, 25 February 2002, Xinhua News. 
133
  Li Jiang, “The Publishing of a Magazine Concerning Hukou Reform”, 2009, [Online; cited 20 
Sept 2009] Available from: http://crd-net.org/Article/Class71/200905/20090505220647_15265.html 
134
  Hong Hao, “How Far the Hukou System Could Go?” People’s Daily, 17 February 2009. 
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career prospects of migrant workers and encourage longer employment tenure in this textile 
company.  This is in line with some implications of findings from the construction industry 
(Jiang et al., 2008). 
Guanxi, personal connections, is one of the key practices in Confucian society.  However, it 
had been misconnected with unethical and illegal transactions in China.  We took a broad 
review of guanxi, and revealed its revival as social capitals in a more open and rule-based 
China.  Our empirical results from the second part of the thesis show that guanxi networks 
encourage longer tenure as well as reducing uncertainty in the process of a job match.  
Meanwhile, peer pressure from this network reduces shirking, and it could potentially 
increase productivity of both an individual and a firm. 
The thesis commences with a review of institutional progress in the labour market against 
the background of economic transition in China.  The modern graduate employment system 
was initiated in 1997.  However, graduates are still denied access to certain regional labour 
markets due to their hukou status because the labour market remains segmented between 
local residents and migrant workers.  Since the legalization of the private economy in 1978, 
there have been fundamental changes in policy towards private enterprise.  Nevertheless, 
even in 2009, private enterprise, though being the most important job creators in the 
country, still faces institutional constraints on financing and accessing to factor and product 
markets.  This would potentially have an influence on their business operation strategies.   
In Chapter 2, a review on existing literature on job search highlights that an individual’s 
financial situation not only affects the intensity of their job search, but it also influences on 
the formation of reservation wage, which therefore has a potential impact on their 
willingness of accepting an offer.  The examination of literature on internal labour market is 
summed up by Baker and Holmstrom (1995) having “too many theories, and too few facts”.  
This is particularly true in the Chinese labour market. 
In Chapter 3, our investigation of the existing empirical work on graduate job search in 
China reveals that job search effort has no effect on employment success, this in contrast to 
the well established evidence from developed counties (in Chapter 2).  Meanwhile, we 
expect that the welfare attached to hukou status would shape graduate search behaviour, 
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particularly, their willingness to accept an offer.  Based on a survey data, a count data 
model on the number of employers contacted present evidence that non-urban hukou 
holders carried a more intensive job search.  An upper-censored Poisson regression 
confirms that the more intensive search effort of a non-urban hukou holder is rewarded by a 
higher probability of receiving an offer.  This provides evidence that job search effort is 
rewarded in terms of receiving an offer in the graduate job market in China.  This is very 
important since it indicates that graduates could enhance their employability by searching 
harder.  A small amount of previous researches in this area has, for a variety of reasons, not 
provided a definitive answer on the effectiveness of search. 
The willingness of accepting an offer between different hukou statuses has been 
investigated by using a binary data model.  Empirical evidence shows that non-urban hukou 
holders are more likely to accept an offer.  The interpretation of this result is that the lower 
reservation wage of non-urban hukou holders, which is partly a consequence of their hukou 
status.  Further confirmation of the difference in reservation wage was supported by results 
from an interval regression of starting salary, in which we found that non-urban hukou 
holders, on average, accept significantly lower starting salaries, though there is no 
difference of expected earnings between these two groups.  This indicates that the increase 
of unemployment benefits in urban areas might have an inverse effect in terms of 
increasing employment among graduates. 
The determination of compensation within a private enterprise is the focus of Chapter 4.  
Based on salary information of 1,086 personnel records, we used both an OLS and an 
Instrument Variable model, results show that human capital, guanxi and position impact 
significantly on an individual’s remuneration.  This suggests that private owners, on 
average, appreciate skilled workers though the private return to higher education is lower.  
Guanxi can increase an individual’s earnings by passing on information about well-paid 
vacancy or by matching a job with recommendation. 
The probability of having or being a first-time recipient of a deferred compensation 
package has been examined by two binary data models.  We present empirical evidence that 
firm specific tenure is the decisive factor in terms of entitlement to the deferred 
compensation package.  This confirms that a stable workforce is desired by employers who 
Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research                                                                    Chapter 6 
  
 
 
135
utilised a compensation strategy to accomplish it, the strategy of offering deferred 
compensation package seems working well. 
However, workers with local hukou status receive a wage premium and have the privilege 
of having the deferred firm benefits.  We suggest that local workers are more likely to have 
a good quality of guanxi which gives them access to better paid jobs, and they are more 
likely to be perceived as stable in terms of lower rate of turnover.   
In Chapter 5, attention was turned to the job separation patterns of workers with different 
hukou status.  In general, migrant workers demonstrated a high turnover rate based on 
duration models estimated using both single and multiple employment-spell data.  This 
supports the findings in other empirical work (Knight and Yueh, 2004; Lu and Song, 2006).   
We are particularly interested in the employment termination patterns after one essential 
hukou reform in Jiangsu province in 2003, after which migrant workers would be granted a 
local hukou contingent on a legal residence and a regular income.  However, when taking a 
closer examination, we find that migrant workers remain excluded from the local welfare 
system, meanwhile, there has been a colossal labour shortage in this region; which has 
generated by reduction of labour supply alongside continuous manufacturing expansion (for 
more details see Section 5.3.2).  Our empirical evidence based on a sub-sample, only 
including observations one year after the hukou reform, shows that the job separation 
patterns between local and non-local workers has not changed much when compared it with 
the result estimated using the whole sample.  We suggest that migrant workers are 
discriminated against in terms of receiving remuneration and the deferred compensation 
package in the firm.  The positive effect of hukou reform on migrant job turnover within the 
firm, if there is any, has been offset by the high labour demand in this region.  Based on this, 
we suggest the fundament of hukou reform is needed in order to equalize welfare 
entitlement.  
6.2 Further research 
The shortage of migrant workers since 2004 in the developed areas of China was 
temporarily alleviated due to a fall in exports caused by the world recession which started 
in 2008.  With the economic recovery, a shortage of migrant workers recurred in Zhujiang 
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economic delta in September 2009135.  As we analysed in Chapter 4, this shortage partly 
attributes to the government policy aimed at reducing the income disparity between urban 
and rural areas.  More actions have gradually been taken to improve welfare in rural areas 
since the end of our study period, 2007.  Most recently, in August 2009, the Chinese Human 
Resources and Social Security Ministry disclosed a plan that in the future peasants would 
be able to claim a pension after reaching the age of 60136.  It is likely that this labour 
shortage will become a long-term problem 137 and consequently threaten the workforce 
stability of each firm.  Our research has revealed the effect of hukou reform on internal 
labour mobility in developed areas.  As hukou reform has been experimented with in 
several other less-developed provinces and cities (Section 1.2), further research is needed to 
take a broad view in order to fully understand labour mobility following reforms of welfare 
and hukou; which then will be able to provide information for making further policy  
related to hukou reform and welfare provision.    
Social capital, guanxi, is proved to have subtle influence on graduates’ job obtainment in 
Chapter 3.  This is in line with other empirical work (Zang, 2003; Zeng and Cui, 2008).  
However, in Chapter 4, we presented evidence that guanxi significantly increases an 
individual’s earnings.  This is in line with the well-established evidence that social contacts 
assist better employment in terms of tangible pay-offs, such as higher earnings as discussed 
in Chapter 2.  This indicates the importance of social capitals in facilitating to gain well-
paid jobs.  To be able to reveal a comprehensive influence of guanxi on employment among 
skilled workers in China, further research is needed to understand the way in which how 
employers distribute different types of vacancy and the role of social contacts in terms of 
passing on vacancy information in the internet age. 
Meanwhile, in Chapter 4, we present evidence that a tertiary education increases one’s 
earning by 30% compared with workers only having a primary schooling, ceteris paribus.  
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  “The Chinese Human Resources and Social Security Ministry: Peasants would Receive Pension 
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It is very likely that this return to education is partially from guanxi since most guanxi in 
our sample is formed via schooling.  Franzen and Hangartner (2006) show that jobs 
received by graduates through informal job-search channels in Sweden tend to be linked to 
their education degree and is linked to better career prospects.  However, the size of 
observations with guanxi in our sample is small, 177.  Further work is needed to investigate 
the influence of social contacts on earnings disparity using a large sample across a range of 
enterprises.   
Receiving education has been verified as important in reducing socioeconomic inequality in 
the long-run.  However, there is a growing concern that income disparity in the transitional 
economy in China is due to the high return to skilled workers (Wan, 2004; Wan and Zhang, 
2006; Goh et al., 2009).  Qian and Smyth (2008) even reported a 12% return rate to an 
additional year of schooling, using survey data collected in 2005.  Meanwhile a large 
number of researches have frequently reported that the private return to one extra years 
schooling is low, around 4%, see a review by Heckman (2005).  Some empirical work even 
shows the return rate is highest to primary education or un-skilled in China (Huang et al., 
2002).  All of the above empirical results are drawn from using aggregate or survey data.  
Evidence from our research supports a lower return to education: return rate to one extra 
year of schooling is 7% in comparison with secondary schooling.  This conflict requires 
further research with comprehensive investigations at the micro level, such as different 
types of industry and ownership of firms. 
  Epilogue 
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EPILOGUE 
 
On completion of this research, I am pleased to report that the problems resulting from 
hukou policy in China are now being taken seriously by policy-makers, as evidenced by a 
news editorial provided by the Economic Observer, an influential financial newspaper, and 
in 12 regional publications, on 1 March 2010 just before the Third Session of the 11th 
National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in 
Beijing.   The editorial urged the abolition of the hukou system.  In an online “chat” on 27 
February, 2010, Wen Jiabao, the Chinese premier, pledged reform of the policy.  According 
to political analysts, the proposals for reform probably have the blessing of Communist 
party officials. 
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Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
General information 
Hukou status 436 0.601 0.490 0 1 
Gender 436 0.761 0.427 0 1 
Communist party membership 436 0.390 0.488 0 1 
Household income in 1000 per annum 436 24.002 20.766 15 130 
Employability( at least receiving one 
offer) 436 0.787 0.410 0 1 
Rate of offer acceptance 436 0.713 0.453 0 1 
Academic profile 
Succeeded in Degree 436 0.881 0.324 0 1 
Number of employers contacted 436 9.144 9.816 0 60 
Passed College English Test Band 4 436 0.511 0.500 0 1 
Passed College English Test Band 6 436 0.328 0.470 0 1 
Average grade achievement 436 77.557 7.711 50 93 
Major in 
Social sciences 436 0.422 0.494 0 1 
Nature sciences 436 0.528 0.500 0 1 
Agriculture 436 0.050 0.219 0 1 
Job search behaviour 
Number of different search methods used 436 3.023 1.573 1 9 
Different Vacancy information channel used 
From University 436 0.523 0.500 0 1 
From websites 436 0.291 0.455 0 1 
From traditional media 436 0.028 0.164 0 1 
From social contacts 436 0.154 0.361 0 1 
From others 436 0.005 0.068 0 1 
Different Job search methods used 
Attending regional job fairs 436 0.271 0.445 0 1 
Institutional embeddedness 436 0.564 0.496 0 1 
Social contacts 436 0.099 0.298 0 1 
Via websites 436 0.046 0.209 0 1 
Other methods 436 0.021 0.142 0 1 
Any labour market experience 436 0.885 0.319 0 1 
 
Expected annual income in ¥1,000 436 30.810 7.873 17 55 
Actual company size in number of 
employee 298 735.000 610.169 5 1500 
Actual annual income in ¥1,000 299 23.007 11.565 12 70 
Table A1 (1): Summary of Statistics of the Dataset Used in Chapter 3                             
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Variables Number percent Accumulated percent 
Value 
taking
Preparation for interview  
without preparation 21 4.82 4.82 1 
pay a little attention to dress 37 8.49 13.3 2 
learn something about the aim company 130 29.82 43.12 3 
pay attention to the aim company 218 50 93.12 4 
learn a lot the aim company, its industry 30 6.88 100 5 
Expected work place  
Beijing, or Shanghai, or Shenzhen 111 25.46 25.46 1 
Capital city of each province or big city in coast 
areas 
224 51.38 76.83 2 
Medium/small city in coast/east area 50 11.47 88.3 3 
Medium/small city in middle area 13 2.98 91.28 4 
Medium/small city in west area 12 2.75 94.04 5 
Other 26 5.96 100 6 
Value of the importance of CV  
not at all 62 14.22 14.22 1 
a little influence 187 42.89 57.11 2 
obvious influence 106 24.31 81.42 3 
important influence 65 14.91 96.33 4 
crucial influence 16 3.67 100 5 
Table A1 (2): Some of 5-point Likert Scale Variables used in Chapter 3 
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  Appendix 1 (3): Upper-censored Poisson distribution used in Chapter 3 
 
Let Yi* be the true count for respondent i, and let Yi be the censored counterpart.  The 
censoring of the variable is such that: 
( )* * 3 13 * 3
<
=  ≥
i i
i
i
Y if Y
Y
if Y  
The probability of each possible occurrence is given by:  
[ ] ( )
[ ] ( )
2
Pr 0,1, 2 2
!
Pr 3 1 3
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λ λ
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where ( )expλ β′=i ix is the Poisson mean, xi is a vector of explanatory variables relevant to 
the number of offers received, and β is a corresponding vector of parameters to be 
estimated. 
Let yi be the sample realisation of the random variable Yi.  Further, we let di be a censoring 
indicator, defined such that: 
0 3
1 3
<
= 
=
i
i
i
if y
d
if y  
The sample log-likelihood can then be written: 
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2
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The log-likelihood function presented in (4) has been programmed using the ML routine in 
STATA in order to estimate the model.  The programme is now written. 
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Programme for Upper-censored Poisson distribution used in Chapter 3 
 
Program define cpoisson 
Version 6 
args lnf xb 
tempvar p1 p2 lam 
quietly gen double `lam' = exp(`xb') 
quietly gen double `p1'=exp(-`lam')*(`lam'^y)/exp(lnfact(y)) 
quietly gen double `p2'=1-exp(-`lam')-exp(-`lam')*`lam'-exp(-`lam')*`lam'^2/2 
quietly replace `lnf'=ln(`p1') if y <3 
quietly replace `lnf'=ln(`p2') if y= =3 
end 
ml model lf cpoisson (offer=independent variables) 
ml maximize 
Where lam means lambda, y is the number of offers received 
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Survey Questionnaire  
GRADUATES’ JOB SEARCH AND OUTCOMES 
毕业生求职行为及其结果调查 
This survey is about graduate job hunting from            (University) 
The aim is to find out: 
 
1. Factors influencing students’ job hunting behaviour and outcomes. 
2. Job search methods used and their outcome. 
 
Why is this survey being carried out? 
The aim of the survey is to provide information which can be used to improve the teaching 
and student service throughout this university and, in particular, to make sure that training 
and services are relevant to students’ employment and career development. 
 
Who will take part in the Survey? 
Students who will graduate from this university in June 2005 and go to search a position (so 
those who will further their study, going abroad or voluntarily unemployed for some time 
don’t need to fill in) 
 
Who is running the Survey? 
The survey is being carried out by the Career Centre of                          (University) 
 
We assure you that your replies will be used only for this research project. The results will 
be published in such a way that identification of individual persons is impossible.  
 
 
 
 
 
If you wish, we will send you a summary of the most important results 
 
Thank you very much for your kind support. 
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How to fill in this questionnaire? 
 
1． The questionnaire will take 20 minutes. 
2． If you have definite job, you will fill in Section 1, 2, 3 and 6; if you are still seeking 
for job, you will fill in Section 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6; if you will be self-employed, you 
will fill in Section 1, 2, 5 and 6. 
3． Please circle a proper one from choices (Unless otherwise requested). 
4． Use a pen. 
5． Please follow instructions to skip questions that are not relevant to you. 
6． Where exact information is not known, please provide your best estimate. 
7． In some questions we have employed answer scales from 1 to 5. 
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Section One   about Yourself 
1 What is your gender?   A.  Female   B. Male  
 
2. Are you a member of the Communist Party?  A. Yes    B. No 
 
3. In which province were you born?             
 
4. Where are you from?  A. rural area   B. small or medium city      
   C. capital or centrally  administrated city 
 
5. Could you estimate your family annual income? 
 
A. Less than ¥20,000.  
B.  ¥20,000-¥40,000. 
C.  ¥40,000-¥70,000. 
D.  ¥70,000-¥100,000. 
E.  More than ¥100,000. 
 
6. What do you think about your appearance?    Please circle one from  1  2  3  4  5 
 
 (1. Not handsome\not pretty;   3. Very plain;  5. Very handsome\pretty) 
 
7. What is your current employment status? 
 
A.  you have signed a contract. 
B. you have a definite work situation whilst waiting for a signed contract. 
C. you have decided on self employment. 
D. you have had an offer which you are unwilling to accept. 
E. you have not had any offer yet. 
F. you are waiting for the final decision. 
 
8.  Your email address                      (if you wish to see some important results of the 
survey.） 
 
Section Two Your Education 
 
9. What is your major? (Please, provide information about all higher education courses you 
have ever taken (If you changed the school, the field of study or if you took more than one 
degree, please fill in more than one row) 
 
First major in                   Name of institution and school                               
Degree earned: BA    BS     No degree 
 
Second major in                 Name of institution and school    
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Degree earned：BA   BS   No degree      
 
10. What is your class of grade? 
 
A. Average result is more than 91. 
B. Average result is among 86-90. 
C. Average result is among 81-85.  
D. Average result is among 71-80. 
E. Average result is among 61-70. 
F. Average result is less than 60. 
 
11. How well do you use English? (Including reading, writing, speaking, and listening) 
 
A. Pass CET-6 and get A.         
B. Pass CET-6. 
C. Pass CET-4 and get A. 
D. Pass CET-4. 
E. Other. 
 
12. How do you rate your expertise in selected software areas at the time of graduation? 
  
  1. No expertise at all. 
  2. Know a little.   
  3. Could use most basic function. 
  4. Familiar with. 
  5. Very familiar and could use advanced skill.                                                          
                                             
A. Word Processing                         1    2    3    4    5 
B. Office Automation including (Excel, PowerPoint etc.）      1    2    3    4    5 
C. Programming language     1    2    3    4    5 
D. Dataset management      1    2    3    4    5 
E. Subject-related software     1    2    3    4    5 
 (E.g. CAD for engineering, SPSS for social science) 
 
13. Did you have any kind of part-time job during your study? 
 
Note: A job means any type of work including casual, temporary or part-time work, if 
it was more than two weeks 
 
A. Yes, I worked for profit using my field knowledge. 
B. Yes, I worked for profit using knowledge unrelated to my field. 
C. Yes, unpaid work in a family business. 
D. Yes, other unpaid work as a volunteer.  
E. No, I haven’t had any job. 
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14. How do you rate your personality in these aspects? 
 
                     Rare below average  above    strong  
A.  Ambition  1 2 3 4 5 
B.  Responsibility 1 2 3 4 5 
C.  Honesty  1 2 3 4 5 
D.  Dedication  1 2 3 4 5 
E.  Persistence  1 2 3 4 5 
F.  Flexibility  1 2 3 4 5 
 
Section Three Your Job Hunting 
15. How much do you expect to earn per annual? 
 
A. ¥15,000－¥20,000 
B. ¥20,001－¥30,000 
C. ¥30,001－¥50,000 
D.  More than ¥50,001 
 
16. Where is your preferred work place? 
 
A. Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen. 
B. Capital city and medium city in coastal area. 
C. Big city in middle and west. 
D. Medium or small city. 
E. Other e.g.                  
 
17. What is your preferred company type? 
 
A. Foreign company or Joint venture. 
B. Sate-owned Company. 
C. Institution. 
D. Private companies. 
E. Government or public sectors. 
F.  Other e.g.                
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18. How do you obtain information of vacancies? Multiple choices 
 
A. From the career centre and its website of my institute. 
B. From website of the provincial and other public employment agency. 
C. From other commercial employment websites (e.g.51website, Zhilian website, etc.). 
D. From other people (e.g. parent，relative，friend). 
E. From other media. 
F. Other (please specify)                                
 
19. Which information collecting channel is the most important one for you (at least lead to 
an offer)? Please fill in the item number (A-F) from question 4. The most important 
information channel is                    
 
20. How did you try to hunt for a job? Multiple choices 
  
A. Go to local job fairs.  
B. Go to job fairs in universities.  
C. Go to local job fairs in expected work places.  
D. Release a CV on website of university career centre. 
E. Release a CV on commercial websites.  
F. Introduction by teachers. 
G. Rely on relationship built while studying. 
H. Rely on social capital such as parents, friends and relatives.  
I. Other methods (please specified)                       
 
21. Which channel was the most important one for you (generate an offer)? Please fill in the 
item number (A-I) from question 6, Most important method is         
 
22. How many employers have you contacted (e.g. by CV)?  
      Approximate number   
 
23. To what extent, did you experience the following difficulties in your job search? 
            1. Not at all 
 2. A little 
 3. Obvious influence 
   4. Important influence 
 5. Decisive influence 
 
A. Few suitable jobs  1 2 3 4 5 
B. Work experience  1 2 3 4 5 
C. Job-seeking skill  1 2 3 4 5 
D. Graduate qualification 1 2 3 4 5 
E. Degree too general  1 2 3 4 5 
F. Degree too specialized 1 2 3 4 5 
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G. Imperfect information 1 2 3 4 5 
H. Others (please specify)                                             
24. How many interviews have you attended?                  
 
25. How ready you are before you are going to an interview?  A  B  C  D  E 
 
   A. Go without preparation. 
   B. Pay a little attention to your dress.  
   C. Learn something about this company. 
   D. Pay much attention to the company and your dress. 
   E. Learn a lot about the company before go to the interview. 
 
26. How important, do you think the following are influencing on success in getting a job?  
            1. Not at all 
 2. A little 
 3. Obvious influence 
   4. Important influence 
 5. Decisive  
 
A. Field of study    1 2  3  4 5 
B. Main subjects\ specialisation  1 2  3  4 5 
C. Academic record    1 2  3  4 5 
D. Acquired work experience during study 1 2  3  4 5 
E.  Reputation of institution   1 2  3  4 5 
F.  Foreign language proficiency  1 2  3  4 5 
G. Computer skills    1 2  3  4 5 
H. Recommend from other people  1 2  3  4 5 
I. Communist membership   1 2  3  4 5 
J. Recommendation/reference   1 2  3  4 5 
K. Personality     1 2  3  4 5 
L. Gender, appearance etc.   1 2  3  4 5 
M. Other（please specify）：                                                            
  
27. How important, do you think the following are influencing on the decision to accept an 
offer?  
A. Salary    1 2  3 4 5 
B. Welfare    1 2  3 4 5 
C. Work place    1 2  3 4 5 
D. With a hukou quota  1 2  3 4 5 
E. Field relate with your study  1 2  3 4 5 
F. Situation of enterprise   1 2  3 4 5 
   (its type, fame, industry) 
G. Promotion opportunities  1 2  3 4 5 
H. Parents’ attitude   1 2  3 4 5 
I. Marital consideration   1 2   3 4 5 
(where your partner will go) 
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J. Other (please specify)        
    
28. When you hunt for a job, how you rate the number of companies asked for work 
experience account for the total company number you contacted with? 
A. More than 91%  
B. 71%－90% 
C. 51%－70% 
D. 31%－50% 
E. Less than 30% 
 
 
29. When you were hunting for a job, have you ever experienced gender discrimination? 
Yes, how do you rate the number of company account for the total company’s number 
which you are expected to apply for? 
  
A. More than 91%                                   
B. 71%―90％ 
C. 51%－70% 
D. 31%—50% 
E.  Less than 30% 
 
30. How do you rate the importance of the following factors in the probability of a female 
obtaining an expected job? 
 1. Not at all 
 2. A little 
 3. Obvious influence 
   4. Important influence 
 5. Decisive influence 
                                        
A.  Appearance and body figure  1 2 3 4 5 
B.  Family background   1 2 3 4 5 
C.  Wide field related horizon  1 2 3 4 5 
D.  Fort (foreign language proficiency, other awards) 
      1 2 3 4 5 
E.  Excellent communication skill and organization capability  
      1 2 3 4 5 
F. Other（please specify）                                                           
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31. How do you rate these factors for hunting for a job? 
                    
 1. Not at all 
 2. A little 
 3. Obvious influence 
   4. Important influence 
 5. Decisive influence  
A. Innovative   1 2 3 4 5 
B. Managerial capabilities 1 2 3 4 5 
C. Team-working   1 2 3 4 5 
D. Problem solving  1 2 3 4 5 
E. Self study   1 2 3 4 5 
F. Communication  1 2 3 4 5 
G. Other (please specify)                       
   
32. How successful do you think that your degree course has been in developing each of the 
following attributes? 
 1. Very unsuccessful  
 2. Unsuccessful 
 3. OK  
   4. Successful  
 5. Very successful  
         
A. Innovative   1 2    3  4 5 
B. Managerial capabilities 1 2    3  4 5 
C. Team-working   1 2    3  4 5 
D. Problem solving  1 2    3  4 5 
E. Self study   1 2    3  4 5  
F. Communication  1 2    3  4 5 
G. Other (please specify)                                           
 
33.  How many offers have you received? 
A.   None 
B. 1  
C. 2 
D. 3 or more  
 
34. Which type of company will you work for? 
 
A. State-owned enterprises. 
B. Collectively-owner enterprise. 
C. Domestic privately-owned enterprsies. 
D. Foreign and join venture. 
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E. Government or public sector. 
F. Other such as                   
 
35. What is your position? What is your job title?                 
 
36. How many people work for your employer/ business in total (including those reported 
in D10)? Include: All staff in all locations e.g. workers in offices and factories, drivers, etc. 
A. Less than 10 people 
B. 10-99 people 
C. 101-500people 
D. 501-1000 
E.  1001 or more people 
 
37. How much will you earn per annum？ 
 
A. Less than ¥15,000 
B. ¥15,001－¥20,000 
C. ¥20,001－¥30,000 
D. ¥30,001－¥50,000 
E. More than ¥50,001 
 
Section Four  for Those Who Are Still Searching for A Job 
38. If you have not got definite your work unit, because of   
 
A. You have an offer, but the salary is less than what you expected. 
B. You have got an offer, but you are not satisfied with the work place.  
C. You got offer, but the company couldn’t help you solve your registry. 
D. You got an offer, but your partner couldn’t get a job at the same area. 
E. You got an offer, but your work will be unrelated with what you learned. 
F. You have not got an offer because of your own problems. 
G.  You have not got an offer because bad performance in interviews. 
H.  You have not got an offer because of some other reasons.                                      
 
39. Will you consider accepting the following types of job?   
 
A. Comparative high salary, but not stable e.g. website maintainer, short message 
 writer etc in a big city. 
B. Comparative high salary, unstable job in medium and small city in east or costal 
 areas. 
C. Medium salary, stable job in medium and small city in central or west areas. 
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D. Going to the West, good potential opportunity while hard working  environment.  
E. Part time job related with the field you study in a big city.  
F. Any kind of Part time job in a big city. 
G. Others please specify          
                           
40. For those engaged in part time job, what is your attitude? 
1.Strongly disagree. 
2.Disagree. 
3.Neutrally. 
4.Agree. 
5.Strongly agree. 
                                         
A.  Embarrassment but still willing to accept  1 2 3 4 5 
B.  Worry about conflicts of labour relationship issue1 2 3 4 5 
C.  It will influence on accessing to a better job later 1 2 3 4 5 
D.  It couldn’t be taken by a graduate   1 2 3 4 5 
E.  It will be helpful to gain work experience. 1 2 3 4 5 
F.  Other (please specify)                       
 
Section Five  for Those Are Going to Be Self-employed   
41. The reason for decision to be self-employed is 
 
A. Personal interest. 
B. Severe competition in job hunting 
C. Continue your business which was built during your course study. 
D. Family influence.  
E.  Others (please specify)         
 
42.   When being self-employed, the degree of difficulty in terms of?  
      
A.  Inaccessible to enough capital        1   2 3 4 5 
B.   Little preferential policy (less to be carried out) 1   2 3 4 5 
C.   Limitation from non-local population registry 1   2 3 4          5 
D.   Support from family (finance or emotion)  1   2 3 4 5 
E.   Short of skills.      1   2 3 4 5 
F.   Others                                      
 
43. Which of the following characteristics are applicable to you? (Multiple reply possible) 
A.  I am serving a single contractor. 
B. I took over an existing firm/office etc. 
C. I established a new firm/office etc. 
D. I am working at home. 
E. I have a partnership with friends/relatives. 
F. I have no employees.  
G. other（please specify）                
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Section Six University Career Centre 
44. To what extent, do you satisfy the work done by career centre? 
                                        
1.Strongly disagree 
2.Disagree 
3.Neutrally 
4.Agree 
5.Strongly agree 
 
A. Organizing high institution talent market  1 2 3 4 5 
B. Release position information timely    1 2 3 4 5 
C. Guide work (CV writing etc.)               1 2 3 4 5 
D. Enough staff to assistant graduates            1 2 3 4 5 
E. Staff provide professional service              1 2 3 4 5 
F. Staff are patient and dedicated             1 2 3 4 5 
G. Enough career service (professional consulting)  1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
Do you have any suggestion to improve service provided by the Career Centre?     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
End of questionnaire 
 
 
Thank You 
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 High income 
(¥) 
Middle 
income 
(¥) 
Low 
income 
(¥) 
Individual monthly salary in 1996 2000 600 300 
Base of Personal premium (the local standard 
is ¥550 per month) in 1997 
1650 600 330 
Firm contribution (21%) 346.5 126 69.3 
Personal contribution (7%)  115 42 23 
Annual interest rate % (5 years fixed) 138  3.87 3.87 3.87 
Amount in personal pension account (11 % of 
base personal premium)139 (Pa) 
181.5 66 33 
Previous year average monthly payment when 
retire140 in 2012 (Sa) 
3200 3200 3200 
Real Monthly revenue from the personal 
pension account after 15 years premium 141 
1138.7 414 227.7 
Monthly Pension142 (Pm) 1776 1051.8 865.5 
Table A2: Pension Comparison among High, Middle and Low Income Groups 
 (Results used in Section 4.3.2) 
 
The above calculation are based on the 1996 pension scheme, Sa is defined to be the average 
monthly salary in the region of the year before a worker retires; k is the proportion of earning 
allocated to the personal pension account, E0 is individual pension base payment, T is the total 
deposit period (180 months, in our case), g is the annual real wage growth rate143, r the bank’s 
annual interest rate, if following that, the monthly pension of three groups in the first 10 years after 
retirement can be calculated by equation 1 using continuous compound interest, or equation 2 using 
discrete compound interest. Equation 1 is a theoretical calculation; its value is greater than that of 
equation 2. 
 
                                                      
138
  This is referred to 5-year fixed interest rate of the central bank from 1997 to 2005. 
139
  On the condition that the firm and the individual paid required premiums.  Many firms do not 
fulfil their duties 
140
  Using 2005 as base year, this amount is predicted by real wage growth rate, 14% (deducted from 
the local standard was increased from ¥550 in 1997 to ¥1,800 in 2006).  The high wage growth 
rate is criticized by overestimating; it is expected to be much lower while including the private 
sector, where average  wage was reported just 55% of that of urban workers, published by Jiangsu 
Province Statistical Bureau based on a survey of 3,039 private firms in Changzhou area in 2007, 
[Online; cited March 2009;] Available from URL: http://www.cztjj.gov.cn/node/TongjiFenxi/2007-
5/24/17_39_06_450.html 
141
  This has been adjusted by 2% local inflation rate. 
142
  Calculation is based on equation 2. 
143
  Based on Jiangsu Province Statistic Year Book 2000-2007, the average annual wage growth rate 
is 14%, the inflation is 2%, and therefore the real wage growth rate is 12%. 
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*The above table is based on 1996 pension scheme due to our study period is from February 1994 
to Jan 2007.  Following further reform, the 2007 pension scheme took effect in October 2007.  The 
most important change of the new scheme is that firm contribution only goes to the basic account; 
individual contribution which was mandatorily increased to 8% goes to the individual account.  
This new scheme takes real wage growth rate into account.  
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Tenure Coef. (Std. Err.) 
Constant 3.64***(0.22) 
Guanxi  0.88***(0.15) 
Deferred Compensation Package 0.25**(0.10) 
Male workers 0.25***(0.06) 
Age when start employment -0.02***(0.00) 
Married workers 0.48***(0.06) 
Managerial position 1.13***(0.16) 
Recruited via informal channels 0.36***(0.14) 
Local hukou status 0.18**(0.08) 
Working department (excluded category: administration and sales staff): 
Production line -0.49***(0.12) 
Production office -0.61***(0.13) 
Logistics section -0.65***(0.16) 
Educational background (excluded category: primary schooling): 
Secondary schooling  -0.11(0.07) 
Vocational schooling  0.03(0.14) 
Higher education  -0.55***(0.18) 
  
k 0.48 (0.08) 
δ
 
1.35 (0.04) 
  
Number of subjects 4,033 
Number of observations 4,299 
Log likelihood -5353.47 
Note:*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01  
Table A3: Gamma Distribution of Single Employment Spell Data 
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List of Acronyms Used in the Thesis 
 
CTR, Certificate of Temporary Residence (zanzhuzheng) 
CCP, China Communist Party 
DPOE, Domestic Privately-Owned Enterprise 
TVP, Township, Village and Private Enterprise 
SARS, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
CUG, China University of Geosciences 
DCP, Deferred Compensation Package 
PWP, Prentice et al., 1981 
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